U.S. Supreme Court 06-20-11

by: Grapkoch • June 19, 2011 • no comments

Read the full article for details about the following new cases:

• The Due Process Right to Counsel at Civil Contempt Hearings

In Turner v. Rogers, the defendant sought review from the Supreme Court on the issue as to whether an indigent defendant has a constitutional right to appointed counsel at a civil contempt proceeding that results in his incarceration. At issue here was whether a non-custodial parent who was charged with failing to meet child support obligations must be provided with counsel where his ability to pay is contested. The Court answers yes-at least, maybe yes, under the right circumstances:

We conclude that where as here the custodial parent (entitled to receive the support) is unrepresented by counsel, the State need not provide counsel to the noncustodial parent (required to provide the support). But we attach an important caveat, namely, that the State must nonetheless have in place alternative procedures that assure a fundamentally fair determination of the critical incarceration-related question, whether the supporting parent is able to comply with the support order.

The Court begins by noting that this case is not governed by the Sixth Amendment. "[T]he Sixth Amendment does not govern civil cases. Civil contempt differs from criminal contempt in that it seeks only to 'coerce the defendant to do' what a courthad previously ordered him to do."

Instead, the Court proceeds under a Fourteenth Amendment analysis while noting that this limited Due Process right only assures that fundamental safeguards are in place. Applying the three-part test of Mathews v. Eldridge to address this fundamental safeguards inquiry, the Court ultimately rejects a categorical rule requiring appointed counsel in all such circumstances for three reasons:

1. Assuming proper procedures, indigence can be a question that in many-but not all-cases is sufficiently straightforward to warrant determination prior to providing a defendant with counsel;
2. The imbalance in fundamental fairness is mitigated where the "prosecuting party" is actually a private person who is also unrepresented (particularly when they are unrepresented due to indigence); and
3. If state courts employ substitute procedural safeguards, the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty is mitigated. Those safeguards include (1) notice to the defendant that his 'ability to pay' is a critical issue in the contempt proceeding; (2) the use of a form (or the equivalent) to elicit relevant financial information; (3) an opportunity at the hearing for the defendant to respond to statements and questions about his financial status, (e.g., those triggered by his responses on the form); and (4) an express finding by the court that the defendant has theability to pay."

Reviewing this decision, it is important to keep in mind the Court's overriding caveat. In fact, the majority repeatedly stresses that its refusal to craft a categorical rule is not dispositive:

We consequently hold that the Due Process Clause does not automatically require the provision of counsel at civil contempt proceedings to an indigent individual who is subject to a child support order, even if that individual faces incarceration (for up to a year). In particular, that Clause does not require the provision of counsel where the opposing parent or other custodian (to whom support funds are owed) is not represented by counsel and the State provides alternative procedural safeguards equivalent to those we have mentioned.

(Emphasis in original). Accordingly, the Court reverses and remands this case on a finding of constitutional error because Turner was neither represented by counsel nor afforded the procedural safeguards required by due process.

More information on Turner v. Rogers can be found via the SCOTUSblog case page, available here.

Turner v. Rogers