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Framing the proportionality argument for ECSA I
by: Ryan Scott • July 20, 2026 • no comments
In 1985, the Oregon legislature created a graded scheme of criminal liability aimed at ending child sexual abuse. The statutory scheme “punishes most harshly the creation of child pornography, next, its distribution, beyond that, its use to promote further abuse of children, and finally, its use in general.” State v. Porter, 241 Or App 26, 34, 249 P3d 139 (2011). Accordingly, like the previous statutes aimed at punishing dissemination of child pornography, the legislature chose the term “duplicate” to capture commercial practices associated with distribution and production. Not to capture conduct associated with possessing or viewing an image—which would be punishable as second-degree conduct.
The legislative history of ORS 163.684(l)(a)(A) makes clear that it was intended to encompass those who “disseminate” and “deal” in child pornography, not those who merely possess it without that intention.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals has held that downloading images (which does not necessarily implicate any intent to distribute the images) equals "duplication" under the ECSA I statute.
Consequently, when a defendant downloads images for their own personal use, they are charged under the first degree version of the statute, which was intended to address more than mere possession. In other words, the COA has erased the principal distinction between the acts that form the prohibited conduct is possession and control (that is the second-degree crime) and duplication or dissemination of more child pornography (that constitutes the first-degree offense). State v. Pugh, 255 Or App 357, 365, 297 P3d 27 (2013)
The Oregon Supreme Court has turned down the opportunity to review the COA holding.
So how does this implicate the Proportionality Clause of the Oregon Constitution?
Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution provides that “all penalties shall be proportioned to the offense.” A sentence is constitutionally disproportionate when it shocks the moral sense of reasonable persons as to what is right or proper under the circumstances. State v. Wheeler, 343 Or 652, 656, 669-71, 175 P3d 438 (2007). In determining whether a sentence “shocks the moral sense,” a court considers three factors: “(1) a comparison of the severity of the penalty and the gravity of the offense; (2) a comparison of the penalties imposed for other, related crimes; and (3) the criminal history of the defendant.” Rodriguez/Buck, 347 Or at 58. That analysis focuses on the offense to which the claimed disproportionate sentence is applied, not the totality of the defendant’s criminal conduct. State v. Carey-Martin, 293 Or App 611, 621-21, 640, 643, 430 P3d 98 (2018).
The first factor of the Rodriguez/Buck test requires a court to compare the severity of the penalty and the gravity of the offense. Ridriguez/Buck, 347 Or at 58. The severity of a penalty is the amount of time that the wrongdoer must spend in prison or jail, if convicted of that offense. Id. at 60. An “offense” is defined as the general statutory definition of the crime and, in an as-applied challenge, as the convicted person’s particular criminal conduct within the range of the conduct proscribed by the statute. Id. at 62. In comparing the severity of the penalty and the gravity of the offense, a court “may consider, among other things, the specific circumstances and facts of the defendant’s conduct that come within the statutory definition of the offense, as well as other case specific factors, such as characteristics of the defendant and the victim, the harm to the victim, and the relationship between the defendant and the victim.”
Rodriguez/Buck informs this court’s application of the first factor in this case. Defendant Rodriquez was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse committed by pulling the back of a thirteen-year-old boy’s head against her clothed breasts and caressing his face for about a minute. 347 Or at 48. Defendant Buck was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse committed by failing to remove the back of his hand from a 13-year-old girl’s clothed buttocks after she had leaned against him while casting a fishing line and by wiping dirt off the back of her shorts. Id. The trial court in each case determined that a 75-month prison sentence violated the proportionality clause of Article I, section 16 and imposed a lesser sentence. Id. After engaging in the three-factor analysis described above, the Supreme Court concluded that “the imposition of the mandatory 75–month sentence for first-degree sexual abuse, as applied to the facts of Rodriguez’s and Buck’s offenses, would violate the [state] constitutional requirement that the penalty be proportioned to the offense.” Id. at 50.
