Case Reviews
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Oregon Appellate Court 07-27-11
by: Abassos • July 26, 2011 • no comments
Oregon Appellate Court 07-20-11by: Abassos • July 19, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
Oregon Appellate Court 07-13-11by: Abassos • July 12, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
U.S. Supreme Court 07-07-11by: Abassos • July 6, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
The Supreme Court reiterated today that the credibility of witnesses offering hearsay statements should not be taken into account when evaluating "trustworthiness" under the hearsay exceptions. Rather, the correct inquiry is into the trustworthiness of the statement. Further, the court held that federal due process requires the trial court to admit hearsay statements against penal interest even when the declarant testifies. The case involves consolidated appeals of two co-defendants convicted of murdering a woman during a robbery. The defendants attempted to admit hearsay statements of a person who confessed to the murder to four different people on four separate occasions. One defendant argued that the statements against penal interest exception applied, while the other argued the residual hearsay exception applied. The trial court refused to admit the statements, reasoning that the witnesses were completely incredible and even if they were, the penal interest exception only applies when the declarant is unavailable. The Court of Appeals below and the Supreme Court disagreed on the question of trustworthiness, since the trial court had made a credibility determination that should be left for the jury. Rather, there were substantial facts making the statements trustworthy:
Citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 US 284 (1973), the court further held that federal due process requires the admission of the statements at issue, despite the fact that they do not strictly fit under the statement against penal interest hearsay exception in the OEC. For the defendant who argued that the residual hearsay exception applied, the court disagreed, reaffirming that statements that fit under an exception but do not meet its requirements cannot be admitted through the residual exception instead. However, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that the error here was plain and reversed both judgments. State v. Cazares-Mendez/Reyes-Sanchez
Oregon Supreme Court 06-30-11by: Abassos • June 29, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
Oregon Appellate Court 06-29-11by: Abassos • June 28, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
U.S. Supreme Court 06-27-11by: Grapkoch • June 26, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
In a per curiam disposition available here (scroll to the bottom), the Court vacates the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Juvenile Male on mootness grounds. Although the Ninth Circuit had concluded that the SORNA provision requiring registration of juvenile offenders was unconstitutional on ex post facto grounds, [a]t the time of the Ninth Circuit's decision in this case, the District Court's order of juvenile supervision had expired, and respondent was no longer subject to the sex offender-registration conditions that he sought to challenge on appeal .As a result, respondent's challenge was moot before the Ninth Circuit unless he could "show that a decision invalidating" the District Court's order would likely redress some collateral consequence of the registration conditions. This result was prompted, in large part, by the Montana Supreme Court's certification that JM's continuing duty to register under state law was not contingent upon the continuing validity of the SORNA requirements. United States v. Juvenile Male
U.S. Supreme Court 06-23-11by: Grapkoch • June 22, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
In Freeman v. United States, the Court addressed whether a defendant is ineligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which allows a district court to reduce a term of imprisonment after it has been imposed if the defendant was sentenced based on a sentencing range that the U.S. Sentencing Commission subsequently lowered, because the district court accepted a plea agreement pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C), which binds the district court as to sentence once it accepts the plea. In a plurality opinion, supplemented by Justice Sotomayor's concurrence, the Court answers yes. I'll let you sort out the more technical distinctions between the plurality and the controlling concurrence, but Justice Sotomayor agrees with the plurality on the pivotal principle that the sentence at issue here was "based on" § 3582(c)(2). The key distinction is that Justice Sotomayor appears to believe this to be the case only when "a [Fed.R.Crim.P 11(c)(1)(C)] agreement expressly uses a Guidelines sentencing range applicable to the charged offense to establish the term of imprisonment, and that range is subsequently lowered by the United States Sentencing Commission." The dissent agrees and disagrees with both the plurality and the concurrence. In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor had initially opined that "[i]n my view, the term of imprisonment imposed by a district court pursuant to an agreement authorized by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) is 'based on' the agreement itself, not on the judge's calculation of the Sentencing Guidelines." The dissent believes that she got it right, and should have stopped there: I agree with the concurrence that the sentence imposed under a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement is based on the agreement, not the Sentencing Guidelines. I would, however, adhere to that logic regardless whether the agreement could be said to 'use' or 'employ' a Guidelines range in arriving at the particular sentence specified in the agreement. In that respect I agree with the plurality that the approach of the concurrence to determining when a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) sentence may be reduced is arbitrary and unworkable That appears to be the crux of the argument between the opinions in this case. So, as noted above, for now I'll leave you with the task of sorting out the more particular details. More information on Freeman v. United States can be found at the SCOTUSblog case page, available here.
