Case Reviews
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Oregon Appellate Court 08-31-11
by: Abassos • August 30, 2011 • no comments
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- Stop - Point of Seizure/Reasonable Suspicion
- Statute of Limitations - Commencement of a Prosecution
- Search - School Search - Reasonable Suspicion
- Identity Theft - Mere Possession of stolen ID
- Impeachment - Prior Convictions - 15 years - Confinement
- Prejudice - Lopez-Minjarez (natural and probable consequence instruction is bad law)
- PCR - Judgment Fails to State Legal Basis
Oregon Supreme Court 08-25-11
by: Abassos • August 24, 2011 • no comments
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- Accomplice Liability - The Natural and Probable Consequences Instruction is Bad Law
The Oregon Supreme Ct today upheld the Appellate Court in rejecting the natural and probable consequences jury instruction for accomplice liability. Accomplice liability requires specific intent. The natural and probable consequences instruction seemed to say that, in addition to the crimes for which such intent applied, any other crimes that naturally followed were also appropriate for accomplice liability. Such a theory was and continues to be incompatible with Oregon law. State v. Lopez-Minjarez
That's the big takeaway from today's opinion: that the natural and probable consequences instruction is based on bad law and should not be used. Ever.
The rest of the opinion is dedicated to a harmless error analysis to determine which of Mr. Lopez-Minjarez' convictions, if any, should be reversed. The Court finds that the first crime (chronologically) for which defendant was convicted, a burglary, could not have been affected by the bad instruction. The jury could not have found that the burglary was the natural and probable consequence of a prior crime that defendant intended because there was no prior crime alleged. In addition, there was a kidnapping charge in which defendant essentially admitted to being a principal. All the other convictions though, including murder and felony murder, must be reversed because the jury could have believed that defendant did not have the required intent but that the crimes were the natural consequence of either the kidnapping or the burglary. Because the jury could have based its convictions on a theory consistent with the jury instructions but inconsistent with the law, the error was prejudicial.
Oregon Appellate Court 08-17-11
by: Abassos • August 16, 2011 • no comments
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- OEC 609-1 - Bias - "a mere tendency to show bias"
- Marijuana Diversion - Inapplicable to Possession Within 1000 Feet of a School
- Burglary I - Entering or Remaining - Boots Instruction
- Assault IV - Physical Injury
- Warrantless Search - Automobile Exception
- Vehicle Stop - Reasonable Suspicion
- Preservation - MJOA - Tampering With a Witness
- Termination of Parental Rights - Detriment to Child
Oregon Appellate Court 08-10-11
by: Abassos • August 9, 2011 • no comments
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- Right to Counsel - Invocation on a Different Case - "Factually Unrelated"
- Preservation - Plain Error - Southard
- Restraining Order - "Abuse"
Oregon Appellate Court 08-03-11
by: Abassos • August 2, 2011 • no comments
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- Miranda - Mirandized Confession Following a Non-Mirandized Confession
- Cruel and Unusual Punishment
- Stop - Free to Leave
- Arrest - Placing a Suspect in Handcuffs/Probable Cause
- Criminal Mistreatment I - Contractual Agreement
- TPR - Whether condition of parent is "seriously detrimental"
Oregon Appellate Court 07-27-11
by: Abassos • July 26, 2011 • no comments
Oregon Appellate Court 07-20-11by: Abassos • July 19, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
Oregon Appellate Court 07-13-11by: Abassos • July 12, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
U.S. Supreme Court 07-07-11by: Abassos • July 6, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
The Supreme Court reiterated today that the credibility of witnesses offering hearsay statements should not be taken into account when evaluating "trustworthiness" under the hearsay exceptions. Rather, the correct inquiry is into the trustworthiness of the statement. Further, the court held that federal due process requires the trial court to admit hearsay statements against penal interest even when the declarant testifies. The case involves consolidated appeals of two co-defendants convicted of murdering a woman during a robbery. The defendants attempted to admit hearsay statements of a person who confessed to the murder to four different people on four separate occasions. One defendant argued that the statements against penal interest exception applied, while the other argued the residual hearsay exception applied. The trial court refused to admit the statements, reasoning that the witnesses were completely incredible and even if they were, the penal interest exception only applies when the declarant is unavailable. The Court of Appeals below and the Supreme Court disagreed on the question of trustworthiness, since the trial court had made a credibility determination that should be left for the jury. Rather, there were substantial facts making the statements trustworthy:
Citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 US 284 (1973), the court further held that federal due process requires the admission of the statements at issue, despite the fact that they do not strictly fit under the statement against penal interest hearsay exception in the OEC. For the defendant who argued that the residual hearsay exception applied, the court disagreed, reaffirming that statements that fit under an exception but do not meet its requirements cannot be admitted through the residual exception instead. However, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that the error here was plain and reversed both judgments. State v. Cazares-Mendez/Reyes-Sanchez
Oregon Supreme Court 06-30-11by: Abassos • June 29, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
Oregon Appellate Court 06-29-11by: Abassos • June 28, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
U.S. Supreme Court 06-27-11by: Grapkoch • June 26, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
In a per curiam disposition available here (scroll to the bottom), the Court vacates the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Juvenile Male on mootness grounds. Although the Ninth Circuit had concluded that the SORNA provision requiring registration of juvenile offenders was unconstitutional on ex post facto grounds, [a]t the time of the Ninth Circuit's decision in this case, the District Court's order of juvenile supervision had expired, and respondent was no longer subject to the sex offender-registration conditions that he sought to challenge on appeal .As a result, respondent's challenge was moot before the Ninth Circuit unless he could "show that a decision invalidating" the District Court's order would likely redress some collateral consequence of the registration conditions. This result was prompted, in large part, by the Montana Supreme Court's certification that JM's continuing duty to register under state law was not contingent upon the continuing validity of the SORNA requirements. United States v. Juvenile Male
U.S. Supreme Court 06-23-11by: Grapkoch • June 22, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
In Freeman v. United States, the Court addressed whether a defendant is ineligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which allows a district court to reduce a term of imprisonment after it has been imposed if the defendant was sentenced based on a sentencing range that the U.S. Sentencing Commission subsequently lowered, because the district court accepted a plea agreement pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C), which binds the district court as to sentence once it accepts the plea. In a plurality opinion, supplemented by Justice Sotomayor's concurrence, the Court answers yes. I'll let you sort out the more technical distinctions between the plurality and the controlling concurrence, but Justice Sotomayor agrees with the plurality on the pivotal principle that the sentence at issue here was "based on" § 3582(c)(2). The key distinction is that Justice Sotomayor appears to believe this to be the case only when "a [Fed.R.Crim.P 11(c)(1)(C)] agreement expressly uses a Guidelines sentencing range applicable to the charged offense to establish the term of imprisonment, and that range is subsequently lowered by the United States Sentencing Commission." The dissent agrees and disagrees with both the plurality and the concurrence. In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor had initially opined that "[i]n my view, the term of imprisonment imposed by a district court pursuant to an agreement authorized by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) is 'based on' the agreement itself, not on the judge's calculation of the Sentencing Guidelines." The dissent believes that she got it right, and should have stopped there: I agree with the concurrence that the sentence imposed under a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement is based on the agreement, not the Sentencing Guidelines. I would, however, adhere to that logic regardless whether the agreement could be said to 'use' or 'employ' a Guidelines range in arriving at the particular sentence specified in the agreement. In that respect I agree with the plurality that the approach of the concurrence to determining when a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) sentence may be reduced is arbitrary and unworkable That appears to be the crux of the argument between the opinions in this case. So, as noted above, for now I'll leave you with the task of sorting out the more particular details. More information on Freeman v. United States can be found at the SCOTUSblog case page, available here.
