Oregon Appellate Ct - Nov 30, 2016
by: Sara Werboff • December 5, 2016 • no comments
State v. Nelson, 282 Or App 427 (2016) (Ortega, P.J.)
State v. Lockridge, 282 Or App 414 (2016) (Hadlock, C.J.)
DHS v. K.C., 282 Or App 448 (2016) (Ortega, P.J.)
State v. J.J.-M., 282 Or App 459 (2016) (Sercombe, P.J.)
State v. Macias, 282 Or App 473 (2016) (Sercombe, P.J.)
DHS v. B.J.J., 282 Or App 488 (2016) (Duncan, P.J.)
DHS v. L.D.K., 282 Or App 510 (2016) (Duncan, P.J.)
Boyles v. Myrick, 282 Or App 517 (2016) (Lagesen, J.)
State v. Arreola, 282 Or App 555 (2016) (Tookey, J.)
Defendant Entitled to MJOA on Multiple Rape Counts When State Proved Only One Act of Sexual Intercourse
The court concludes that defendant was entitled to an MJOA on two of three first-degree rape charges because the state failed to prove that more than one rape occurred. Defendant, who was homeless, attacked the victim, who was also homeless, assaulting her and then dragging her to two other locations in the camp. At the last location, defendant raped the victim. The victim fought defendant, and while he was vaginally penetrating her, she managed to pull away a few times causing defendant's penis to slip out of her vagina. Each time, defendant was able to re-penetrate her. The state argued that each time defendant re-penetrated the victim, a new rape had occurred. The court rejects the state's argument.
"The difficulty with the state's position is that it is inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of 'sexual intercourse.' For the state to prevail, we would have to conclude that an ordinary person would understand two people to have engaged in a distinct act of vaginal sexual intercourse every single time that the penis, having initially penetrated the vagina, is removed (accidentally or intentionally) and then reinserted. We believe that an ordinary person, on the contrary, would understand a single act of sexual intercourse to include the possibility of penetration, removal, and reinsertion of the penis multiple times. Thus, the mere fact that the penis is removed and reinserted, without more, does not establish that a new act of 'sexual intercourse' has occurred."
Because the state proved only a single count of rape, defendant was entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the other two. Defendant also challenged his conviction for kidnapping, and the court concludes that defendant was not entitled to an MJOA on that charge. The state proved asportation because defendant moved the victim to qualitatively different locations. The court also rejects defendant's argument that the kidnapping was "incidental" to the rape. Defendant's movement of the victim occurred before the second crime, the rape, and it was reasonable to infer that the asportation was intended to isolate and control the victim.
State v. Eastman, 282 Or App 563 (2016) (Garrett, J.)
Restitution - Defendant Not Required to Preserve Restitution Challenge When There Was No Practical Opportunity to Object
The court reverses a restitution judgment holding that defendant was relieved of the preservation requirement because he had no opportunity to object and because there was no evidence to support the award. Defendant pleaded guilty and the terms of his plea expressly left open the matter of restitution. Later, the court signed a supplemental judgment granting restitution as requested by the district attorney's office. The court agrees with defendant that he had no practical opportunity to object to the restitution award. Nonetheless, the state asked the court to take judicial notice of a letter from the DA's office requesting restitution that was copied to defendant's attorney and the fact that the letter showed that defendant failed to object. The court concludes that it will not take judicial notice of the fact that defendant had an opportunity to object because it would require the court to infer additional facts, such as that the letter was sent or that defendant's attorney did not contact the DA's office to object. The court concludes that defendant did not have a practical opportunity to object. The court further concludes that there was no evidence to support the restitution award in this case. The victim received restitution for medical expenses. In order to award restitution for that category of expenses, the state must also show that the expenses are "reasonable." Here, there was no such evidence.
The court rejects defendant's challenge to attorney fees. Defendant's claim is unpreserved. Additionally, defendant stipulated to attorney fees in his plea petition, and, to the extent that defendant is challenging the amount of attorney fees, the record permits competing inferences about defendant's stipulation.
State v. Almarez-Martinez, 282 Or App 576 (2016) (Flynn, J.)
