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The OCDLA Library of Defense is a digital manual for criminal defense built by the collective contributions of OCDLA members. Ultimately, it will contain every law, every case, every expert, every resource and every good idea an Oregon defense attorney might need.  But only if you help us out. If you visit a page on this website that is missing a case or has a typo, please [[How_To_Edit|edit the page]]. You can even reorganize or rewrite the page if you're feeling ambitious. If you have any questions or suggestions, please email me at: '''Alex Bassos at abassos@gmail.com'''
 
The OCDLA Library of Defense is a digital manual for criminal defense built by the collective contributions of OCDLA members. Ultimately, it will contain every law, every case, every expert, every resource and every good idea an Oregon defense attorney might need.  But only if you help us out. If you visit a page on this website that is missing a case or has a typo, please [[How_To_Edit|edit the page]]. You can even reorganize or rewrite the page if you're feeling ambitious. If you have any questions or suggestions, please email me at: '''Alex Bassos at abassos@gmail.com'''
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<h2>'''Recent [[The_Blog|Blog]] Posts'''</h2>
 
<h2>'''Recent [[The_Blog|Blog]] Posts'''</h2>
  
* [https://libraryofdefense.org/content/best-argument-ever-merger-dcsmcs-and-pcs Best Merger Arg Ever - DCS/MCS/PCS] | Ryan Scott
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{{Special:Wikilog/Blog:Main/5}}
* [https://libraryofdefense.org/content/restitution-appeals-and-little-known-statute Restitution Appeals and a Little Known Statute] | Ryan Scott
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* [https://libraryofdefense.org/node/6277 Preservation at its Most Challenging] | Ryan Scott
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* [https://libraryofdefense.org/node/6276 "Are you for or against the dog this time?" SCOTUS on drug-detection dogs] | Ryan Scott
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* [https://libraryofdefense.org/node/6275 Ninth Circuit recognized that even sex offenders have a "particularly significant liberty interest" in family relationships] | Ryan Scott
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<h2>'''This Week's Cases'''</h2>
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[[File:negligence.jpeg|100px|right]]
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'''Or.S.Ct: Standard for Criminal Negligence'''
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A criminally negligent state of mind does not require “seriously blameworthy” conduct or that a defendant’s conduct shows an “indifference to consequences”; it requires only that the risk of a particular result from defendant’s conduct be “substantial and unjustifiable” and that failure to be aware of said risk is a “gross deviation” from a reasonable standard of care.  Whether conduct exhibits a criminally negligent state of mind is heavily fact-dependent.  Here, defendant was guilty of criminally negligent homicide in a vehicle collision where facts showed he was more than “merely inattentive”: he was driving in a known “safety corridor” under hazardous conditions, he was a professional driver who should have been aware of these conditions, several witnesses observed him driving unsafely prior to the collision, and the collision was avoidable. The Oregon Supreme Court also affirmed State v Betts (384 P2d 198, 1963) in noting that evidence of prior conduct logically permits an inference of an ongoing state of mind.
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State v Lewis, ___Or___ (2012)
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[[File:Bruised-leg.jpeg|100px|right]]
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'''A Superficial Bruise Does Not Qualify as a Physical Injury'''
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For the purposes of first-degree criminal mistreatment, “physical injury” means “impairment of physical condition or substantial pain." ORS 161.015(7). In turn, "impairment of physical condition" requires "harm to the body that results in a reduction in one's ability to use the body or a bodily organ for less than a protracted period of time." State v. Higgins, 165 Or App 442(2000).  Here, defendant admitted to spanking her 16-month-old across his buttocks, which made the child cry and caused a bruise.  However, the child’s doctor testified that the bruise was ‘superficial,’ and the child had full range of motion.  Thus, there was no evidence that the bruise was a ‘physical injury’ for purposes of criminal mistreatment. State v. Wright
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'''Increase in “Look-Back” Period for DUII Diversion Is Not an Ex Post Facto Violation'''
