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Framing the proportionality argument for ECSA Iby: Ryan Scott • July 20, 2026 • no comments In 1985, the Oregon legislature created a graded scheme of criminal liability aimed at ending child sexual abuse. The statutory scheme “punishes most harshly the creation of child pornography, next, its distribution, beyond that, its use to promote further abuse of children, and finally, its use in general.” State v. Porter, 241 Or App 26, 34, 249 P3d 139 (2011). Accordingly, like the previous statutes aimed at punishing dissemination of child pornography, the legislature chose the term “duplicate” to capture commercial practices associated with distribution and production. Not to capture conduct associated with possessing or viewing an image—which would be punishable as second-degree conduct. The legislative history of ORS 163.684(l)(a)(A) makes clear that it was intended to encompass those who “disseminate” and “deal” in child pornography, not those who merely possess it without that intention. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals has held that downloading images (which does not necessarily implicate any intent to distribute the images) equals "duplication" under the ECSA I statute. Consequently, when a defendant downloads images for their own personal use, they are charged under the first degree version of the statute, which was intended to address more than mere possession. In other words, the COA has erased the principal distinction between the acts that form the prohibited conduct is possession and control (that is the second-degree crime) and duplication or dissemination of more child pornography (that constitutes the first-degree offense). State v. Pugh, 255 Or App 357, 365, 297 P3d 27 (2013) The Oregon Supreme Court has turned down the opportunity to review the COA holding. So how does this implicate the Proportionality Clause of the Oregon Constitution? Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution provides that “all penalties shall be proportioned to the offense.” A sentence is constitutionally disproportionate when it shocks the moral sense of reasonable persons as to what is right or proper under the circumstances. State v. Wheeler, 343 Or 652, 656, 669-71, 175 P3d 438 (2007). In determining whether a sentence “shocks the moral sense,” a court considers three factors: “(1) a comparison of the severity of the penalty and the gravity of the offense; (2) a comparison of the penalties imposed for other, related crimes; and (3) the criminal history of the defendant.” Rodriguez/Buck, 347 Or at 58. That analysis focuses on the offense to which the claimed disproportionate sentence is applied, not the totality of the defendant’s criminal conduct. State v. Carey-Martin, 293 Or App 611, 621-21, 640, 643, 430 P3d 98 (2018). The first factor of the Rodriguez/Buck test requires a court to compare the severity of the penalty and the gravity of the offense. Ridriguez/Buck, 347 Or at 58. The severity of a penalty is the amount of time that the wrongdoer must spend in prison or jail, if convicted of that offense. Id. at 60. An “offense” is defined as the general statutory definition of the crime and, in an as-applied challenge, as the convicted person’s particular criminal conduct within the range of the conduct proscribed by the statute. Id. at 62. In comparing the severity of the penalty and the gravity of the offense, a court “may consider, among other things, the specific circumstances and facts of the defendant’s conduct that come within the statutory definition of the offense, as well as other case specific factors, such as characteristics of the defendant and the victim, the harm to the victim, and the relationship between the defendant and the victim.” Rodriguez/Buck informs this court’s application of the first factor in this case. Defendant Rodriquez was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse committed by pulling the back of a thirteen-year-old boy’s head against her clothed breasts and caressing his face for about a minute. 347 Or at 48. Defendant Buck was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse committed by failing to remove the back of his hand from a 13-year-old girl’s clothed buttocks after she had leaned against him while casting a fishing line and by wiping dirt off the back of her shorts. Id. The trial court in each case determined that a 75-month prison sentence violated the proportionality clause of Article I, section 16 and imposed a lesser sentence. Id. After engaging in the three-factor analysis described above, the Supreme Court concluded that “the imposition of the mandatory 75–month sentence for first-degree sexual abuse, as applied to the facts of Rodriguez’s and Buck’s offenses, would violate the [state] constitutional requirement that the penalty