OCDLA Library of Defense - Latest Case Reviews
Blog
Challenging Language from Standard Instruction 1005by: Ryan Scott • October 30, 2024 • no comments In every criminal trial in Oregon for decades, the jury has likely been told the following: "Generally, the testimony of any witness whom you believe is sufficient to prove any fact in dispute." You should object to that language and, if the judge does not want to strike it outright, ask for this alternative: "Generally, the testimony of any witness whom you believe is sufficient to prove any fact in dispute. If the fact is necessary to proving an element of the crime, you must believe the witness beyond a reasonable doubt with regard to that fact." The basis for the objection is this. As currently constructed, the instruction – or at least a reasonable interpretation of it -- undermines the requirement that the state prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. It would permit a juror to find against the defendant when it believes the complainant on a material element of the crime, but does not believe the complainant beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Purrier, 265 Or App 618, 621, 336 P3d 574 (2014)(state’s argument “incorrectly describe[ed] the jury’s task as choosing which of two versions of events the jury finds more believable” and was confusing and misleading because it “omit[ed] the possibility, among others, that the jury would find the state’s version more plausible, yet not be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt.”) The instruction is also unduly slanted towards the state, which is the only party that must actually prove any fact in dispute (assuming no affirmative defense on the part of the defendant.) See State v Martin, 290 Or App 851, 417 P3d 505 (2018)(prohibiting even legally correct jury instruction when it was unduly slanted in favor of one party.) Similarly, because only one side has the burden in this case, telling the jury what it takes to find a fact in dispute has been proven is an inappropriate comment on the evidence.
State v. Hayward, 327 Or 397 (1998) The alternative instruction because it is a correct statement of the law and would ameliorate the risk of its misuse. Because the standard instruction relates to a factual finding, a juror may not recognize how it relates to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction, which relates to a finding of guilt. This amendment ameliorates that problem somewhat. An Easy Demurrer (Failure to Register as a Sex Offender)by: Ryan Scott • October 4, 2024 • no comments Prosecutors insist that cases should be routinely joined because it promotes judicial efficiency. But the real reason is that it prejudices the defendant. It may not prejudice the defendant enough to merit severance, but it always increases the chance the jury would decide the case on something other than the merits of the state's argument. Whenever possible, however, a defense attorney should seek to punish the state by demurring to an indictment that is obviously improperly joined. After all, the prosecutor isn't really inconvenienced by severance of charges that shouldn't have been joined in the first place. But if they have to go back to Grand Jury because the indictment was dismissed, maybe they won't be quite so unfairly aggressive next time. What follows is an example where the indictment will always be subject to a demurrer. If you have a client that has at least two charges in one indictment, and one of the charges is "failure to register as a sex offender," that indictment is vulnerable. Why? Because there is no legal way that a failure to register charge is every properly joined with any charge other than another failure to register. So if your client is pulled over, and a gun or drugs are found in the car, and they didn't register on their birthday six months earlier, if all those charges are in one indictment, they're improperly joined. Or maybe your client is charged with a rape in the third degree, and, oops, he didn't register from a prior conviction for rape in the third degree, putting the new R3 and a FTR on the same indictment is not legal. Wait, you say! Maybe that's a motion to sever, but I've got that R3/FTR indictment in front of me and the indictment alleges Poston language ("same or similar" or "common scheme or plan", so how can I get past that? Here's the answer: Although “it usually is sufficient for the state to allege the basis for joinder by using the language of the joinder statute,” Warren, 364 Or at 120, the alleged basis for joinder must “be possible, given the offenses and facts alleged.” Warren, 364 Or at 122. And there is no theory where FTR is "same or similar" to anything other than another FTR. (See Garrett and Gialoretto for the analysis of same or similar.) And what possible scheme or plan could be