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The five-year  increase in the “look-back” period for DUII diversion eligibility does  not result in “greater or additional punishment” for DUII such that the increase is an ex post facto violation.  The change in eligibility requirements was not an increase in “punishment” because the primary purpose of the change was to be a procedural alternative to punishment, not to change the crime of or sentence for, DUII. State v. Carroll, __ Or App __ (2012).
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'''Particularity Requirement for Admitting Abuse-Victim Hearsay'''
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The pretrial notice required under OEC 803(18a)(b)  for admitting an abuse victim’s out-of-court statements must identify the particular statements to be offered.  Here, the state violated the rule by only providing copies of reports and stating that the reports “contain the particulars of statements made by [victim] that the state intends to offer.” State v. Bradley, __ Or App __ (2012); see also State v. Wood, __ Or App __ (Oct. 24, 2012).
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'''Aiding-and-Abetting After-the-Fact Is Not a Crime'''
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Oregon law does not recognize an aid-and-abet after-the-fact theory of criminal liability because “the aid-and-abet statute plainly applies only to conduct prior to or during the commission of a crime.” Here, the trial court erroneously convicted defendant of fraudulent use of a credit card for helping the principal actor escape arrest after defendant learned of the theft and misuse of the credit card. The court exercises its discretion to correct the trial court’s unpreserved error and remands for a new trial because defendant “stands convicted of something that is not a crime.” State v. Barboe, __ Or App __ (2012).
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'''Merger, Valuation of Stolen Property, and Restitution in Juvenile Proceedings'''
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The court affirms the juvenile court’s judgment of jurisdiction for acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute first-degree arson, aggravated first-degree theft, and two counts of second-degree burglary. The two counts of burglary do not merge because youth had sufficient time to renounce his criminal intent between entering a school building with intent to commit theft and later reentering with intent to commit arson.  ORS 164.115(1), governing the valuation of property under the theft statutes, does not bar the court from considering the cost of replacements as a factor in determining fair-market value. Here, the juvenile court properly considered the cost of replacement computers in finding that the stolen property was worth at least $10,000 as required for aggravated first-degree theft. The term “victim” for restitution purposes in juvenile proceedings includes insurance companies. “Victim” is given its definition in the Criminal Code, not the juvenile code. State v. G.L.D., __ Or App __ (2012).
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'''Stop – Reasonable Suspicion'''
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An order to come out of a house with your hands up is a stop. Here, there was reasonable suspicion for the stop where defendant entered a house occupied by two murder victims, didn’t match the description of anyone who lived there, and didn’t answer the telephone when officers called the house.  Also, officers had probable cause to enter the house since there was probable cause to believe that there was evidence of recent murders inside and that it was at risk of being destroyed. And, for the same reasons, there were exigent circumstances that required the officers to secure the house.  The officers gained probable cause to arrest when defendant came out of the house and they noticed blood on his pants.  Finally, it was not a violation of Miranda when defendant asked if he needed an attorney and the officers responded that “It’s up to you.” Defendant’s statement was equivocal and officers responded appropriately.  State v. Hudson, __ Or App __ (2012).
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'''Dependency > Preservation > Failure to Make Required Findings'''
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Because a dispositional order is required at the conclusion of a dependency hearing, the contesting party must object at that time if a juvenile court fails to include statutorily required findings under ORS 419B.340(2) in order to preserve the issue for appeal. DHS v. C.C.
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<h2>'''Appellate Review'''</h2>
  
'''Dependency > Subject Matter Jurisdiction'''
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{{Special:Wikilog/Blog:Appellate Ct Review/1}}
  
