U.S. Supreme Court 3-21-2012
by: Aalvarez • March 21, 2012 • no comments
Read the full post for a summary of today's opinions
- 6th Amendment--Ineffective Assistance of Counsel--Plea Bargaining
In a 5-4 split, the Supreme Court held that the 6th amendment right to effective counsel requires that defense attorneys communicate to their clients any formal plea offers from the prosecution.
In this case, the defense attorney failed to communicate an offer to the defendant, which lapsed. The defendant later submitted himself to open sentencing, where he was given a much harsher sentence than he would have received under the original plea offering.
Under the Strickland/Hill two-prong test, the court found the defense attorney's actions deficient because practically every state/federal jurisdiction requires that plea offers be communicated to the defendant.
Moreover, the court found that the defendant was prejudiced because had defense counsel communicated this plea to him, he would have accepted a plea bargain limiting his prison stay to one year, as opposed to agreeing to open sentencing, where he received 4 years. The court then re-defined the standard for prejudice in situations such as these, noting that:
Strickland's inquiry into whether "the result of the proceeding would have been different," requires looking at whether he would have accepted the offer to plead pursuant to the terms earlier proposed. In order to complete a showing of Strickland prejudice, defendants must also show that, if the prosecution had the discretion to cancel it or if the trial court had the discretion to refuse to accept it, there is a reasonable probability neither the prosecution nor the trial court would have prevented the offer from being accepted or implemented.
Scalia, with whom Alito, Thomas, and Roberts join, dissents, noting that the "ultimate focus" of the Strickland test is the "fundamental fairness of the proceeding being challenged." Because all agree that the plea-proceedings in court were based on accurate advice from court and counsel, that should be the end of the matter. Reversed and remanded. Missouri v. Frye
In a companion case to Frye (also a 5-4 split, also a majority opinion written by Kennedy), the court held that there can be ineffective assistance of counsel arising from plea bargaining if the defendant is later convicted at a fair trial.
Here, the defendant fired a shot towards the victim's head, but somehow missed, hitting her in the waist. He was charged with, among other things, attempted murder. The prosecution twice offered to dismiss two of the charges and to recommend a sentence of 51 to 85 months. After informing the defendant of these offers, the defense attorney managed to convince him to go to trial anyway, on the theory the prosecution would be unable to prove intent because the victim was shot in the waist. The defendant was convicted on all counts and sentenced to a minimum of 185 months.
The court rejected the AG's contention that the 6th amendment does not apply to plea bargaining, reaffirming the Frye opinion.
Since all sides conceded that the attorney's actions were deficient, the only question was prejudice. Because the defendant was more than willing to accept the plea offer before the defense attorney convinced him to do otherwise, and because the defendant received a minimum sentence 3 1/2 times greater than the plea he was offered, the Strickland prejudice requirement was met.
Scalia, with whom Alito, Thomas, and Roberts join, dissents. Again, as in Frye, Scalia re-iterates his belief that the 6th amendment ensures only that the defendant be given a fair trial, and as such, the right is not infringed unless counsel's mistakes call into question the "basic justice of a defendant's conviction or sentence."
