Main Entrance

Are violent offenders redeemable? by: Ryan Scott • August 15, 2017 • no comments Worthwhile article on this topic from Slate. And here is a notable opinion piece on release violent felons from prison. Does the gov't need a warrant to get historical cell-site information" by: Ryan Scott • August 15, 2017 • no comments The US Supreme Court may answer that question this year. All the pro-privacy amicus briefs can be found here. Results of the 2016 Criminal Law Quiz by: Ryan Scott • August 14, 2017 • no comments The quiz is here. The results are brutal this year. The ECSA/criminal episode issue was decided against the defense in State v. Dulfu, although the Oregon Supreme Court has granted review. The good news appears to be limited to (4)(b). That said, most of the remaining issues have yet to be addressed by the COA. But virtually all of the undecided issues are working their way through the appellate courts, so there is reason to think we'll get answers in 2018. When ambiguity favors the defendant by: Ryan Scott • August 14, 2017 • no comments I have often noted that ambiguity in the law favors the state. If a defendant honestly can't tell whether or not crimes arise out of the same criminal episode, then he won't know the maximum sentence he might fact. Consequently, his decision to go to trial or accept a plea offer must factor in the worst case scenario, i.e., the sentence he might get if the court finds multiple criminal episodes. The prosecutor has little reason to make the same calculation from the other side. Maybe she'll make the offer marginally better because the defendant has a plausible claim to one criminal episode, but the consequences of being wrong -- arguing for multiple criminal episodes and losing -- is going to be of minimal significance. This situation plays out in various ways every date in the criminal justice system. I don't include situations where the defendant doesn't know if he's going to be found guilty or not. But I do include situations where there is a genuine dispute over whether -- if the defendant actually did the acts he's accused of -- he's actually guilty of an offense, because there is some ambiguity over what the law actually says. But there is one situation where the ambiguity in the law provides a potentially huge upside to the defendant. And that is when he has a slightly outside-the-box type of legal argument that could result in dismissal of most or all of the charges, and because of the relative novelty of the argument, there is no clear case law one way or the other. Because it's a longshot, the prosecutor scoffs and gives it little weight, generally assuming -- with good reasons -- that most judges are highly risk-adverse and aren't likely to grant the defendant's motion. → continue reading... Told to leave purse in impounded car by: Ryan Scott • August 14, 2017 • no comments Not an unusual fact situation described here. From fourthamendment.com: Defendant was a passenger in a car stopped for expired tags. She should have been allowed to keep her purse when she got out of the car. Instead, she was told to leave it in the car, and then it was searched in the car when the car was impounded. Suppressed. State v. Campbell, 2017 Iowa App. LEXIS 777 (Aug. 2, 2017). Very Interesting Federal Opinion: Search Warrant and Hard Drive by: Ryan Scott • July 28, 2017 • no comments The opinion is here. Key quote: It is unlikely that the Government would argue it is constitutionally reasonable to search a home based on a warrant previously issued for a crime the homeowner had already been convicted of, and to also direct the searchers to look for evidence of offenses not named in the warrant. In this case, however, the Government asserts the right to do just that, but for a portable hard drive (thumb drive) rather than a home. We recognize the differences between a home and a thumb drive and the unique challenges in applying the Fourth Amendment in a digital context. See generally Josh Goldfoot, The Physical Computer and the Fourth Amendment, 16 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 112 (2011); Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 531 (2005). But the Fourth Amendment compels us to treat them the same in this case. We hold that the military judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding