Welcome to The Library

The OCDLA Library of Defense is a digital manual for criminal defense built by the collective contributions of OCDLA members. Ultimately, it will contain every law, every case, every good idea, every expert and every resource an Oregon defense attorney might need. But only if you help us out.

If you visit a page on this website that is missing a case or has a typo, please edit the page. Before editing any pages for the first time, you may want to visit the how to edit page.

If you have any questions or suggestions, please contact Alex Bassos at abassos@gmail.com

This spot will be the entry point to the OCDLA online forum.

• Improper Joinder Demurrer Follow-Up | Ryan Scott
• The Class of Victims | Ryan Scott
• News of the Week | Stacy Du Clos
• Equal Protection, Restitution and Indigency | Rankin Johnson III
• Self Fulfilling Prophecy: Buzzed Driving and DUII | Richard Oberdorfer
• The Silver Lining in McDaniel | Jesse Merrithew
• Obliterating ID Marks on a Firearm | Ryan Scott

To suppress evidence obtained from a body-wire or a wiretap, under ORS 133.735-736 the defendant must be an “aggrieved person.” An aggrieved person is either a party to the intercepted communication, or is a person “identified in the order ‘whose oral communications are to be intercepted.’” Here, defendant was not a party to the intercepted communications because he was not present during the recorded conversation, nor was defendant identified in the body-wire order. Therefore, he was not an aggrieved person and could not suppress the conversation under ORS 133.736. State v. Klein

Each individual animal identified with a count of animal abuse will qualify as a separate victim. Here, twenty counts of second degree animal abuse could not be merged into a single conviction because each separate count “identified a different animal and charged conduct by defendant toward that animal.” State v. Nix

The Portland police inventory policy for opening closed containers designed to contain valuables (1) only applies to items in the possession of a person placed in custody, and (2) must occur prior to placing such person into a holding room or police vehicle. Here, defendant was a passenger in a stopped car, so he was stopped, but he was not "in custody" for purposes of inventory because he was only stopped as a witness. The state could not use the arrested driver's constructive possession of the bag to justify the search because the driver was already in the patrol car.

The state’s arguments that defendant lost his privacy rights in his laptop bag are unpersuasive to the court:

• A denial of ownership does not itself establish an intention to relinquish all interests in the property. Defendant had a continuing privacy interest in his bag even though he initially denied owning it, then said he was holding onto it for a friend.
• Officers may conduct a search to determine the owner of lost property only when the property is actually lost, as in abandoned. There is no exception to the warrant requirement that allows officers to open a closed container in order to determine whether the contents are stolen.
• A defendant only loses his privacy interest to stolen goods that are in plain view. Here, officers suspected, but did not know that the laptop bag contained stolen goods.

State v. Rowell

A stop occurred when police asked for defendant’s identification, wrote down the defendant’s information on his hand and told the defendant that he had been seen engaging in strange behavior. However, the stop ended when a police officer informed defendant that he was free to leave, even though the police officer had just told the defendant to stand in the search position with his hands behind his back. Therefore, the evidence obtained from defendant’s consent to search after that point was not the product of an illegal stop. State v. Canfield

A person may be found guilty of speeding, under ORS 811.111, if the person either drives above the statutorily designated speed limit for that type of road or drives above a posted speed limit that is different from the designated speeds. Defendant had argued, based on the language of the statute, that if the designated speed is posted then the statute wouldn’t apply. The court rejects that construction: “under that interpretation, the statutory speeds. . .could not be both posted and enforced.” State v. Patrick