In considering the first factor, the Rodriguez/Buck court noted that the first-degree sexual abuse statute, ORS 163.427(1), criminalizes a broad range of conduct, “including, but not limited to, momentary touching of an intimate part without the victim’s awareness or knowledge, touching that the victim apprehends but does not appreciate as sexual, momentary touching over clothing, prolonged hand to genital contact, prolonged skin to skin genital contact, and, of course, forcing a person under 18 to engage in bestiality.” Id. at 69 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court remarked that the Rodriguez/Buck defendants’ conduct was on the outer edge of that conduct. Id.at 75.
Similarly, ECSA I also criminalizes a broad range of conduct. Written in the days prior to the internet, the statute was intended to criminalize the dissemination of child pornography. The consequences of such dissemination was severe.
Furthermore, the introduction of child pornography encourages and sustains a marketplace for such images, often commercializing and commodifying the criminal activity that depends on the continuing victimization of the child.
The severity of the harm is reflected in the punishment. ECSA I is a crime seriousness level 8, so that even someone with no criminal history is presumptively subject to a prison sentence. That sentence becomes exponentially longer with each additional count. However, the Court of Appeals has held that a person can be guilty of ECSA I merely by downloading (“duplicating”) an image for their own personal use, behavior which is more consistent with ECSA II, which is a crime seriousness level 5 on the Oregon Sentencing Guidelines and presumptive probation if the defendant has no criminal history..
In other words, merely downloading an image for one’s personal use does not involve the commodification and ongoing victimization that arises from the dissemination of the images, and therefore the defendant’s behavior is on the outer edge of the conduct made criminal by the statute.
Because defendant’s conduct is comparable to mere possession of the images and ECSA II, and far less severe than the originally intended scope of ECSA I, it is disproportionate to sentence defendant as a level 8 CSL as if he were a distributor of child pornography and not a level 5 CSL, which is more reflective of the nature and seriousness his conduct.
Updated Post on Cutting-Edge Proportionality Arguments
by: Ryan Scott • July 11, 2026 • no comments
I wrote a Library of Defense post slightly more than a year ago on a number of proportionality arguments that were open questions but had a sound basis in case law. Here is a partial list of what I wrote. What follows will be an update regarding those arguments (including one that has already won!) and additional crimes where a proportionality argument might be justified.
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First, when the defendant has already been shown to be rehabilitated. How often does that come into play at sentencing? All the time, specifically when a defendant receives a lengthy prison sentence to run consecutively to a Murder II sentence. In that case, the defendant’s only opportunity to begin serving the consecutive portion of the sentence in this case is if the parole board finds that he is likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time. Imposing the consecutive sentence is unconstitutional because he will only be able to serve that sentence once it is determined that he has reformed and will not likely return to his criminal behavior. [Update: the opening brief on this issue has been written by OPDC, and the state's response brief is due in a few months.]
Second, when the defendant's health problems would render the prison sentence particularly cruel. [Update: This has been argued by me at the COA just a month ago. I expect it will be a year before we get an opinion.]
Third, when a defendant receives the same sentence for felony murder (when he neither killed the victim nor intended the victim to be killed) as a person who, for example, intentionally kills their spouse in cold-blood. How can the same sentence be proportionate to both offenses? [No updates that I am aware of.]
Fourth, the crime of sexual abuse in the second degree when it is based on age. In a 1955 case called State v. Pirkey, the Oregon Supreme Court struck as unconstitutional a crime that could be treated as either a misdemeanor or a felony, it did so under the equal privileges clause. The COA -- in a per curiam opinion in St v Alvey -- would subsequently hold that that portion of Pirkey had been overruled in a different equal privileges case. What no one mentioned in Alvey was that Pirkey seemed to suggest that giving the prosecutor the ability to charge the same behavior as either a felony or a misdemeanor violated Oregon's proportionality clause as well.