be proportioned to the offense.” Id. at 50. In considering the first factor, the Rodriguez/Buck court noted that the first-degree sexual abuse statute, ORS 163.427(1), criminalizes a broad range of conduct, “including, but not limited to, momentary touching of an intimate part without the victim’s awareness or knowledge, touching that the victim apprehends but does not appreciate as sexual, momentary touching over clothing, prolonged hand to genital contact, prolonged skin to skin genital contact, and, of course, forcing a person under 18 to engage in bestiality.” Id. at 69 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court remarked that the Rodriguez/Buck defendants’ conduct was on the outer edge of that conduct. Id.at 75. Similarly, ECSA I also criminalizes a broad range of conduct. Written in the days prior to the internet, the statute was intended to criminalize the dissemination of child pornography. The consequences of such dissemination was severe. Furthermore, the introduction of child pornography encourages and sustains a marketplace for such images, often commercializing and commodifying the criminal activity that depends on the continuing victimization of the child. The severity of the harm is reflected in the punishment. ECSA I is a crime seriousness level 8, so that even someone with no criminal history is presumptively subject to a prison sentence. That sentence becomes exponentially longer with each additional count. However, the Court of Appeals has held that a person can be guilty of ECSA I merely by downloading (“duplicating”) an image for their own personal use, behavior which is more consistent with ECSA II, which is a crime seriousness level 5 on the Oregon Sentencing Guidelines and presumptive probation if the defendant has no criminal history.. In other words, merely downloading an image for one’s personal use does not involve the commodification and ongoing victimization that arises from the dissemination of the images, and therefore the defendant’s behavior is on the outer edge of the conduct made criminal by the statute. Because defendant’s conduct is comparable to mere possession of the images and ECSA II, and far less severe than the originally intended scope of ECSA I, it is disproportionate to sentence defendant as a level 8 CSL as if he were a distributor of child pornography and not a level 5 CSL, which is more reflective of the nature and seriousness his conduct. Updated Post on Cutting-Edge Proportionality Argumentsby: Ryan Scott • July 11, 2026 • no comments I wrote a Library of Defense post slightly more than a year ago on a number of proportionality arguments that were open questions but had a sound basis in case law. Here is a partial list of what I wrote. What follows will be an update regarding those arguments (including one that has already won!) and additional crimes where a proportionality argument might be justified.
First, when the defendant has already been shown to be rehabilitated. How often does that come into play at sentencing? All the time, specifically when a defendant receives a lengthy prison sentence to run consecutively to a Murder II sentence. In that case, the defendant’s only opportunity to begin serving the consecutive portion of the sentence in this case is if the parole board finds that he is likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time. Imposing the consecutive sentence is unconstitutional because he will only be able to serve that sentence once it is determined that he has reformed and will not likely return to his criminal behavior. [Update: the opening brief on this issue has been written by OPDC, and the state's response brief is due in a few months.] Second, when the defendant's health problems would render the prison sentence particularly cruel. [Update: This has been argued by me at the COA just a month ago. I expect it will be a year before we get an opinion.] Third, when a defendant receives the same sentence for felony murder (when he neither killed the victim nor intended the victim to be killed) as a person who, for example, intentionally kills their spouse in cold-blood. How can the same sentence be proportionate to both offenses? [No updates that I am aware of.] Fourth, the crime of sexual abuse in the second degree when it is based on age. In a 1955 case called State v. Pirkey, the Oregon Supreme Court struck as unconstitutional a crime that could be treated as either a misdemeanor or a felony, it did so under the equal privileges clause. The COA -- in a per curiam opinion in St v Alvey -- would subsequently hold that that portion of Pirkey had been overruled in a different equal privileges case. What no one mentioned in Alvey was that Pirkey seemed to suggest that giving the prosecutor the ability to charge the same behavior as either a felony or a misdemeanor violated