In a custody case involving multiple jurisdictions, ORS 109.741(1)(b) confers jurisdiction to Oregon when no other state has jurisdiction under paragraph (1)(a) and both subparagraphs (1)(b)(A) and (1)(b)(B) apply. Here, mother had “a significant connection” with Oregon because she:
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<h2>'''Appellate Review'''</h2>
* had belongings in Oregon
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* had lived in the state for four years
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* received prenatal care in Oregon
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* applied for and collected public assistance in the state.
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Furthermore, mother's contacts with health care institutions and professionals, her interactions with DHS, and her erratic conduct constituted relevant evidence "concerning the child's care, protection, training and personal relationships" in Oregon under ORS109.741(1)(b)(B). Therefore, the Oregon court had jurisdiction. DHS v. S.C.S
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'''Dependency > Continued Jurisdiction'''
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{{Special:Wikilog/Blog:Appellate Ct Review/1}}
  
A court may not base an order for continued jurisdiction on unalleged facts unless the underlying petition provided sufficient notice of what the parent must do to prevent continued jurisdiction. Here, the petition stated that the mother had alcohol problems and pleaded guilty to assault and strangulation. Thus, mother had sufficient notice that her anger problems were at issue. DHS v. M.M.B.
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<h2>'''OR Supreme Review'''</h2>
  
'''Failure to Demand a Speedy Trial'''
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{{Special:Wikilog/Blog:OR Supreme Ct Review/1}}
  
Where a defendant is in prison and knowingly fails to demand trial, the delay is attributable to the state, but it is otherwise reasonable under ORS 135.747.  Here, defendant failed to appear for two separate court dates for a misdemeanor DUII.  He was arrested on a bench warrant, and shortly thereafter, his probation on an unrelated charge was revoked.  While in the DOC, defendant waited nine months to demand trial.  The court holds that because defendant knowingly failed to demand, the nine-month delay was reasonable, and the cumulative delay of 16 months attributed to the state was also reasonable. State v. Bircher.
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<h2>'''US Supreme Review'''</h2>
  
'''MJOA – Variance between Indictment and Evidence'''
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{{Special:Wikilog/Blog:US Supreme Ct Review/1}}
  
Variance between the indictment and the evidence at trial is prejudicial, “[i]f thedefendant would need to develop a different argument to contend with the variance.” State v. Boitz, 236 Or App 350, 356 (2010). Here, defendant was charged with hindering prosecution.  The indictment alleged that the defendant “did***prevent, by means of deception, the discovery or apprehension of Shane Culp.”  This differed from the statutory language and jury instruction which states that a person hinders prosecution where he, “[p]revents or obstructs, by means of * * * deception, anyone from performing an act which might aid in the discovery or apprehension ofsuch person[.]” Defendant’s argument was that defendant did not prevent sheriffs from apprehending Shane Culp since the sheriffs decided that defendant was lying and ultimately arrested him.  Instead, defendant prevented the sheriffs from immediately searching the house which would satisfy the statute but not the indictment.  Thus, the variance in this circumstance was prejudicial, and the court reverses.  State v. Hansen
 
  
'''DMV Can’t Suspend a License Twice for the Same Failure to Pay a Fine'''
 
  
Where the DMV has already suspended a person’s license for the maximum statutory period for failure to pay traffic fines, the DMV cannot re-suspend the license because the driver continues not to pay the fine.  Here, because defendant had already been suspended for the statutory period, DMV lacked the authority to suspend his license again, and the appropriate remedy is exclusion of the later suspension order. Richardson v. DMV.
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</td>

Revision as of 17:23, November 16, 2012

The Library

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The OCDLA Library of Defense is a digital manual for criminal defense built by the collective contributions of OCDLA members. Ultimately, it will contain every law, every case, every expert, every resource and every good idea an Oregon defense attorney might need. But only if you help us out. If you visit a page on this website that is missing a case or has a typo, please edit the page. You can even reorganize or rewrite the page if you're feeling ambitious. If you have any questions or suggestions, please email me at: Alex Bassos at abassos@gmail.com


Recent Blog Posts


The Easiest -- or is the hardest? -- Part of Being a Criminal Defense Lawyer

by: Ryan Scott • April 1, 2025 • no comments

There are a lot of clever, creative, hard-working criminal defense lawyers in Oregon. And reflecting that qualities, they come up with -- or rediscover -- legal arguments no one else is currently thinking about. And those arguments have the potential to benefit their clients tremendously, even if the arguments don't prevail until they get to a higher court.

