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How should I start jury selection? The Court of Appeals just told me—and maybe you, too.

Yes, you heard that right. As a new guy who graduated law school in 2023, I’ve often struggled with breaking the ice during jury selection—and doing so in a way that advances my trial theory.

Thankfully, the Court of Appeals (O’Connor, J.) just released an opinion that tells trial lawyers how to pick a jury. Specifically, the opinion in State v. Pugh suggests how we can set up voir dire to ensure the trial judge strikes unfriendly jurors. 341 Or. App. 435, 439–40 (2025). And, if the trial judge denies our for-cause challenges, how we can get the appellate court to reverse a guilty verdict.

Pugh reminds us to sprint to bias as soon as we stand up in front of the panel.

The State has charged your client with felon in possession of a firearm where their only felonies are old or non-violent crimes. File a pre-trial motion to dismiss. Demand a hearing. At that hearing, show the judge that your client is no longer a danger to others. Call witnesses to talk about how safe and law-abiding your client is. Bring in employment, treatment, and schooling records. Talk about the lack of subsequent violent criminal history. Because your client is no longer a danger, they still have a constitutional right to bear arms.

More follows below, including helpful federal and state cases to support your arguments.

The Oregon Supreme Court is going to hear argument in September in the case of State v. Monaco. The conviction was for felony murder. One of the "questions presented and proposed rules of law" identified in the opening brief is as follows:

Third Question Presented. Does ORS 163.115(1)(b), Oregon’s felony murder statute, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?

Proposed Rule of Law. This court has interpreted ORS 163.115(1)(b) as creating a presumption of a culpable mental state for the causation-of-death element of felony murder, by the defendant’s commission or attempted commission of the underlying felony. Such a legal presumption violates due process because it is inconsistent with the presumption of innocence, relieves the state of its burden to prove every element of the offense, and invades the province of the jury. In the alternative, it violates due process by establishing a strict-liability offense for a violent felony.

My question, which is in the larval stage of development, is this: Are any of the constitutional principles on which the Monaco argument relies applicable to major sex crimes where no mental state at all applies to the element that makes a defendant guilty (the age of the victim in a Jessica's Law case) or where no mental state applies but the defendant has the ability to raise an affirmative mental state defense (sex with a sleepy or intoxicated person)?