that evidence of an offense not named in the warrant was outside the scope of the warrant and must be suppressed. Furthermore, based on the facts found by the military judge, we conclude, as a matter of law, that the search was not constitutionally reasonable under the particular circumstances of this case. Accordingly, we affirm the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals (ACCA). Another noteworthy quote: → continue reading... Dog sniff in legal MJ state by: Ryan Scott • July 16, 2017 • no comments Notable Colorado opinion. Headline at fourthamendment.com reads: CO: In this recreational MJ use state, a dog sniff is a “search,” and a positive alert isn’t PC a crime is occurring A reminder to Oregon defense lawyers by: Ryan Scott • July 13, 2017 • no comments I am of the opinion that the standard jury instructions for most theories of Assault II, some theories of Assault I, APSO, Theft-by-Taking and Criminal Mischief I and II are wrong. If you want supplemental jury instructions that would give you an additional defense and/or give you an issue for appeal, please contact me directly. If you know someone who is taking one of these cases to trial, please spread the word. Did a recent merger opinion render some ID Thefts unconstitutional? by: Ryan Scott • July 13, 2017 • no comments Maybe yes.  First, a quick primer on vertical proportionality.  From State v. Koch: On appeal, defendant argues that his sentences violate the proportionality requirement of Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution. He asserts that, if he had committed Level 4 forgeries, the maximum durational departure sentence with a "B" criminal history score would have been 18 months in prison. Article I, section 16, prohibits the imposition of a sentence for a lesser offense that is greater than that available for a more serious offense. State v. Turner, 296 Or. 451, 456, 676 P.2d 873 (1984); Merrill v. Gladden, 216 Or. 460, 464, 337 P.2d 774 (1959); Cannon v. Gladden, 203 Or. 629, 631-33, 281 P.2d 233 (1955). Second, State v. Haddon, which essentially held that ID Theft (a felony) can be a lesser-included of Fraudulent Use of a Credit Card (misdemeanor). In sum, proof of the elements of fraudulent use of a credit card proves the elements of the offense of identity theft, in the forms in which the offenses were alleged in this case. At least as is alleged here, identity theft does not require proof of an element that is not already included in fraudulent use of a credit card. In other words, some ID Theft charges, by being charged as felonies, will violate Article I, section 16, because they carry a greater sentence than misdemeanors that describe more serious behavior. The Haddon court found that the FUCC (the greater offense, measured by elements, but the lesser offense measured by crime seriousness) merged into ID Theft (the reverse). Even if that is the correct result in a merger analysis, that holding wouldn't solve the proportionality problem under the Oregon Constitution.  The state can also defeat the merger argument by not charging FUCC, but that too would not have an impact on the proportionality challenge. This argument will be limited to ID Thefts that fall into the Haddon category, but if they do, it's a powerful and fun argument to make.  I would ask for either dismissal of the ID Theft or, failing that, immediate reduction to a misdemeanor. Can you raise it pre-trial? Probably not. Whether you'd want to alert the prosecutor to the issue as a part of negotiations will likely depend on how easy a problem it would be for them to fix. Did Simonov overrule Barnes? by: Ryan Scott • June 25, 2017 • no comments This is a long blog post, but please read before you go to trial on an assault II based on serious physical injury, an assault I based on knowingly causing serious physical injury to a child, or assault on a public safety officer. It will tell you everything you need to know about why the standard jury instructions for those crimes are wrong. → continue reading... Is Engen good law anymore? by: Ryan Scott • June 23, 2017 • no comments In State v. Engen, the Court of Appeals held that while a defendant must knowingly possess a controlled substance, he didn't need to know the exact nature of the controlled substance.  