Oregon Appellate Court 06-22-11by: Abassos • June 21, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
U.S. Supreme Court 06-20-11by: Grapkoch • June 19, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
In Turner v. Rogers, the defendant sought review from the Supreme Court on the issue as to whether an indigent defendant has a constitutional right to appointed counsel at a civil contempt proceeding that results in his incarceration. At issue here was whether a non-custodial parent who was charged with failing to meet child support obligations must be provided with counsel where his ability to pay is contested. The Court answers yes-at least, maybe yes, under the right circumstances: We conclude that where as here the custodial parent (entitled to receive the support) is unrepresented by counsel, the State need not provide counsel to the noncustodial parent (required to provide the support). But we attach an important caveat, namely, that the State must nonetheless have in place alternative procedures that assure a fundamentally fair determination of the critical incarceration-related question, whether the supporting parent is able to comply with the support order. The Court begins by noting that this case is not governed by the Sixth Amendment. "[T]he Sixth Amendment does not govern civil cases. Civil contempt differs from criminal contempt in that it seeks only to 'coerce the defendant to do' what a courthad previously ordered him to do." Instead, the Court proceeds under a Fourteenth Amendment analysis while noting that this limited Due Process right only assures that fundamental safeguards are in place. Applying the three-part test of Mathews v. Eldridge to address this fundamental safeguards inquiry, the Court ultimately rejects a categorical rule requiring appointed counsel in all such circumstances for three reasons:
Reviewing this decision, it is important to keep in mind the Court's overriding caveat. In fact, the majority repeatedly stresses that its refusal to craft a categorical rule is not dispositive: We consequently hold that the Due Process Clause does not automatically require the provision of counsel at civil contempt proceedings to an indigent individual who is subject to a child support order, even if that individual faces incarceration (for up to a year). In particular, that Clause does not require the provision of counsel where the opposing parent or other custodian (to whom support funds are owed) is not represented by counsel and the State provides alternative procedural safeguards equivalent to those we have mentioned. (Emphasis in original). Accordingly, the Court reverses and remands this case on a finding of constitutional error because Turner was neither represented by counsel nor afforded the procedural safeguards required by due process. More information on Turner v. Rogers can be found via the SCOTUSblog case page, available here. Turner v. Rogers
U.S. Supreme Court 06-16-11by: Grapkoch • June 15, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
This morning, the Court announced its decision on whether to apply the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule when police conduct a search in compliance with binding precedent that is later overruled. In refusing to do so, the Court explained that "[b]ecause suppression would do nothing to deter police misconduct in these circumstances, and because it would come at a high cost to both the truth and the public safety, we hold that searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule." In arriving at this conclusion, the majority explicitly rejects the proposition that the exclusionary rule is "a self-executing mandate implicit in the FourthAmendment itself." Instead, the Court reiterates the need to engage in "a more rigorous weighing" of "costs and deterrence benefits" of the rule, with a particularly sharp eye towards "the 'flagrancy of the police misconduct' at issue." Under this test, "[p]olice practices trigger the harsh sanction of exclusion only when they are deliberate enough to yield 'meaningful' deterrence, and culpable enough to be 'worth the price paid by the justice system.'" Applying the foregoing test, the Court notes that because the appellate precedent at issue here actually authorized a certain police practice, "all agree that the officers' conduct [at issue here] was in strict compliance with then-binding Circuit law and was not culpable in any way." In fact, the "officers who conducted the search did not violate Davis's Fourth Amendment rights deliberately, recklessly, or with gross negligence .Nor does this case involve any 'recurring or systemic negligence' on the part of law enforcement .The police acted instrict compliance with binding Circuit precedent." (Citations omitted). Therefore, there was no basis for concluding that the deterrent value of the rule exceeded its social costs. Along the way to this conclusion, the Court rejects two very notable arguments (both were advocated by Davis and adopted by the dissent):
More information on Davis v. United States can be found at the SCOTUSblog case page, available here.
Oregon Appellate Court 06-15-11by: Abassos • June 14, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
U.S. Supreme Court 06-13-11by: Grapkoch • June 12, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
I skipped the updates last Thursday morning, as I was out of town. Two opinions were issued, although both involved the construction of federal statutes. So, in case you missed the June 9th opinions and you're still interested at this point, here's a recap: → read the full summaries...Oregon Appellate Court 06-08-11by: Abassos • June 7, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
Possession of child pornography is not sufficient in itself for a finding of child endangerment. The state did not make a sufficient showing that a threat of exposure to pornographic images is harmful enough to children to justify a finding of endangerment. In addition, the mere fact that the father possessed images of child pornography was not enough by itself to show that the father posed a harm to his children. In the Matter of T.F.
U.S. Supreme Court 06-06-11by: Grapkoch • June 5, 2011 • no comments Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
In a fairly exciting development, the Supreme Court announced today that is was accepting certiorari in the case of Martinez v. Ryan, which asks whether a defendant in a state criminal case who is prohibited by state law from raising on direct appeal any claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, but who has a state-law right to raise such a claim in a first post-conviction proceeding, has a federal constitutional right to effective assistance of first post-conviction counsel specifically with respect to his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. In the opinion below, the Ninth Circuit answered in the negative: "We have already concluded that there is no right to the assistance of post-conviction counsel in connection with a state petition for post-conviction relief, such as Martinez asserts in this case. Without a right to the appointment of counsel, there can be no right to the effective assistance of counsel." So, next term we'll likely get a chance to see if the Supremes agree with that proposition. More information can be found at the SCOTUSblog case page, available here.
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