U.S. Supreme Court 06-23-11
by: Grapkoch • June 22, 2011 • no comments
Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
- Confrontation Clause Bars "Surrogate" Forensic Lab Certifications
In Bullcoming v. New Mexico, the defendant sought certiorari on whether the Confrontation Clause permits the prosecution to introduce testimonial statements of a nontestifying forensic analyst through the in-court testimony of a supervisor or other person who did not perform or personally observe the laboratory analysis described in the statements. In a 5-4 decision, the Court answers no:
"We hold that surrogate testimony of that order does not meet the constitutional requirement. The accused's right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the certification, unless that analyst is unavailable at trial, and the accused had an opportunity, pretrial, to cross-examine that particular scientist."
As an initial matter, a majority of the Court (5) first disposes of the notion that the lab analyst certification at issue here merely transcribed a "machine-generated" number. Rather, the certification involved a series of representations "relating to past events and human actions not revealed in raw, machine-produced data:"
- [The non-testifying analyst] certified that he received Bullcoming's blood sample intact with the seal unbroken;
- That he checked to make sure that the forensic report number and the sample number "corresponded;"
- That he performed on Bullcoming's sample a particular test, adhering to a precise protocol; and
- By leaving the "remarks" section of the report blank, that no "circumstance or condition affected the integrity of the sample or the validity of the analysis."
Under Melendez-Diaz, these representations are "testimonial" even despite the purported "obvious reliability" of the test result. The Court bluntly explains that "the comparative reliability of an analyst's testimonial report drawn from machine-produced data does not overcome the Sixth Amendment bar." In arriving at this conclusion, the Court rejects the State's argument that the fact that the lab tech certifications at issue was "unsworn" was enough to distinguish Melendez-Diaz. The Court rules that the attendant formalities were sufficiently testimonial, and that "in Crawford, this Court rejected as untenable any construction of the Confrontation Clause that would render inadmissible only sworn ex parte affidavits, while leaving admission of formal, but unsworn statements 'perfectly OK.'
Next, the Court explains that the "surrogate" testimony of a non-observing lab tech offered by the state fails to meet the constitutional muster for two main reasons. First, that testimony "could not convey what [the certifying analyst] knew or observed about the events his certification concerned, i.e., the particular test and testing process he employed." This fact is crucial even despite the probability that the certifying analyst may not remember all pertinent details. Second, "[n]or could such surrogate testimony expose any lapses or lies on the certifying analyst's part." The fact that the analyst at issue here had been dismissed for unspecified reasons was crucial.
These considerations lead the Court to the "fundamental" observation that the text of the Sixth Amendment does not allow courts to develop "open-ended exceptions" for "reliable" surrogate witnesses. As the Court explains,
"the Clause does not tolerate dispensing with confrontation simply because the court believes that questioning one witness about another's testimonial statements provides a fair enough opportunity for cross-examination."
Dissents and concurrences are worth reading. Also, note that only a plurality accepted Justice Ginsburg's effort to craft a slightly more specific definition of "testimonial" in footnote 6 of the opinion that incorporates the Davis "primary purpose" test. Justice Thomas declined to join that endeavor. More information on Bullcoming v. New Mexico can be found at the SCOTUSblog case page, available here.