The Oregon Constitution provides that "all penalties shall be proportioned to the offense. * * *" Oregon Constitution, Article I, Section 16. In the case at bar the offense, that is to say, the specific act which is prohibited, is clearly defined, but it is difficult to see how two separate and distinct punishments can both be proportionate to the same identical offense when the sentencing court is given no discretionary power to choose between them. State v. Pirkey, 203 Ore. 697, 705 (Or. 1955)
A defendant charged with having otherwise consensual sex with a 17 year old is guilty of a felony Sex Abuse II. For the exact same behavior, they could be guilty of misdemeanor Contributing to the Sexual Delinquency of a Minor. How can both a felony and a misdemeanor be proportionate to the identical offense? [Update: this issue has finally been preserved, but the opening brief is not due for a few months.]
Fifth, when the defendant has significantly greater mental health problems than the defendant in State v. Gonzalez, such that might rise to a GEI claim but which the defendant did not pursue at trial. [Update: this WON in State v Clark, 347 Or App 721 (2026)]
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And now, for some additional crimes which raise proportionality arguments:
Use of a Child in a Sexually Explicit Display: when soliciting a selfie from a 14-17 year old results in 75 months prison, but having sex with the 14-17 year old would result in probation, there's a proportionality problem. I argued this in February to the COA, and we are just waiting on a decision, which I expect won't be until 2027. Note, this is an as-applied argument, not a straight vertical proportionality argument, and so it is important to highlight other case-specific factors when they would impact the analysis, including: (1) was the selfie for the defendant's personal use or did he plan to enter it into the black market, (2) was the defendant a relative or teacher or coach, (3) how explicit was the photo, e.g., topless selfie versus, well, you know?
ECSA I: did the defendant simply download pictures (i.e., duplicate images for his own personal use) and therefore his behavior was of the type ECSA II was supposed to address? This again is an as-applied argument. I wrote something up in a hurry if anyone wants it, but I haven't had reason yet to write it in full.
Unlawful Use of a Weapon with a Firearm: when the defendant points a firearm at another person, he could be subject to five years in prison under UUW w/a firearm, but he could also be subject to a misdemeanor under the crime of Pointing a Firearm at Another. In other words, there is a Pirkey problem, just like SA II above.
Some of these arguments would have a huge impact in the life of a single defendant but maybe no one else. That's reason enough to do. Some of these other arguments would, at least for a time, completely change the legal landscape for a huge swath of deserving defendants and make the world a kinder, fairer place. It wouldn't be the first time that one defense lawyer, making -- and losing -- an argument at the trial court, changed the world for the better.
Threatening to Use a Weapon versus Using a Weapon to Threaten
by: Ryan Scott • June 8, 2026 • no comments
I wrote about this more than ten years ago, but it's probably worth revisiting since every now and then, the distinction might be useful.
If I point a gun at you in a menacing way, that will likely constitute the crime of Unlawful Use of a Weapon, barring any defenses. But what if I tell you that if you don't leave my neighborhood, I'm going to go inside, get a gun, and then come back out and shoot you? Is that UUW?
Here's what the Oregon Supreme Said about the subject, when tasked with deciding whether the "use" in UUW encompassed threatening someone with a firearm.
- The problem with both arguments is that they neglect to distinguish between threatening to use a weapon and using a weapon as a threat. The two are not—or at least, not necessarily—the same. One may threaten to use a weapon without ever touching it, as when, for example, a person says to another, "If you do not give me your money, I will get my gun and shoot you." That does not constitute a current "use" of a weapon, as it is a threat to use it sometime in the future. In contrast, one also may use a weapon as a threat, as when one person points a gun at another and says, "Give me your money." In a sense, that is a threat to use the weapon in the future; there is an implicit warning that, if the money is not forthcoming, the gun will be fired. But—and this is key—it is also a current use of the weapon as a threat.