That is, a defendant charged with possession of cocaine couldn't get an acquittal by arguing he thought it was meth. But back then, a defendant wouldn't have been charged with specifically possessing cocaine.  He was charged with possessing a schedule II controlled substance.  The statute didn't distinguish between cocaine and methamphetamine. Now, a defendant is usually charged with expressly possessing cocaine in most cases, though a separate general statute based on drug categories still exists. The earlier failure to distinguish different controlled substances was part of the analysis in Engen: Given the historical context of the 1977 legislation—the lack of differentiation among types of controlled substances and the historic lack of an explicit mental state requirement pertaining to the specific type of controlled substance possessed—it seems unlikely that the 1977 legislature intended to impose such a requirement. As I mentioned, at least some of the drug statutes make those distinction now.  Let's assume the charge is possession of cocaine.  The mental state is knowingly.  The conduct -- using a Simonov analysis -- is possession of cocaine.  I don't think a person can be guilty under that statute of possessing cocaine if they thought they possessed methamphetamine. New Hampshire accidentally makes pregnancy a defense to murder by: Ryan Scott • June 23, 2017 • no comments The story is here. There is a larger point to be made about sloppy legislative drafting (as well as other points not suited to this blog) but I'll save those for another time. Another example demonstrating that incarceration is often not based on community safety by: Ryan Scott • May 31, 2017 • no comments If prisoner A is in custody, serving a prison sentence, because it is necessary to keep the community safe, then the fact that there is a job shortage would not impact that conclusion, would it? But if a job shortage is a basis for releasing a prisoner, perhaps community safety isn't the issue. And if community safety isn't the issue, then aren't there a number of ways to punish a person that are more effective and cheaper than incarceration? Why do I bring this up? Because of this story in the Wall Street Journal: To Fill Summer Jobs, Maine Gov. Releases Non-Violent Prisoners. What is responsible for the fall in drunk driving since the early '80s? by: Ryan Scott • May 22, 2017 • no comments Drunk driving fatalities have fallen dramatically since the early '80s. They continued to fall since the mid-90s, but that drop is less significant because non-DUII auto fatalities have fallen the same amount, suggesting that improvements in auto safety (which protect the drunk and sober alike) account for most if not all of the drop in the last two decades. Still, if you go back to the early '80s, the decline of drunk driving fatalities has been an extraordinary success story. Is it because of tougher laws? Social stigma? Demographics? Change is alcohol consumption patterns? You might find an answer here. Would raising most speed limits make roads safer? by: Ryan Scott • May 13, 2017 • no comments Discussion here. Non-Oregon Case Law on "No Trespassing" Signs and the 4th Amendment by: Ryan Scott • May 13, 2017 • no comments The Tennessee Supreme Court, in a recent opinion, went over a large body of case law on whether a "No Trespassing" sign defeats the implicit license of police to walk up to your front door. A discussion of their opinion is here. The Oregon Court of Appeals recently discussed the issue in St v. Wilson. New Regarding Historical Cell-Site Data (SW or Subpoena?) by: Ryan Scott • May 13, 2017 • no comments The US Supreme Court is considering whether to take cases where the issue is whether a search warrant or a mere subpoena is necessary to obtain historical cell-site data. Links to the multiple petitions for cert can be found here. Discussion here. And an argument for revisiting the third-party doctrine is here. As previously noted, the Oregon Constitution provides much greater protection to records held by third-parties, per State v. Ghim. Having said that, the exact parameters of that protection will continue to be unknown until defense attorneys start preserving the issues. The Standard Theft-by-Taking Jury Instruction is Wrong by: Ryan Scott • May 10, 2017 • no comments In State v. Simonov, the Oregon Supreme Court lays out the law on applying which mental states to which elements.  