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<h4>Wiretaps and Body-wires</h4> '''OR.S.Ct.'''
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<h4>Attorney Fees</h4> '''Trial Court Must Make a Record of Defendant’s Ability to Pay'''
  
To suppress evidence obtained from a body-wire or a wiretap, under ORS 133.735-736 the defendant must be an “aggrieved person.” An aggrieved person is either a party to the intercepted communication, or is a person “identified in the order ‘whose oral communications are to be intercepted.’” Here, defendant was not a party to the intercepted communications because he was not present during the recorded conversation, nor was defendant identified in the body-wire order. Therefore, he was not an aggrieved person and could not suppress the conversation under ORS 133.736. State v. Klein 
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A court may not impose attorney fees upon a Defendant unless the court makes a record of Defendant’s particular circumstances from which the trial court could find Defendant “is or may be able” to pay the fees.
  
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Here, Defendant was ordered to pay $400 in attorneys fees.  His attorney had informed the trial court that Defendant did not work and had no money.  The state did not provide any evidence to the contrary.  The order to pay was reversed because the trial court record said nothing about Defendant’s particular circumstances and the state has the burden to show he can pay.  [http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/Publications/A148382.pdf State v. Pendergrapht]
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<h4>Venue</h4> '''State Must Show Where Defendant Was Located on Expiration of Ten Day Period'''
  
<h4>Animal Abuse</h4>'''''Goats are Victims Too'''''
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In order to prove venue for failure to register as a sex offender under ORS 131.305(1), the state must show where the defendant was on the expiration of the 10-day period.  State v. Depeche and State v. Macnab.  Here, the state showed that defendant moved out of a treatment facility and that he didn’t register within ten days of that move. But thestate did not show where defendant was on day ten or establish the standard for alternative venue under ORS 131.325.  The fact that defendant ultimately resurfaced in Multnomah county does not establish venue in that county.  [http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/Publications/A143564.pdf State v. Thompson]
  
Each individual animal identified with a count of animal abuse will qualify as a separate victim. Here, twenty counts of second degree animal abuse could not be merged into a single conviction because each separate count “identified a different animal and charged conduct by defendant toward that animal.” [http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/Publications/A145386.pdf State v. Nix] 
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<h4>Speedy Trial</h4> '''Eight-Year Delay Following Failure to Appear is “Reasonable”'''
  
<h4>Inventory</h4>'''''Pandora’s Closed Container of Exceptions'''''
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Defendant does not implicitly consent to a delay by failing to appear to court.  However, the amount of delay that follows a failure to appear is reasonable where the defendant knew that he was required to appear and that failing to do so would result in the issuance of a warrant for his arrest.  Here, the defendant failed to appear for a pretrial conference in 2000, and the state didn’t execute the warrant for his arrest until 2008. The court holds that although defendant did not consent to the delay, that portion of the delay was nonetheless reasonable.  [http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/Publications/A141240.pdf State v. Hernandez-Lopez]
  
The Portland police inventory policy for opening closed containers designed to contain valuables (1) only applies to items in the possession of a person placed in custody, and (2) must occur prior to placing such person into a holding room or police vehicle. Here, defendant was a passenger in a stopped car, so he was stopped, but he was not "in custody" for purposes of inventory because he was only stopped as a witness. The state could not use the arrested driver's constructive possession of the bag to justify the search because the driver was already in the patrol car.
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<h4>Unlawful Extension of a Stop</h4> '''Must Have Reasonable Suspicion of the Crime Officers Are Investigating'''
  
The state’s arguments that defendant lost his privacy rights in his laptop bag are unpersuasive to the court:
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“An officer’s reasonable suspicion about certain crimes does not justify the officer’s extension of a stop to conduct an investigation of another crime for which the officer does not also have reasonable suspicion.”  An officer does not have reasonable suspicion of PCS based on (1) furtive movement, (2) rotting teeth, (3) general nervousness, and (4) possible car theft and attempt to elude police officer.
  