State v. Ziska, 355 Or 799, 808, 334 P3d 964 (2014)[Bold added.]
Sex and Firearms
by: Ryan Scott • May 6, 2026 • no comments
Yes, another proportionality post. I am comparing two arguments, one I have raised frequently in the past few years, and one that I wrote about fourteen years ago and then forgot.
Under the Oregon Constitution, a sentence not only can't be cruel and unusual. It also can't be disproportionate.
This comes into play in three ways. The first is that the sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because it violates vertical proportionality. That is, the sentence for the lesser-included offense is greater than the sentence for the greater offense. For example, under Sex Abuse II, sex with a 16 or 17 year old is ranked as a crime seriousness 7 under the guidelines but Rape III, sex with a 14 or 15 year old, is ranked as a crime seriousness 6. Under a case the state believes was wrongly decided, State v. Simonson, this scheme violates the proportionality clause.
Alternatively, if the facts of any particular case -- taking into account a number of factors -- are far less egregious than typical, then the typical sentence might also violate proportionality. See Buck/Rodriguez.
The third way is that the characteristics of the defendant (age, mental ability, mental health) make the defendant less culpable and therefore the sentence that would be imposed on a normally culpable defendant would be disproportionate when imposed on the less culpable defendant. Not going to touch on this one in this post.
I have proposed an expansion of the sentencing scheme/vertical proportionality argument, which can be thought of a facial challenge, but my expansion is part-facial, part-as-applied. If the exact same behavior can be charged as either a felony or a misdemeanor, how is it possible that both a felony sentence and a misdemeanor sentence can be proportionate to the crime?
The Oregon Supreme Court asked this question sixty years ago but it hasn't answered it yet.
- The Oregon Constitution provides that "all penalties shall be proportioned to the offense. * * *" Oregon Constitution, Article I, Section 16. In the case at bar the offense, that is to say, the specific act which is prohibited, is clearly defined, but it is difficult to see how two separate and distinct punishments can both be proportionate to the same identical offense when the sentencing court is given no discretionary power to choose between them.
State v. Pirkey, 203 Ore. 697, 705 (Or. 1955)
The Court of Appeals, in a very different context, made this observation:
- It would be illogical to presume that the legislature intended that identical criminal conduct could, depending solely on prosecutorial discretion, be indicted as either of two degrees of a crime with such widely divergent sentencing ranges.
State v. Cook, 163 Or App 578, 586, 989 P2d 474 (1999).
This comes into play, because sex abuse II, when it is based solely on the age of the victim being under 18, is a felony. But contributing to the sexual delinquency of a minor, the exact same behavior -- sex with someone under 18 -- is a misdemeanor. How can both be proportionate? How can that, according to the COA, be logical?
Okay, that's the sex part. Here's the firearm part.
Arguably, the same dynamic is at play when a defendant is charged with unlawful use of a weapon based on threatening someone with a firearm.
- We conclude that, as used in ORS 166.220(1)(a), "use" refers both to employment of a weapon to inflict harm or injury and employment of a weapon to threaten immediate harm or injury. In these cases, the evidence is undisputed that each defendant displayed a dangerous or deadly weapon against another person in a manner that threatened the other person with imminent serious physical injury.
State v. Ziska, 355 Or 799, 811, 334 P3d 964, 970 (2014)
UUW is, obviously, a felony.
But pointing a firearm at someone "with malice" is also a misdemeanor.
- 166.190 Pointing firearm at another; courts having jurisdiction over offense. Any person over the age of 12 years who, with or without malice, purposely points or aims any loaded or empty pistol, gun, revolver or other firearm, at or toward any other person within range of the firearm, except in self-defense, shall be fined upon conviction in any sum not less than $10 nor more than $500, or be imprisoned in the county jail not less than 10 days nor more than six months, or both.
Whether or not they are describing the same crime would depend on the definition of "with malice." Without looking at the legislative history, I struggle to see how pointing a firearm at someone with malice could mean anything other than a threat to shoot them. What else could malice mean?