The charge was UUV, but it's a great place to start if you ever have any questions about mental states and material elements.   In his opinion, Justice Brewer points out that the "knowing" mental state is the lowest applicable mental state that can be applied to conduct.  When it comes to results and circumstances, the lowest applicable mental state is criminal negligence.  He points out that if a crime is in the criminal code, and no mental state is explicitly applied to a particular element, then the lowest possible mental state applies, which, in the case of a conduct element, is "knowingly" and in the case of a circumstance element is "negligently." He briefly uses theft to highlight the difference between conduct and circumstance, specifically the fact that value of an item is a circumstance. The theft statutes provide an example of the role of circumstance elements in a criminal offense. “Theft” in any degree is defined by ORS 164.015, which describes the prohibited conduct (the taking of property) and the applicable mental state (intent to deprive another of property). The prohibited conduct for theft in any degree is the taking of another’s property with the intent to deprive the owner of it. Id. A person commits first-degree theft when the person commits theft as defined in ORS 164.015, and the value of the property is $1,000 or more. ORS 164.055. If the value of the property is $100 or more and less than $1,000, the person commits second-degree theft, and if the value of the property is less than $100, the person commits third-degree theft. ORS 164.045 (second-degree theft); ORS 164.043 (third-degree theft). But what he says next is what's most important.  He cites St v Jones, a COA case (authored by then-Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals, David Brewer) that specifically involves whether one should apply a knowing mental state to the value of items stolen.  And he summarizes Jones as follows: → continue reading... Top Ten Observations about Defense Lawyers by: Ryan Scott • March 31, 2017 • no comments Kopf's list begins: 10. Criminal defense lawyers are at great risk of becoming drunken bastards—the stress is beyond description. 9. Being a good criminal defense lawyer requires sincerity whereas being a great criminal defense lawyer requires the ability to fake it. 8. When it comes to convincing a client to accept a guilty plea because it is in the manifest best interests of the client, a criminal defense lawyer must become a client whisperer. 7. When it comes to convincing a client to reject a plea offer and take the case to a jury, a criminal defense lawyer (regardless of gender) must possess balls of steel. 6. Real criminal defense lawyers don’t hate prosecutors, but they don’t trust them either. The rest of the list gets more interesting. → continue reading... Race, Crime, Lead: More on the Impact of Banning Leaded Gasoline by: Ryan Scott • March 30, 2017 • one comment Kevin Drum's post is here, highlighting two studies. Very interesting to show how leaded gasoline -- and the subsequent ban on leaded gasoline -- impacts incarceration and crime as categorized by the race of the defendant. Does Retroactive Application of SO Registry Laws Violate Ex Post Facto? by: Ryan Scott • March 30, 2017 • no comments You may have thought this issue was dead, but apparently it has some life. Per SCOTUSblog, SCOTUS has invited the solicitor general to weigh in on the petition for cert in Snyder v. Doe, which raises the question whether retroactive application of sex-offender-registry laws violates ex post facto clause. That doesn't mean the justices will take the case, but at least one justice is considering doing so. I wouldn't expect a decision on whether to grant cert until the fall. SW to Seize and Search a Car's Black Box by: Ryan Scott • March 30, 2017 • no comments I've been waiting to have a case -- almost certainly a vehicular manslaughter or similar -- in which to raise this issue. Hasn't happened yet. But here's an appellate opinion where it was raised. Key quote: The state challenges an order granting appellee Charles Worsham’s motion to suppress. Without a warrant, the police downloaded data from the “event