Oregon Appellate Court 06-22-11by: Abassos • June 21, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
U.S. Supreme Court 06-20-11by: Grapkoch • June 19, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
In Turner v. Rogers, the defendant sought review from the Supreme Court on the issue as to whether an indigent defendant has a constitutional right to appointed counsel at a civil contempt proceeding that results in his incarceration. At issue here was whether a non-custodial parent who was charged with failing to meet child support obligations must be provided with counsel where his ability to pay is contested. The Court answers yes-at least, maybe yes, under the right circumstances: We conclude that where as here the custodial parent (entitled to receive the support) is unrepresented by counsel, the State need not provide counsel to the noncustodial parent (required to provide the support). But we attach an important caveat, namely, that the State must nonetheless have in place alternative procedures that assure a fundamentally fair determination of the critical incarceration-related question, whether the supporting parent is able to comply with the support order. The Court begins by noting that this case is not governed by the Sixth Amendment. "[T]he Sixth Amendment does not govern civil cases. Civil contempt differs from criminal contempt in that it seeks only to 'coerce the defendant to do' what a courthad previously ordered him to do." Instead, the Court proceeds under a Fourteenth Amendment analysis while noting that this limited Due Process right only assures that fundamental safeguards are in place. Applying the three-part test of Mathews v. Eldridge to address this fundamental safeguards inquiry, the Court ultimately rejects a categorical rule requiring appointed counsel in all such circumstances for three reasons:
Reviewing this decision, it is important to keep in mind the Court's overriding caveat. In fact, the majority repeatedly stresses that its refusal to craft a categorical rule is not dispositive: We consequently hold that the Due Process Clause does not automatically require the provision of counsel at civil contempt proceedings to an indigent individual who is subject to a child support order, even if that individual faces incarceration (for up to a year). In particular, that Clause does not require the provision of counsel where the opposing parent or other custodian (to whom support funds are owed) is not represented by counsel and the State provides alternative procedural safeguards equivalent to those we have mentioned. (Emphasis in original). Accordingly, the Court reverses and remands this case on a finding of constitutional error because Turner was neither represented by counsel nor afforded the procedural safeguards required by due process. More information on Turner v. Rogers can be found via the SCOTUSblog case page, available here. Turner v. Rogers
U.S. Supreme Court 06-16-11by: Grapkoch • June 15, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
This morning, the Court announced its decision on whether to apply the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule when police conduct a search in compliance with binding precedent that is later overruled. In refusing to do so, the Court explained that "[b]ecause suppression would do nothing to deter police misconduct in these circumstances, and because it would come at a high cost to both the truth and the public safety, we hold that searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule." In arriving at this conclusion, the majority explicitly rejects the proposition that the exclusionary rule is "a self-executing mandate implicit in the FourthAmendment itself." Instead, the Court reiterates the need to engage in "a more rigorous weighing" of "costs and deterrence benefits" of the rule, with a particularly sharp eye towards "the 'flagrancy of the police misconduct' at issue." Under this test, "[p]olice practices trigger the harsh sanction of exclusion only when they are deliberate enough to yield 'meaningful' deterrence, and culpable enough to be 'worth the price paid by the justice system.'" Applying the foregoing test, the Court notes that because the appellate precedent at issue here actually authorized a certain police practice, "all agree that the officers' conduct [at issue here] was in strict compliance with then-binding Circuit law and was not culpable in any way." In fact, the "officers who conducted the search did not violate Davis's Fourth Amendment rights deliberately, recklessly, or with gross negligence .Nor does this case involve any 'recurring or systemic negligence' on the part of law enforcement .The police acted instrict compliance with binding Circuit precedent." (Citations omitted). Therefore, there was no basis for concluding that the deterrent value of the rule exceeded its social costs. Along the way to this conclusion, the Court rejects two very notable arguments (both were advocated by Davis and adopted by the dissent):
More information on Davis v. United States can be found at the SCOTUSblog case page, available here.
Oregon Appellate Court 06-15-11by: Abassos • June 14, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
U.S. Supreme Court 06-13-11by: Grapkoch • June 12, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
I skipped the updates last Thursday morning, as I was out of town. Two opinions were issued, although both involved the construction of federal statutes. So, in case you missed the June 9th opinions and you're still interested at this point, here's a recap: → read the full summaries...Oregon Appellate Court 06-08-11by: Abassos • June 7, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
Possession of child pornography is not sufficient in itself for a finding of child endangerment. The state did not make a sufficient showing that a threat of exposure to pornographic images is harmful enough to children to justify a finding of endangerment. In addition, the mere fact that the father possessed images of child pornography was not enough by itself to show that the father posed a harm to his children. In the Matter of T.F.
U.S. Supreme Court 06-06-11by: Grapkoch • June 5, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
In a fairly exciting development, the Supreme Court announced today that is was accepting certiorari in the case of Martinez v. Ryan, which asks whether a defendant in a state criminal case who is prohibited by state law from raising on direct appeal any claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, but who has a state-law right to raise such a claim in a first post-conviction proceeding, has a federal constitutional right to effective assistance of first post-conviction counsel specifically with respect to his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. In the opinion below, the Ninth Circuit answered in the negative: "We have already concluded that there is no right to the assistance of post-conviction counsel in connection with a state petition for post-conviction relief, such as Martinez asserts in this case. Without a right to the appointment of counsel, there can be no right to the effective assistance of counsel." So, next term we'll likely get a chance to see if the Supremes agree with that proposition. More information can be found at the SCOTUSblog case page, available here.