*A denial of ownership does not itself establish an intention to relinquish all interests in the property.  Defendant had a continuing privacy interest in his bag even though he initially denied owning it, then said he was holding onto it for a friend.
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Here, defendant was stopped for failure to wear a seatbelt, and the officer saw him reach toward the passenger floorboard before approaching the car.  Defendant did not have a license, insurance, or registration documents with him, and he told the officers that he had borrowed the car. When officers asked him to step out of the car, he acted nervously, rolled up the windows, and reached for his keysUltimately, the officers conducted a dog-sniff on the car and found drugsUnder these circumstances, the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to extend the stop to investigate for drugs, even if they could have investigated theft of the car or attempting to elude a police officer.  [http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/Publications/A145415.pdf State v. Kentopp]
*Officers may conduct a search to determine the owner of lost property only when the property is actually lost, as in abandonedThere is no exception to the warrant requirement that allows officers to open a closed container in order to determine whether the contents are stolen.
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*A defendant only loses his privacy interest to stolen goods that are in plain viewHere, officers suspected, but did not know that the laptop bag contained stolen goods.  
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[http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/Publications/A143095.pdf State v. Rowell]
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<h4>Preservation</h4> '''Authentication'''
  
<h4>Stops</h4>'''''No Stop If Officer Says Free to Leave'''''
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Defendant’s appellate argument regarding authentication of a photograph was not preserved by a trial argument that there was a discovery or Due Process violation.  Nor is an authentication argument preserved by a general objection of “Foundation”. [http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/Publications/A145184.pdf State v. Ritchie]
  
A stop occurred when police asked for defendant’s identification, wrote down the defendant’s information on his hand and told the defendant that he had been seen engaging in strange behavior. However, the stop ended when a police officer informed defendant that he was free to leave, even though the police officer had just told the defendant to stand in the search position with his hands behind his back. Therefore, the evidence obtained from defendant’s consent to search after that point was not the product of an illegal stop.  [http://courts.oregon.gov/Publications/A143570.pdf State v. Canfield]
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<h4>Stops</h4> '''Sufficient Show of Authority - Mere Conversation Not Unlawful'''
  
<h4>Speeding</h4>
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Under a totality of the circumstances approach, the interaction of the two plain clothes police officers with the Defendants was not a sufficient show of authority to constitute an unlawful seizure where the officers flashed their badges but calmly and casually spoke to the Defendants in their parked car.
  
A person may be found guilty of speeding, under ORS 811.111, if the person either drives above the statutorily designated speed limit for that type of road or drives above a posted speed limit that is different from the designated speeds. Defendant had argued, based on the language of the statute, that if the designated speed is posted then the statute wouldn’t apply.  The court rejects that construction: “under that interpretation, the statutory speeds. . .could not be both posted and enforced.[http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/Publications/A143367.pdf State v. Patrick]  
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Here, Defendants were sitting in a parked car in a parking lot under observation by plain clothes police officers due to suspected drug trafficking in the parking lot. The police officers approached the car on either side, rapped on the windows, and showed their badges.  The officers suggested to the Defendants that their behavior was suspicious and that they were trespassing.  At that point, one Defendant dropped four bindles of drugs from her hand. Defendant argues that the interaction between the police officers and the Defendants before the Defendant dropped the bindles was an unconstitutional seizure.  The court reasoned that while the officers approached the car in concert, they did not physically block the Defendant’s means of exiting the car. They spoke to the Defendants in a calm and conversational tone and did not draw their weapons or ask for identification. The court held that, taken together, the circumstances do not indicate a “sufficient show of authority” to constitute an unlawful seizure. [http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/Publications/A145982.pdf State v. Moats]
  
<h4>Juvenile Dependency</h4>'''''Hearsay Statements by Step-Child to DHS Worker Are Admissible Under Party-Opponent Exception'''''
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<h4>Dependency</h4> '''Child Neglect'''
  
When DHS offers a child’s out-of-court statements in a dependency case, they are admissible as non-hearsay statements of a party-opponent under OEC 801(4)(b)(A), because the child is a party adverse to  DHS. This applies to step-children too because DHS puts their step-child/parent relationship at risk.  [http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/Publications/A150208.pdf DHS v. JG]
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A DHS determination of child neglect was founded where there  was reasonable suspicion of a risk of harm from mom allowing dad to move back in to her house.
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Here, the court reverses the trial court and affirms that the DHS order was proper.  First, mother had stipulated in the dependency jurisdictional hearing that father posed a risk to the minor.  Second, there was independent evidence of a risk of harm.  For example, the minor had reported to school officials that his father tried to stab him. The mother had been informed previously by DHS that the father was not to have contact with the minor because he was a sex offender and prohibited from having contact with children.  The mother had been informed by the father’s parole officer that father had violated the conditions of his parole and that a warrant had been issued for his arrest. The court held that under these circumstances, DHS properly determined that there was reasonable suspicion that the mother had placed the minor under threat of harm.  [http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/Publications/A148861.pdf A.F. v. Or. Dept. of Human Serv.]

Revision as of 10:54, August 10, 2012

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Attorney Fees

Trial Court Must Make a Record of Defendant’s Ability to Pay

A court may not impose attorney fees upon a Defendant unless the court makes a record of Defendant’s particular circumstances from which the trial court could find Defendant “is or may be able” to pay the fees.