To be clear, this is not something where the sentencing scheme is itself disproportionate. UUW can be charged any number of ways, and it would be necessary to take into account what the defendant actually did. But if pointing a firearm at someone with malice necessarily encompasses pointing a firearm at them in order to threaten shooting them, then how can both a felony sentence (perhaps five years under the gun minimum) or a maximum six-month jail sentence for a misdemeanor both be proportionate to the offense?
What to do about this? At sentencing on either a sex abuse II based solely on age, or UUW based solely on threatening someone with a firearm, ask for immediate misdemeanor treatment, because doing otherwise would violate Oregon's proportionality clause. Be sure to quote Pirkey when you do so.
One side note. If your client is accused at pointing a gun at someone, and your argument is that they did so as a warning, not a threat, I highly recommend asking that the jury be allowed to consider the lesser-offense of "pointing a firearm at another."
Challenging the Gridblock for Online Sexual Corruption
by: Ryan Scott • May 1, 2026 • no comments
This week, the Oregon Supreme Court remanded a case back to the Court of Appeals to decide whether the sentence for Online Sexual Solicitation of a Minor violates Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution. Specifically, does it violate the rule known as vertical proportionality, whereby a lesser offense imposes a greater punishment than a greater offense?
For example, if the sentence for theft in the third degree was greater than theft in the first degree, that would violate proportionality. Online sexual corruption of a child in the first degree is committed when a perpetrator uses an online communication to contact a person whom they reasonably believe is under 16 years of age for the purposes of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of the perpetrator or another person and intentionally takes a substantial step towards meeting the child. Online sexual corruption of a child is a category 8 offense, which makes it presumptive prison.
But if that same perpetrator has sex with, say, a 15 year old, the sentence is a category 6 offense and presumptive probation if the perpetrator has either no or little criminal history.
Above, I used the phrase "lesser offense" in describing the situation where a lesser offense is treated more harshly than a greater offense. But that phrase "lesser offense" glosses over a significant legal issue. Note I did not say "lesser-included offense" because Online Sexual Corruption is a not a lesser-included offense. And the state would argue it is not always a lesser offense. For example, what if the defendant was communicating with a 10 year old?
Imagine a not uncommon scenario where the defendant wasn't communicating with a child at all, but an undercover police officer who had logged into an adults-only website and told the defendant he was a minor child.
Vertical proportionality has existed for a long-time in Oregon. Historically, it was limited to looking at the punishment for related offenses, not the facts of any particular case. More to the point, it has existed since long before Rodriguez/Buck, the cases which held for the first time that defendants could argue that the specific facts of their case rendered a sentence unconstitutionally disproportionate. So vertical proportionality meant the sentencing scheme was unconstitutional, but Rodriguez/Buck and their progeny meant a sentence could be unconsitutional as-applied to a specific defendant, based on their conduct and particular characteristics.
The defendant in the hypothetical I described -- and probably the defendant in the vast majority of Online Sexual Corruption stings -- has, in my opinion, a very strong argument for an as-applied challenge. It is not unlike a scenario where a defendant is convicted of Using a Child in a Sexually Explicit Display, for soliciting a slightly lewd photo from a 15 year old and getting 70 months in prison, when having sex with that same 15 year old would result in probation. Under those facts, it's a very compelling argument that the greater sentence is disproportionate compared to the much lesser sentence for more serious behavior.
But a facial challenge to the sentencing scheme is going to be a problem, because the state will have an argument that not every Online Sexual Corruption or Using a Child Case will involve less egregious behavior. In the abstract, it could be worse behavior, and the problem with a facial challenge is the court may have to consider abstractions, specifically whether Online Sexual Corruption could ever be worse than Rape in the Third Degree.
In sum, you almost always want to argue the sentence is unconstitutional as-applied, in addition to any facial challenge you want to make.