Oregon's proportionality clause as well. The Oregon Constitution provides that "all penalties shall be proportioned to the offense. * * *" Oregon Constitution, Article I, Section 16. In the case at bar the offense, that is to say, the specific act which is prohibited, is clearly defined, but it is difficult to see how two separate and distinct punishments can both be proportionate to the same identical offense when the sentencing court is given no discretionary power to choose between them. State v. Pirkey, 203 Ore. 697, 705 (Or. 1955) A defendant charged with have otherwise consensual sex with a 17 year old is guilty of a felony Sex Abuse II. For the exact same behavior, they could be guilty of misdemeanor Contributing to the Sexual Delinquency of a Minor. How can both a felony and a misdemeanor be proportionate to the identical offense? [Update: this issue has finally been preserved, but the opening brief is not due for a few months.] Fifth, when the defendant has significantly greater mental health problems than the defendant in State v. Gonzalez, such that might rise to a GEI claim but which the defendant did not pursue at trial. [Update: this WON in State v Clark, 347 Or App 721 (2026)]
And now, for some additional crimes which raise proportionality arguments: Use of a Child in a Sexually Explicit Display: when soliciting a selfie from a 14-17 year old results in 75 months prison, but having sex with the 14-17 year old would result in probation, there's a proportionality problem. I argued this in February to the COA, and we are just waiting on a decision, which I expect won't be until 2027. Note, this is an as-applied argument, not a straight vertical proportionality argument, and so it is important to highlight other case-specific factors when they would impact the analysis, including: (1) was the selfie for the defendant's personal use or did he plan to enter it into the black market, (2) was the defendant a relative or teacher or coach, (3) how explicit was the photo, e.g., topless selfie versus, well, you know? ECSA I: did the defendant simply download pictures (i.e., duplicate images for his own personal use) and therefore his behavior was of the type ECSA II was supposed to address? This again is an as-applied argument. I wrote something up in a hurry if anyone wants it, but I haven't had reason yet to write it in full. Unlawful Use of a Weapon with a Firearm: when the defendant points a firearm at another person, he could be subject to five years in prison under UUW w/a firearm, but he could also be subject to a misdemeanor under the crime of Pointing a Firearm at Another. In other words, there is a Pirkey problem, just like SA II above. Some of these arguments would have a huge impact in the life of a single defendant but maybe no one else. That's reason enough to do. Some of these other arguments would, at least for a time, completely change the legal landscape for a huge swath of deserving defendants and make the world a kinder, fairer place. It wouldn't be the first time that one defense lawyer, making -- and losing -- an argument at the trial court, changed the world for the better.
Threatening to Use a Weapon versus Using a Weapon to Threatenby: Ryan Scott • June 8, 2026 • no comments I wrote about this more than ten years ago, but it's probably worth revisiting since every now and then, the distinction might be useful. If I point a gun at you in a menacing way, that will likely constitute the crime of Unlawful Use of a Weapon, barring any defenses. But what if I tell you that if you don't leave my neighborhood, I'm going to go inside, get a gun, and then come back out and shoot you? Is that UUW? Here's what the Oregon Supreme Said about the subject, when tasked with deciding whether the "use" in UUW encompassed threatening someone with a firearm.
Next 20 Articles Case Reviews
Oregon Court of Appeals, July 1st, 2026by: Rankin Johnson INITIATING A FALSE REPORT - Elements JOINDER, SEVERANCE, AND ELECTION - Discretion to order election SEARCH AND SEIZURE - Reasonable suspicion JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Preliminary and final instructions Oregon Court of Appeals, June 24th, 2026by: Rankin Johnson SEARCH AND SEIZURE - Probable cause RESTITUTION - Collateral source rule Oregon Court of Appeals, June 17th, 2026by: Rankin Johnson MENS REA - Sufficiency SEARCH AND SEIZURE - Consent by non-English speaker DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS - Compelling circumstances SEARCH AND SEIZURE - Staleness JURY UNANIMITY - Proof HEARSAY AND CONFRONTATION - Unavailability due to misconduct DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS - Invocation of right to remain silent SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION - Voluntariness _________________________ |
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