U.S. Supreme Court - June 9, 2016

by: Aalvarez • June 11, 2016 • no comments

Judicial Recusal - "Earlier, Significant, Personal Involvement As a Prosecutor"

Where a judge has had "an earlier, significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a critical decision in the defendant's case," the risk of actual bias in the judicial proceeding is so high such that due process requires the judge to recuse himself.

Here, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania vacated the decision of a post-conviction court which had stayed the execution of Williams, who had been previously sentenced to death. One of the judges on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was the district attorney who gave approval to seek the death penalty in Williams' case when it was proceeding at the trial level. On review by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court first determined that due process requires that a judge recuse himself from a defendant's case when he has had earlier, significant involvement as a prosecutor in the case. Applying the test to the facts at bar, the Court held that the role that the judge had in William's case was sufficient to require his recusal. The Court stated that "there can be no doubt that the decision to pursue the death penalty is a critical choice in the adversary process." Further, the Court explained that there is no doubt that the judge "had a significant role in this decision," because "[w]ithout his express authorization, the Commonwealth would not have been able to pursue a death sentence against Williams. The importance of this decision and the profound consequences it carries make it evident that a responsible prosecutor would deme it to be a most significant exercise of his or her official discretion and professional judgment." Because the Judge played a significant role as a prosecutor in Williams' case, he should have excluded himself from the PCR proceedings.

Justices Roberts and Alito joined in dissenting from the majority, arguing that the Judge's decision to seek the death penalty for Williams as a prosecutor did not involve the issues that he would be reviewing as a Judge to the PCR matter, and therefore he could review them neutrally without having to recuse himself.

Justice Thomas also dissented, distinguishing William's criminal case and his post-conviction proceedings. Further, Justice Thomas also argued that a broader rule requiring recusal would be contrary to Supreme Court precedent.