But the great thing about criminal defense in Oregon is, you don't have to be particularly creative or clever to make those same arguments. You just have to be in a position to hear about them. One way, for example, is to check out the Oregon Supreme Court's press announcements on every second or third Friday. It will the cases, if any, the Supreme Court has granted review on, a majority of which will be either criminal cases or criminal-adjacent. Had you checked last Friday, you would have learned that the Supreme Court granted review to the constitutionality of Oregon's felony murder scheme. If you've got a felony murder client, you've just been alerted to a motion you can file that may result in your client's felony murder charge being dismissed.

(For the non-lawyers out there, felony murder is unlike any other murder. It doesn't require intent to kill the victim and it doesn't require the defendant personally kill the victim.)

So how great is this? The trial lawyer in that case -- State v. Monaco, fyi -- and the appellate attorney have done all the heavy lifting. They have researched the issue, found the case law, and made an argument sufficiently compelling that the Supreme Court thinks it has merit. Once you've got the briefs, it will maybe take you a half-hour to write your own motion, which may -- down the road -- either result in a dismissal of the charge or, if the prosecutor is smart, get you a better plea offer to avoid the possibility of dismissal. (The morning the press release came out, I mentioned it to a prosecutor, and her reaction was not dismissive. She probably would have been dismissive if I had told her the basis for the legal challenge. Rather, she was "not dismissive" because she believes it's entirely plausible the Oregon Supreme Court will make a decision that could put every felony murder in doubt. For negotiation purposes, that's just as valuable to you as an argument the prosecutor might find credible.)

I give this example, because I think taking five minutes once very 2-3 weeks to look at the Supreme Court press release is, relative to the amount of effort it takes, perhaps one of the most valuable uses of your time, even recognizing you don't have a lot to spare. But even if you don't make a habit of doing that, you would have heard the news anyway if (1) you were on the defense listserve and (2) read my e-mail on the topic. (Not by any means the same thing.)

If you don't want to be on the listserve (I get it), there are other things you can do to keep abreast of new arguments. You can go to OCDLA conferences. You can have friends who love to talk about the law and arguments they've recently heard about. You can read the Library of Defense. You can read the full opinions of the COA to look for new and novel issues the COA rejected but not on the merits. Or COA dissents, where the dissenter made a pretty compelling argument and you think there is a chance the issue will get to the OSC.

But most of all -- and this is either the easiest or hardest thing to do, depending on your personality -- you've got to get excited about new and novel arguments.

Most attorneys don't. And if they don't get excited, they are less likely to do any of the things I mentioned above. Even when they hear about an argument, they are unlikely to make it, because the time it would take to ask for a sample motion and change the caption doesn't seem worth the effort.

I suspect, but I don't know, that the attorneys who don't get excited about new and creative ways to help their clients are also the least happy attorneys. If you don't find joy in a new and fun argument handed to you on a silver platter, an argument that might give you leverage in negotiations or a win at the appellate courts, you are missing out on one of the more significant pleasures of being a defense warrior. Yes, there are other less-cerebral ways of finding joy in the job, but this one is perhaps the easiest.

Or, if you're not interested, the hardest.

A Finding of a Sufficient Pause Must Be Made by a Jury

by: Ryan Scott • March 24, 2025 • no comments

Procedurally, the Court of Appeal's opinion State v. Ballangrud, issued on March 12, 2025, is a bit complicated. Substantively, the bottom line is this:

At least one judge on the Oregon Court of Appeals believes that one of the findings necessary to defeat merger -- a sufficient pause between crimes that would otherwise merge -- is a jury question under the 6th Amendment of the US Constitution. It's like an Apprendi/Blakely factor but even more profound. A finding of a sufficient pause doesn't increase the sentence for a conviction. It increases the number of convictions. Could anything be more a jury question than how many convictions a defendant ends up with? If it's a jury question, the state must give notice no later than 60 days after arraignment, and, absent a waiver, it must submit the question of a substantial pause to the jury.

