A Florida Court's Summary of McNeely
From OCDLA Library of Defense
< Blog:Main(Difference between revisions)
This wikilog article is a draft, it was not published yet.
by: Ryan • April 11, 2016 • no comments
(Created page with "<summary>Of possible interest to those who do DUII cases.</summary> :State next contends that exigent circumstances exists to justify the warrantless blood draws. T...") |
|||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
<summary>Of possible interest to those who do DUII cases.</summary> | <summary>Of possible interest to those who do DUII cases.</summary> | ||
| − | :State next contends that exigent circumstances exists to justify the warrantless blood draws. This exception to the warrant requirement “applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1558 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011)). Applying that exception, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a warrantless blood draw in Schmerber when the officer reasonably believed that the delay involved in securing a warrant would result in the dissipation of alcohol | + | :State next contends that exigent circumstances exists to justify the warrantless blood draws. This exception to the warrant requirement “applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1558 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011)). Applying that exception, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a warrantless blood draw in Schmerber when the officer reasonably believed that the delay involved in securing a warrant would result in the dissipation of alcohol in a driver’s blood. 384 U.S. at 772. Forty-seven years later, in McNeely, the Supreme Court clarified Schmerber, holding that the natural metabolization of alcohol in the blood stream does not create a per se exigency justifying warrantless, nonconsensual blood testing in all DUI cases, though it is a relevant consideration in determining if exigent circumstances exist. 133 S. Ct. at 1568. Hence, “[a]fter McNeely, law enforcement officers [are] no longer categorically permitted to obtain a suspect’s blood sample with out a warrant simply because the alcohol [is] leaving the suspect’s blood stream.” Commonwealth v. Duncan, No. 2013-SC-000742-DG, 2015 WL 2266474, at *5 (Ky. May 14, 2015). |
| − | + | ||
| − | clarified Schmerber, holding that the natural metabolization of alcohol in the blood stream does not create a per se exigency justifying warrantless, nonconsensual blood testing in all DUI cases, though it is a relevant consideration in determining if exigent circumstances exist. 133 S. Ct. at 1568. Hence, “[a]fter McNeely, law enforcement officers [are] no longer categorically permitted to obtain a suspect’s blood sample with out a warrant simply because the alcohol [is] leaving the suspect’s blood stream.” Commonwealth v. Duncan, No. 2013-SC-000742-DG, 2015 WL 2266474, at *5 (Ky. May 14, 2015). | + | |
[http://www.5dca.org/Opinions/Opin2016/040416/5D14-1654.op.pdf ''Florida v Liles''] | [http://www.5dca.org/Opinions/Opin2016/040416/5D14-1654.op.pdf ''Florida v Liles''] | ||
{{wl-publish: 2016-04-11 15:44:45 -0700 | Ryan:Ryan Scott }} | {{wl-publish: 2016-04-11 15:44:45 -0700 | Ryan:Ryan Scott }} | ||
Latest revision as of 15:45, April 12, 2016
Of possible interest to those who do DUII cases.
- State next contends that exigent circumstances exists to justify the warrantless blood draws. This exception to the warrant requirement “applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1558 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011)). Applying that exception, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a warrantless blood draw in Schmerber when the officer reasonably believed that the delay involved in securing a warrant would result in the dissipation of alcohol in a driver’s blood. 384 U.S. at 772. Forty-seven years later, in McNeely, the Supreme Court clarified Schmerber, holding that the natural metabolization of alcohol in the blood stream does not create a per se exigency justifying warrantless, nonconsensual blood testing in all DUI cases, though it is a relevant consideration in determining if exigent circumstances exist. 133 S. Ct. at 1568. Hence, “[a]fter McNeely, law enforcement officers [are] no longer categorically permitted to obtain a suspect’s blood sample with out a warrant simply because the alcohol [is] leaving the suspect’s blood stream.” Commonwealth v. Duncan, No. 2013-SC-000742-DG, 2015 WL 2266474, at *5 (Ky. May 14, 2015).