Oregon Appellate Court 06-01-11by: Abassos • May 31, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
U.S. Supreme Court 05-31-11by: Grapkoch • May 30, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
The Court handed down an opinion today in Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, which asked whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits an officer from executing a valid material witness warrant (18 U.S.C. § 3144) with the subjective intent of conducting further investigation or preventively detaining the subject. Al-Kidd had argued that the Fourth Amendment was violated because the AG used material witness warrants as a pretext to detain suspects for whom he did not have probable cause to arrest. However, the Court holds that "an objectively reasonable arrest and detention of a material witness pursuant to a validly obtained warrant cannot be challenged as unconstitutional on the basis of allegations that the arresting authority had an improper motive." In reaching this conclusion, the Court explains that this case does not fall into any of the exceptions to the general rule that subjective motivations are irrelevant primarily because the judicial warrant at issue was based on "individualized suspicion." After first clarifying that "suspicion" is not limited to a belief "that the person suspected has engaged in wrongdoing"-but rather connotes a belief as to any connection with a crime- the Court explains that this case does not fall within the contours of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (prohibiting suspicionless, programmatic searches based solely a general interest in crime control). That is so because it was not the absence of probable cause that triggered Edmonds invalidating-purpose inquiry, but the checkpoints' failure to be based on "individualized suspicion." Furthermore, neither the "special needs" nor the "administrative inspection" exceptions to the Fourth Amendment subjective motivation-rule apply to this case "[b]ecause those exceptions do not apply where the officer's purpose is not to attend to the special needs or to the investigation for which the administrative inspection is justified .The Government seeks to justify the present arrest on the basis of a properly issued judicial warrant-so that the special-needs and administrative-inspection cases cannot be the basis for a purpose inquiry here." In sum, the Court appears to fashion a rule stating that a subjective motivation inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is foreclosed where the case involves a judicial warrant issued upon any individualized suspicion relating to law enforcement. Here, the judicial warrant established a qualifying suspicion that Al-Kidd was a material witness within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3144 and hence subject to detention. Therefore, the subjective motivations of the applying officer were irrelevant. More information on Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd can be found at the SCOTUSblog case page, available here.
Oregon Supreme Court 05-27-11by: Abassos • May 26, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
The Oregon Supreme Court ruled today that a trial judge is required to grant a victim's request to vacate a sentence where the judge has found that the victim's constitutional right to be informed in advance of sentencing was violated: "The victim was entitled to a remedy by due course of law under Article I, section 42(3)(a). Her proposed remedy - vacating defendant's sentence and conducting a resentencing hearing - was permissible, in that it was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Because the remedy could be "effectuated after the disposition" of this criminal proceeding, the victim had not waived her rights under ORS 147.533. The trial court erred in not granting the victim the relief that she sought." One key to this case is that the trial judge found that the victim's rights were violated. Diplomatically put, the record could have been more fully developed in that regard. What happened in this case is that the victim told the victim's advocate, a non-attorney employee of the District Attorney, that she wanted to attend critical stages of the proceedings. She was told to turn in a form to effectuate her request prior to March 2nd. Which she did, but not prior to a quick plea and sentencing that occurred on February 28th. The victim knew about the hearing date but was told by the advocate that she didn't need to be there. The craziest thing about this case to me is that side conversations between the victim and any employee of the District Attorney apparently matter immensely. Yet the defense has no access to such information. As happens so often in criminal cases, the defense is simply blindsided. The defense is barred from talking to the complainant in most cases. The defense is barred from finding out what was said at Grand Jury. We're generally unable to talk to the officer who took the complainant's statements. The police aren't required to record the accusations. Which means that we are often hearing the complainant's actual story for the very first time at trial. This case feels like one more step in the direction of making critical information inaccessible to the defense. Stay tuned for more on this case as the dust settles. It's also worth noting that one of the main tent presentations at the Annual Conference will be on victims rights. Just one more reason to attend.[http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/S059423.htm State v. Barrett]
U.S. Supreme Court 05-26-11by: Grapkoch • May 25, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
Earlier this term, the Court heard arguments in Camreta v. Greene. That case had asked whether the traditional warrant/warrant exception requirements that apply to seizures of suspected criminals should apply to an interview of the child in light of reports of child abuse, or whether a balancing standard should apply instead. However, the Court-in an opinion available here-avoided the 4th Amendment question on mootness grounds: In this case, the happenstance of S.G.'s moving across country and becoming an adult has deprived Camreta of his appeal rights. Mootness has frustrated his ability to challenge the Court of Appeals' ruling that he must obtain a warrant before interviewing a suspected child abuse victim at school. We therefore vacate the part of the Ninth Circuit's opinion that addressed that issue, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Two concurring opinions appear (authored by Scalia and Sotomayor (joined by Breyer)), as well as one dissenting opinion (Kennedy joined by Thomas). For the most part, those opinions are targeted at the majority's decision that a party who prevails due to qualified immunity may nevertheless seek certiorari on the constitutional question at issue so long as the issue is justiciable in all other respects. For more infomation, the Camreta case page at SCOTUSblog is available here. Camreta v. Greene
Oregon Appellate Court 05-24-11by: Abassos • May 23, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
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