This opinion was expressed by the Chief Presiding Judge in a concurrence. The majority rejected the argument, at least in part, because it concluded -- wrongly -- that the defendant-appellant had improperly argued the issue to the court (something the concurrence rejected). But even the majority left open the possibility that if properly raised, it would hold the question of a sufficient pause should be submitted to the jury. And whatever the COA ultimately does hold, the issue is of such importance that I would assume the Oregon Supreme Court will eventually grant review.

Please preserve this now. Raise it at sentencing, arguing that the state never go notice of an intent to submit the question to the jury, much less actually submitted it. For argument, just provide the judge a copy of the concurrence in Ballangrud.

Good luck!

PS: And yes, I wrote multiple blog posts arguing this exact thing over ten years ago.

Is Actual Innocence a Viable Claim in Post-Conviction?

by: Ryan Scott • February 21, 2025 • no comments

Oregon Supreme Court has announced its intent to answer that question.

On February 20, 2025, the Supreme Court:

1. Allowed petitions for alternative writs of mandamus in:

Jordan Perkins v. Corey Fhuere (S071631) (original mandamus proceeding involving an order of the Marion County Circuit Court, Case No. 23CV53183) relator was convicted of sex offenses

against a victim and sentenced to prison. The victim subsequently recanted their testimony, stating in a notarized declaration that their sexual contact with relator had been consensual. Based on that recantation, relator petitioned for post-conviction relief, alleging the stand-alone claim of actual innocence and that his conviction and sentence violated the state and federal constitutions. The state moved to dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim, on grounds that relator's stand-alone actual innocence claim was not a basis for postconviction relief. The trial court agreed with the state, dismissed relator's petition, and relator petitioned for a writ of mandamus.

The Oregon Supreme Court issued an alternative writ, directing the trial court to either vacate the order entered November 27, 2024, granting the state's motion to dismiss and dismissing

with prejudice relator's Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, and to enter an order denying that motion; or, in the alternative, to show cause for not doing so.

The issue in this mandamus proceeding is:

Whether a stand-alone claim of actual innocence may provide a basis for post-conviction relief.

Sexual Penetration and Contaminated Memories

by: Ryan Scott • February 1, 2025 • no comments

"[The] phenomenon of false memory, and the circumstances that can contribute to the creation of a false memory, are complex and beyond the experience of ordinary jurors. . . ."

State v. Dye, 286 Or App 626 (2017)

There are a number of attorneys who are skeptical of the benefits of hiring a memory expert in a child sex abuse case (or any other case for that matter). Often, these attorneys -- many of whom are in their fifties or sixties -- have never actually consulted with a memory expert. By consult, I don't mean a five minute conversation but actually hiring them to review the case. They will also tell you that the prosecutors they've talked to will claim they've never lost a case in which the defense hired a memory expert. They will also tell you, contrary to the quote from State v. Dye above, that jurors understand the idea of suggestion and don't need an expert to point it out.

I'm not going to get into a whole long argument why I think these attorneys are wrong and are committing malpractice when they fail to have a meaningful consultation with a memory expert when there is any possibility the accusations are based on a false memory. But I do want to give one very narrow, very specific example that comes up frequently in sexual penetration cases. Since sexual penetration for a child under 12 carries a mandatory 25 year sentence, the punishment is far more severe than a sexual abuse I, which is "only" 75 months.

→ continue reading...

Chess Moves: Bench Trials, Severance Motions and OEC 404

by: Ryan Scott • January 9, 2025 • no comments

Yesterday, the Court of Appeals issued an opinion in which the primary issue was the trial court's denial of a motion to sever. The Court never reached the merits because they found any error in denying severance was harmless. So this post really isn't about severance at all, but about how judges will try to immunize their bad rulings when the defendant waives jury, and the most effective way to stop them from doing so.

→ continue reading...



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