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| + | Evidence > Standard for Admitting Prior Bad Acts | ||
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| + | Defendant was charged with three counts of first degree rape involving forcible compulsion. At trial, the state introduced the testimony of a fourth woman who testified that she was forcibly compelled to engage in intercourse with the defendant as well. The state argued that the testimony of the witness, a Craigslist masseur, who claimed the defendant forced her to have sex with him, was relevant to proving that victim # 3, an 18 year old who met defendant via a Craigslist relationship ad, was also forcibly raped during her date with the defendant. The testimony was not admissible to (1) prove that victim #3 did not consent, (2) prove defendant’s intent, or (3) prove a method or plan. | ||
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| + | (1) Consent: The fact that one woman refuses consent to have sexual relations with a defendant does not mean that another woman made the same choice because there are too many independent variables to allow one victim’s state of mind to prove another’s. Thus, this was not a valid basis to admit the testimony. | ||
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| + | (2) Intent/ state of mind: In order to admit evidence to show intent, the evidence must: (a) be sufficiently similar to constitute a “complex act requiring several steps, particularly premeditated” and (2) either the defendant concedes that the act occurred, putting intent at issue or the trial judge instructs the jury not to consider uncharged misconduct evidence offered to prove intent unless and until the jury finds the act requires proof of intent to have been done and is proceeding to determine intent. Here, the testimony failed both (1) and (2) because resorting to force during initially consensual sexual contact does not constitute a complex act, and defendant did not concede that he had forcibly raped the victim. | ||
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| + | (3) Method or plan: the standard for admission under method or plan is higher than for intent. The evidence must show “not merely a similarity in the results, but such a concurrence of common features that the various acts are naturally to be explained as caused by a general plan of which they are the individual manifestations.” (quoting Wigmore, 2 Evidence Sec. 304 at 249). Because the evidence was not similar enough to show intent, it was not similar enough to show method. The court also discusses, but does not decide, whether Oregon law requires a standard high enough to show modus operandi in admitting evidence to show a plan. State v. Leistiko. | ||
| + | Statements in Response to Promises > Applies to Private Investigators | ||
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| + | First, ORS 136.425(1)’s prohibition against introducing a confession made “under the influence of fear produced by threats,” applies to inculpatory statements made by defendant in response to promises by private investigators or police that confession would avoid “imminent criminal prosecution.” Here, defendant was induced to confess to stealing items from his employer after private investigators promised leniency by indicating that defendant would keep his job and that cooperation could prevent his wife from learning about the allegations. | ||
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| + | Second, merely reading the Miranda warnings is not sufficient to dispel the prior improperly induced statements when the officer downplays the warning’s significance in the defendant’s mind. Here, defendant made a second series of inculpatory statements to a police officer after talking to the private investigators. The officer gave Miranda warnings but stated that they were “‘a matter of housekeeping’ and just ‘a formality.’” The officer also assured the defendant that he was “not necessarily” going to be arrested and that it was up to his company on how they wanted to handle the situation. These statements failed to dispel the coercive effect of the “prior inducements.” State v. Powell | ||
Revision as of 11:48, July 26, 2012
A Digital Manual For Oregon Criminal DefenseLibraryofdefense.org is an extensive guide and resource for Oregon Defense Attorneys to find everything you need to know about Oregon criminal law. This site compiles relevant case law, statutes, and resources about every subject pertaining to criminal defense, allowing you to quickly and easily find the information you need. LibraryofDefense.org is growing every day with 1,019 articles and counting. The site is built collectively through the contributions of OCDLA members. Check out the help page to see how you can edit any page. Legal Categories |
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How To Contribute To The Library of DefenseHow to edit pages on LibraryofDefense.org... If you visit a page where the article needs work being rewritten and organized, please feel free to edit the page. Before editing any pages, you may need to first request an account: ? and log in; you may then want to play in our sandbox to familiarize yourself with formatting. Random Article Evidence > Standard for Admitting Prior Bad Acts Defendant was charged with three counts of first degree rape involving forcible compulsion. At trial, the state introduced the testimony of a fourth woman who testified that she was forcibly compelled to engage in intercourse with the defendant as well. The state argued that the testimony of the witness, a Craigslist masseur, who claimed the defendant forced her to have sex with him, was relevant to proving that victim # 3, an 18 year old who met defendant via a Craigslist relationship ad, was also forcibly raped during her date with the defendant. The testimony was not admissible to (1) prove that victim #3 did not consent, (2) prove defendant’s intent, or (3) prove a method or plan. (1) Consent: The fact that one woman refuses consent to have sexual relations with a defendant does not mean that another woman made the same choice because there are too many independent variables to allow one victim’s state of mind to prove another’s. Thus, this was not a valid basis to admit the testimony. (2) Intent/ state of mind: In order to admit evidence to show intent, the evidence must: (a) be sufficiently similar to constitute a “complex act requiring several steps, particularly premeditated” and (2) either the defendant concedes that the act occurred, putting intent at issue or the trial judge instructs the jury not to consider uncharged misconduct evidence offered to prove intent unless and until the jury finds the act requires proof of intent to have been done and is proceeding to determine intent. Here, the testimony failed both (1) and (2) because resorting to force during initially consensual sexual contact does not constitute a complex act, and defendant did not concede that he had forcibly raped the victim. (3) Method or plan: the standard for admission under method or plan is higher than for intent. The evidence must show “not merely a similarity in the results, but such a concurrence of common features that the various acts are naturally to be explained as caused by a general plan of which they are the individual manifestations.” (quoting Wigmore, 2 Evidence Sec. 304 at 249). Because the evidence was not similar enough to show intent, it was not similar enough to show method. The court also discusses, but does not decide, whether Oregon law requires a standard high enough to show modus operandi in admitting evidence to show a plan. State v. Leistiko. Statements in Response to Promises > Applies to Private Investigators First, ORS 136.425(1)’s prohibition against introducing a confession made “under the influence of fear produced by threats,” applies to inculpatory statements made by defendant in response to promises by private investigators or police that confession would avoid “imminent criminal prosecution.” Here, defendant was induced to confess to stealing items from his employer after private investigators promised leniency by indicating that defendant would keep his job and that cooperation could prevent his wife from learning about the allegations. Second, merely reading the Miranda warnings is not sufficient to dispel the prior improperly induced statements when the officer downplays the warning’s significance in the defendant’s mind. Here, defendant made a second series of inculpatory statements to a police officer after talking to the private investigators. The officer gave Miranda warnings but stated that they were “‘a matter of housekeeping’ and just ‘a formality.’” The officer also assured the defendant that he was “not necessarily” going to be arrested and that it was up to his company on how they wanted to handle the situation. These statements failed to dispel the coercive effect of the “prior inducements.” State v. Powell |