Here, Defendant was ordered to pay $400 in attorneys fees. His attorney had informed the trial court that Defendant did not work and had no money. The state did not provide any evidence to the contrary. The order to pay was reversed because the trial court record said nothing about Defendant’s particular circumstances and the state has the burden to show he can pay. State v. Pendergrapht

Venue

State Must Show Where Defendant Was Located on Expiration of Ten Day Period

In order to prove venue for failure to register as a sex offender under ORS 131.305(1), the state must show where the defendant was on the expiration of the 10-day period. State v. Depeche and State v. Macnab. Here, the state showed that defendant moved out of a treatment facility and that he didn’t register within ten days of that move. But thestate did not show where defendant was on day ten or establish the standard for alternative venue under ORS 131.325. The fact that defendant ultimately resurfaced in Multnomah county does not establish venue in that county. State v. Thompson

Speedy Trial

Eight-Year Delay Following Failure to Appear is “Reasonable”

Defendant does not implicitly consent to a delay by failing to appear to court. However, the amount of delay that follows a failure to appear is reasonable where the defendant knew that he was required to appear and that failing to do so would result in the issuance of a warrant for his arrest. Here, the defendant failed to appear for a pretrial conference in 2000, and the state didn’t execute the warrant for his arrest until 2008. The court holds that although defendant did not consent to the delay, that portion of the delay was nonetheless reasonable. State v. Hernandez-Lopez

Unlawful Extension of a Stop

Must Have Reasonable Suspicion of the Crime Officers Are Investigating

“An officer’s reasonable suspicion about certain crimes does not justify the officer’s extension of a stop to conduct an investigation of another crime for which the officer does not also have reasonable suspicion.” An officer does not have reasonable suspicion of PCS based on (1) furtive movement, (2) rotting teeth, (3) general nervousness, and (4) possible car theft and attempt to elude police officer.

Here, defendant was stopped for failure to wear a seatbelt, and the officer saw him reach toward the passenger floorboard before approaching the car. Defendant did not have a license, insurance, or registration documents with him, and he told the officers that he had borrowed the car. When officers asked him to step out of the car, he acted nervously, rolled up the windows, and reached for his keys. Ultimately, the officers conducted a dog-sniff on the car and found drugs. Under these circumstances, the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to extend the stop to investigate for drugs, even if they could have investigated theft of the car or attempting to elude a police officer. State v. Kentopp

Preservation

Authentication

Defendant’s appellate argument regarding authentication of a photograph was not preserved by a trial argument that there was a discovery or Due Process violation. Nor is an authentication argument preserved by a general objection of “Foundation”. State v. Ritchie

Stops

Sufficient Show of Authority - Mere Conversation Not Unlawful

Under a totality of the circumstances approach, the interaction of the two plain clothes police officers with the Defendants was not a sufficient show of authority to constitute an unlawful seizure where the officers flashed their badges but calmly and casually spoke to the Defendants in their parked car.

Here, Defendants were sitting in a parked car in a parking lot under observation by plain clothes police officers due to suspected drug trafficking in the parking lot. The police officers approached the car on either side, rapped on the windows, and showed their badges. The officers suggested to the Defendants that their behavior was suspicious and that they were trespassing. At that point, one Defendant dropped four bindles of drugs from her hand. Defendant argues that the interaction between the police officers and the Defendants before the Defendant dropped the bindles was an unconstitutional seizure. The court reasoned that while the officers approached the car in concert, they did not physically block the Defendant’s means of exiting the car. They spoke to the Defendants in a calm and conversational tone and did not draw their weapons or ask for identification. The court held that, taken together, the circumstances do not indicate a “sufficient show of authority” to constitute an unlawful seizure. State v. Moats

Dependency

Child Neglect

A DHS determination of child neglect was founded where there was reasonable suspicion of a risk of harm from mom allowing dad to move back in to her house.

Here, the court reverses the trial court and affirms that the DHS order was proper. First, mother had stipulated in the dependency jurisdictional hearing that father posed a risk to the minor. Second, there was independent evidence of a risk of harm. For example, the minor had reported to school officials that his father tried to stab him. The mother had been informed previously by DHS that the father was not to have contact with the minor because he was a sex offender and prohibited from having contact with children. The mother had been informed by the father’s parole officer that father had violated the conditions of his parole and that a warrant had been issued for his arrest. The court held that under these circumstances, DHS properly determined that there was reasonable suspicion that the mother had placed the minor under threat of harm. A.F. v. Or. Dept. of Human Serv.