Appeal and Review - Probation Revocation Appealable but Not Reviewable
The court affirms the trial court's judgment revoking defendant's probation and sentencing him to 70 months of incarceration. The parties had originally stipulated to a 70 month sentence if defendant's probation was revoked. Relying on its recent decision in State v. Silsby, 282 Or App 104 (2016), the court rejects the state's argument that defendant cannot appeal his revocation sentence because it is not a colorable claim. However, also relying on Silsby, the court concludes that under ORS 138.222(2)(d) that defendant's claim is unreviewable because he stipulated to the revocation sentence in the judgment of conviction.
State v. Pobor, 282 Or App 600 (2016) (DeHoog, J.)
Search and Seizure - Police Could Not Rely on Emergency Aid Exception to Search Defendant's Bedroom
The court concludes that the police violated defendant's Article I, section 9, rights when they searched defendant's bedroom to find the medications she was taking, holding that it was not a necessary search under the emergency aid exception. Defendant's daughter reported to police that her mother had left a suicide note. Police responded to the house, and found defendant outside talking to family and friends. Defendant told police that she had tried to kill herself with a combination of prescription medications and the police were concerned that she would try again. Defendant walked into the house and locked herself in her bedroom. Police broke down the door and took defendant to the hospital. One officer stayed behind and searched defendant's room for her medications, because it was important for the doctors at the hospital to know what defendant took. That officer found illegal drugs.
The court rejects the state's argument that the search was "urgently necessary to assist in treating defendant for any potential drug overdose" and therefore lawful under the emergency aid exception. The emergency associated with the overdose had dissipated and there was nothing to suggest that defendant would be unable to assist in her own treatment.
State v. Potter, 282 Or App 605 (2016) (De Muniz, S.J.)
Search and Seizure - Police Had Reasonable Suspicion to Detain Defendant Visiting Known Drug House
In this state's appeal, the court reverses a trial court's order granting defendant's motion to suppress. Below, defendant argued that he had been detained without reasonable suspicion during a traffic stop that occurred when defendant was leaving a known drug house. Earlier that day, police had investigated the house and arrested the owner and searched several visitors, finding drugs. While they were waiting for a search warrant, the police saw defendant twice arrive at the house, stay briefly, and then leave. The court concluded that defendant's nervous demeanor and his past drug involvement did not amount to reasonable suspicion, however, the fact that he was seen visiting a house that was a confirmed drug house where people were arrested that day and the fact that he exhibited the same pattern of behavior of the earlier visitors did amount to reasonable suspicion.
State v. Westcott, 282 Or App 614 (2016) (Schuman, S.J.)
Per Curiam - Civil Commitment - Insufficient Evidence
The court accepts the state's concession that there was legally insufficient evidence to support appellant's civil commitment.
State v. W.C.A., 282 Or App 622 (2016) (Per Curiam)
Per Curiam - Juvenile Dependency - Dependency Proceeding Not a Foster Care Placement for Purposes of ICWA
The court rejects father's challenge to a juvenile dependency determination. The juvenile court asserted jurisdiction over father's child first in 2015 and again in 2016. Father challenges the 2016 judgment, arguing that DHS failed to present expert testimony required under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) that custody of the child by father was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage. DHS argues on appeal that because the proceeding was not a foster care placement, father was required to preserve his claim and DHS was not required to present expert testimony. The court agrees with DHS that it was not a foster care placement proceeding since the child already had been found to be under the juvenile court's jurisdiction.
DHS v. J.C.S., 282 Or App 624 (2016) (Per Curiam)
Per Curiam - Hearsay Inadmissible as Prior Consistent Statement
The court holds that an officer's testimony conveying a hearsay statement from the complainant that he did not know the defendant was inadmissible as a prior consistent statement. Defendant was convicted of theft for taking the complainant's video poker cash credit. Defendant said that she was having an affair with the complainant and he gave the voucher to her. The complainant testified that he had seen defendant around, but otherwise didn't know her. A police officer testified that the complainant told him that he did not know the defendant. The court concludes that the officer's hearsay statement was not admissible as a prior consistent statement because the statement was not made before the complainant had a motive to fabricate and the error was not harmless.
State v. Hernandez, 282 Or App 627 (2016) (Per Curiam)