furthered by failing to register? Proper joinder is legally impossible. File that demurrer. Make them go back to Grand Jury or make you a better offer. Antoine Demurrers and Electionby: Ryan Scott • September 9, 2024 • no comments There are a number of cases currently at the Court of Appeals where one of the claims is the denial of an Antoine demurrer/motion to elect. For some, no demurrer was filed at the trial level and it's just the denial of a motion to elect. In theory, we could end up getting a decision any week, though I think this issue is of such importance, and applicable to so many cases, that the COA will be very careful with the first one they issue. I’m writing this post because I want to highlight the arguments the AG’s office is making at the COA and a couple of things you can do at the trial level to give your appellate attorney the ammunition for the best possible response. First, one argument the AG’s office is making is that there really is no legal basis for ever compelling the state to elect before they’ve rested and maybe not even then. There argument is that in the most notable cases from the past few years (Payne, Antoine direct, Antoine PCR, Justice Duncan’s concurrence), the language regarding elections are just dicta and not binding on trial courts. It’s partially true that, in a couple of those opinions, the state's failure to elect was discussed in detail but not actually necessary to the final outcome. (I would note that the authors of the Payne opinion and the OSC Antoine concurrence are both current justices, so the AG’s argument faces a serious headwind when one of these cases get to the OSC.) However, it’s not true in the direct appeal in Antoine, where the COA held that the defendant must also argue a motion to elect if he has argued an Antoine demurrer. (I’m simplifying a bit.) The defendant's failure to file a motion to elect was fatal to the appeal and therefore self-evidently essential to the final outcome. Consequently, the AG’s office has backed down slightly, arguing that a standalone motion to elect doesn’t really exist in Oregon law. It only exists as an alternative to a definite and certain demurrer. I strongly suspect the state will lose that argument, but you can moot it out if you always file an Antoine demurrer along with your motion to elect. Second, the state will argue that if you want to prevail on a motion to elect before trial, you must explain the harm that will arise if the state does not elect. Of course, the harm may not be obvious until the state elects, but, still, if you can identify some harm, why not do so? Let’s take a sex case involving thirty allegations but only ten counts. There is enough factual distinction (location, age, etc.) between the allegations that the state could elect if forced. But, as the state says, your defense is all or nothing. You aren’t admitting any of them happened. So what difference does an election make? I would say this. In cross-examination, you aren’t going to challenge every single allegation. After all, you don’t want the complaining witness to have an opportunity to repeat every allegation. You want to target a specific sample of counts to undermine their credibility. In that situation, you will want to target those allegations – if you know them – that line up with certain counts. Instead, the state wants to play whac-a-mole. You have a good argument that one incident couldn’t have happened the way the witness says, they’ll just switch out that allegation in their final election. This is a serious fairness and due process problem. Before trial, the state would have said X is the allegation described in count five. You show X almost certainly didn’t happen so halfway through trial, the state decides that count 5 is now Y. It's also a GJ problem. There is a rebuttable presumption that when the state elects, it mirrors what the GJ found. When the state elects halfway through trial, it’s highly unlikely that’s true. Next 20 Articles Case Reviews
Oregon Supreme Court, October 31st, 2024by: Rankin Johnson WAIVERS - Voluntariness and intoxication Oregon Court of Appeals, October 30th, 2024by: Rankin Johnson DUII - FSTs as scientific evidence EVIDENCE - Other bad acts TRIAL PROCEEDINGS - Deadlocked jury SEARCH AND SEIZURE - Administrative searches RIGHT TO COUNSEL - Waiver EVIDENCE - Vouching Oregon Supreme Court, October 24th, 2024by: Rankin Johnson FIREARMS - Offenses carrying firearm prohibition Oregon Court of Appeals, October 23rd, 2024by: Rankin Johnson TRIAL PROCEEDINGS - Request for continuance SEARCH AND SEIZURE - Consent - UNLAWFUL USE OF A VEHICLE - Mens rea Oregon Court of Appeals, October 9th, 2024by: Rankin Johnson EVIDENCE - Vouching DISORDERLY CONDUCT - Obstructing traffic _________________________ |
RECENT LOD UPDATES________________________________________________ |