data recorder” or “black box” located in Worsham’s impounded vehicle. We affirm, concluding there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information retained by an event data recorder and downloading that information without a warrant from an impounded car in the absence of exigent circumstances violated the Fourth Amendment. Here is Orin Kerr's take on the issue. Historical Cell-Site Data: subpoena or search warrant? by: Ryan Scott • March 22, 2017 • no comments You can see a 9th Circuit oral argument on the issue here. However, keep in mind, the Oregon Constitution may be far more favorable. See State v. Ghim for Oregon's take on the third-party doctrine. Juvenile Arrest Rates Since 1980 by: Ryan Scott • March 6, 2017 • no comments I highly recommend you look at this chart via Kevin Drum. Mr. Drum writes: Since 1996, arrests of juveniles have fallen by two-thirds. Arrests for violent crimes have fallen by more than two-thirds. Bottom line: Kids today are way better behaved and way less scary than they were in the 90s. One of these days we ought to start acting like we know this. Child Porn Sentencing by: Ryan Scott • March 5, 2017 • no comments The Oregon Supreme Court has granted review to a case involving child porn sentencing. The issue is this: how many different criminal episodes are there when multiple images are found during a single search, but those images were obtained on different dates? I won't reiterate the arguments here, but it's my case, so if anyone wants the briefs after they're filed, let me know. If the defense wins, the impact could be that a defendant who is an "I" would stay an "I" for all counts. While much better than being an "A" after just a few counts, are there any other limitations that could dramatically shorten the sentence? Yes. If the state can't prove separate victims, the 200% rule would kick in, and the defendant's likely sentence would be no more than 36 months. But what if the images all involve separate children? My argument -- which I have written about before -- is that the burden is on the state to show that the people depicted in the images are still alive at the time of downloading by the defendant, because if they aren't, they are beyond all harm, and thus cannot be victims (in the same way you can't libel the dead). The state's response, shared by some defense attorneys, is that when you download the images ten, twenty or even a hundred years later, you -- as a consumer of these images -- are the reason these images were created in the first place, thus you are complicit in the original abuse. Consequently, it is the harm from the original abuse that makes the children "victims" for all eternity, even if the porn people look at five hundred years from now is the same porn that exists today. I think this is wrong because I don't think the law recognizes retroactivity in this type of culpability. Space/time certainly doesn't. But there is another key reason, and when I say it, you're going to be shocked, but read on, and you'll see I'm not promoting an argument that only a psychopath would make. → continue reading... Next 20 Articles _________________________

Enter your email to get notice of new articles: ________________________________________________ Oregon Appellate Ct - Aug 16, 2017 by: Sara Werboff • August 18, 2017 • no comments Restitution – Comparative Fault Rules Do Not Apply in Restitution Proceeding Joinder – Any Error in Consolidating of Charging Instruments was Harmless Post-Conviction Relief – PCR Court Erred in Allowing Hearsay Evidence – PCR Court Erred in Applying Prejudice Standard Search and Seizure – Police Unlawfully Extended Traffic Stop Per Curiam – Post-Conviction Relief – PCR Court Erred in Sua Sponte Granting Summary Judgment on Brady Claim Per Curiam – Post-Conviction Relief – PCR Court Lacked Jurisdiction to Enter Order Per Curiam – Juvenile Dependency – Insufficient Evidence to Support Jurisdiction → read the full summaries... Oregon Supreme Ct - Aug 10, 2017 by: Sara Werboff • August 11, 2017 • no comments Sentencing - Second Judge was Authorized to Give More Severe Sentence on Remand Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle – “Vehicle” for Purposes of UUV Does Not Require Current Operability But Must Establish that It is Reasonable to Restore to Operative Condition Search and Seizure – Warrantless Entry in DUII Investigation was Not Justified by Exigent Circumstances → read the full summaries... Oregon Appellate Ct - Aug 9, 2017 by: Sara Werboff • August 11, 2017 • no comments Per Curiam - On Reconsideration, Amending Judgment to Omit Restitution Award → read the full summaries... Oregon Supreme Ct - Aug 3, 2017 by: Sara Werboff • August 4, 2017 • no comments State May Present Both Interfering With a Peace Officer and Resisting Arrest Charges to the Jury Post-Conviction Relief – Petitioner Entitled to Post-Conviction Relief for Counsel’s Failure to Investigate Overdose Theory of Victim’s Death → read the full summaries... Oregon Appellate Ct - Aug 2, 2017 by: Sara Werboff • August 4, 2017 • no comments Miranda Waiver – The State Failed to Establish that Defendant Voluntarily, Knowingly, or Intelligently Waived his Miranda Rights Charges Were Not Properly Joined – Hearsay Was Inadmissible as a Past Recollection Recorded Prosecutorial Misconduct – Reversal Required when Prosecutor’s Statements During Closing were Impermissible Defendant’s Arrest for Public Drinking was Lawful because City Ordinance was Not Preempted by State Law Post-Conviction Relief – PCR Judgment Does Not Satisfy Requirements Merger – Multiple Counts of Identity Theft Involving Different Victims Did Not Merge into Aggravated Identity Theft Indictments – Disallowance of Demurrer was Harmless Error Merger – Trial Court Erred in Failing to Merge Convictions Involving Single Victim Expungement – Trial Court Erred in Failing to Set Aside Defendant’s Arrest Record Trial Court Did Not Err In Failing to Give Choice of Evils Defense Instruction Per Curiam – Contempt – State Concedes It Misfiled Contempt Proceeding and Trial Court Erred in Imposing Punitive Sanctions → read the full summaries... Oregon Appellate Ct - July 26, 2017 by: Sara Werboff • July 31, 2017 • no comments Defendant’s Statements were Admissions and Not Confessions Civil Commitment – Court Reverses Continued Commitment under Expanded Criteria Defining Mental Illness Search and Seizure – Preservation – Defendant’s Argument was Preserved and Evidence Should Have Been Suppressed Search and Seizure – Preservation – Defendant Failed to Preserve Argument that Opening Car Door was Unlawful Search Identity Theft – Evidence was Sufficient to Show Intent to Defraud Search and Seizure – State Did Not Establish that Evidence Would Inevitably Be Discovered Search and Seizure – Defendant was Unlawfully Seized and Alternative Bases for Search Were Not Raised Below Per Curiam – Search and Seizure – State Concedes Officer Lacked Reasonable Suspicion Per Curiam – Burglary – No Burglary Where Defendant Had Permission to Enter → read the full summaries... Oregon Appellate Ct - July 19, 2017 by: Sara Werboff • July 23, 2017 • no comments Defendant Waived Right to Counsel – Defendant’s Demurrer Should Have Been Allowed Indictments – Demurrer Should Have Been Allowed Because No Basis for Joinder Was Alleged Sufficient Evidence that Defendant Went to Premises Where Minors Regularly Congregate Evidence – In Fraud Case, Evidence that Defendant Made Payments to Victims Was Improperly Excluded Search and Seizure – Officer Reasonably Concluded that Entry to Defendant’s Property was Necessary to Render Emergency Aid to Cattle → read the full summaries... Oregon Supreme Ct - July 13, 2017 by: Sara Werboff • July 14, 2017 • no comments State Not Permitted to Prosecute Defendant for Murder when Defendant Pleaded Guilty to Assault and Plea Agreement was Silent as to Risk of Additional Prosecution → read the full summaries... Oregon Appellate Ct - July 12, 2017 by: Sara Werboff • July 14, 2017 • no comments DUII – Defendant’s Refusal to Consent to Breath Test Admissible in DUII Prosecution Evidence – Trial Court Admitted Text Messages as Adoptive Admissions OEC 403 – Granting Reconsideration to Remand to Trial Court to Conduct Balancing → read the full summaries... Oregon Appellate Ct - July 6, 2017 by: Sara Werboff • July 9, 2017 • no comments Scientific Evidence – Officer’s Conclusion that Defendant Passed or Failed Field Sobriety Test is Scientific Testimony Requiring Adequate Foundation Expert Testimony – Trial Court Erroneously Excluded General Testimony on False Memory – Offer of Proof was Sufficient for Review Sentencing – Under ORS 137.717, Court Lacked Authority to Impose Multiple Downward Departure Sentences but Court had Discretion to Choose Which Count to Depart Search and Seizure – Officer’s Belief that Defendant Possessed Drugs was Not Objectively Reasonable Attorney Fees – Defendant’s General Statement that He May Be Able to Work Insufficient to Support Attorney Fee Award Search and Seizure – Traffic Stop Was Valid under Vehicle Code Juvenile Dependency – Court Violated Interstate Compact by Appointing Guardian in California Sentencing – Trial Court Plainly Violated 200 Percent Rule for Consecutive Sentences Inmate Litigation – Trial Court Did Not Err in Revoking the Waiver of Plaintiff’s Filing Fees Interference with Peace Officer – On Reconsideration Reversing Conviction Because Defendant was Engaged in Passive Resistance Self-Representation – Trial Court Erred in Failing to Allow Defendant to Represent Himself Per Curiam – Merger – Sex Abuse and Sodomy Verdicts Based on Same Acts but Different Theories Should Merge Per Curiam – Merger – Individual Thefts Should Merge into Aggravated Theft Per Curiam – Civil Commitment – Appellant’s Shackling Argument is Unpreserved → read the full summaries... Oregon Supreme Ct - June 29, 2017 by: Sara Werboff • June 30, 2017 • no comments Search and Seizure – Remanding to Determine as Factual Matter Scope of Defendant’s Consent → read the full summaries... Oregon Appellate Ct - June 28, 2017 by: Sara Werboff • June 30, 2017 • no comments Trial Court Properly Denied Demurrer as Untimely – Trial Court Properly Imposed Compensatory Fine Evidence Sufficient to Support Conviction for Initiating False Report Juvenile Dependency – Mother’s Admission Was Sufficient to Support Jurisdiction Per Curiam - Post-Conviction Relief – Remanding for Reconsideration of Poston Issue Per Curiam – Civil Commitment – Insufficient Evidence to Support Commitment Per Curiam - Juvenile Dependency – Court Erred in Appointed Guardian Ad Litem for Mother Per Curiam - Appeal and Review – Defendant May Not Appeal from Guilty Plea → read the full summaries... Oregon Supreme Ct - June 22, 2017 by: Sara Werboff • June 26, 2017 • no comments Sentencing - Sentence Was Not Vindictive When Overall Sentence was Shorter Sentencing – Trial Court Erred in Failing to Consider Whether Defendant’s Intellectual Disability Rendered Measure 11 Sentence Unconstitutional Search and Seizure – Although WA Officer Lacked Authority to Stop Defendant, Evidence Was Constitutionally Obtained → read the full summaries... Oregon Appellate Ct - June 21, 2017 by: Sara Werboff • June 26, 2017 • no comments Search and Seizure – Consent to Search was Voluntary – Defendant was Not Seized Sufficiency of Evidence - Record was Insufficient to Present Substantial Pain Theory of Assault to Jury → read the full summaries... Oregon Supreme Ct - June 15, 2017 by: Sara Werboff • June 19, 2017 • no comments Search and Seizure - Scope of Consent is Determined by Defendant's Actual Intent → read the full summaries... ________________________________________________ Search and Seizure Privacy Interest, Stops,Arrests, Consent, Warrant Exceptions, Suppression Exceptions, Search Warrants Forensic Science Ballistics, Bitemarks, Bloodstains, DNA, Eyewitness ID, Fingerprints, Handwriting ID, Polygraphs, Shaken Baby Evidence Code Procedure, Relevance, Privileges, Lay Witnesses, Experts, Hearsay, Physical Evidence Immigration Padilla, Agg Felonies, Inadmissibility, Removability, Moral Turpitude, Naturalization, Juveniles, U-Visas Crimes Measure 11, Drugs, Sex Crimes, Homicide, Property, DUII, Child Abuse, Other Crimes Self Incrimination Evidentiary Burdens, State Compulsion, Custody/Compelling Circumstances, Right to Silence, Impeachment Mental States Civil Commitments, Aid & Assist, GEI, Disordered Mental State, Mens Rea, Testing, DSM-IV Defenses Alibi, Necessity, Speedy Trial, Self Defense Oregon Constitution Speedy Trial, Right to Counsel, Confrontation, Double Jeopardy, Equal Privileges, Ex Post Facto, Venue |Trial Procedure Charging Decision, Discovery, Right to Counsel, Pretrial Motions Extradition Veterans and Military Service Created by Jess Barton. Sentencing Criminal Episodes,Merger, Consecutive Sentences, Mandatory Minimums, Probation, Restitution, Collateral Consequences