Oregon Appellate Ct - April 23, 2014
by: Abassos • April 23, 2014 • no comments
The summaries are still in the process of being written.
"I Wish You Were Dead" Is Not a Qualifying Contact for a Stalking Order
The statement "I wish you were dead" is more akin to an "impotent expression of anger or frustration" than the sort of unequivocal threat of imminent and serious violence required of a communication to qualify as one of the contacts required for a stalking protective order. Also, threats to call the police and DHS are not threats of violence at all, much less imminent and serious violence.
Forcible Compulsion - Attempted Sex Abuse - Very Aggressively Grabbing Victim's Arm is Enough
There was sufficient evidence that defendant's purpose was to forcibly compel the victim to touch his penis where:
- (1) Defendant took victim to a secluded room
- (2) Stepped in front of her and exposed his penis; and
- (3) "very aggressively" grabbed victim with enough force to leave bruises on her arm.
Thus, defendant's MJOA on attempted sex abuse was appropriately denied.
Coercion - A National Guard Recruiter is a "Public Servant"
The term "public servant" in the coercion statute includes any government employee, including employees of the federal government, as well as anyone who provides a service rendered in the public interest. ORS 163.275. The court reaches this conclusion by using Websters, rejecting defendant's "elaborate" argument stemming from ORS 162.005. Here, defendant was a recruiter for the National Guard and, therefore, both a government employee and "an individual who provides a public service . . . because he assists members of the public." State v Fox
Miranda - An Invocation of Counsel Followed by Illegal Interrogation, a Long Break and a New Interrogation Initiated by Defendant
Where defendant was unlawfully questioned after invoking his right to counsel, he was still capable of validly waiving his right to counsel by initiating further conversations with the police. The appropriate framework with which to analyze such a case is found in State v Acremant, 338 Or 302 (2005), not State v Hall. Here, defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his 5th amendment right to counsel where he did not make any incriminating statements in response to the unlawful police questions and later initiated further contact with detectives without prompting. Defendant validly waived his Article I, Section 12 rights because (1) defendant initiated contact after an extended break in questioning, (2) the detectives went out of their way to make sure defendant knew it was his decision and that he had the right to talk to an attorney, and (3) defendant confirmed that he understood his rights before making any incriminating statements. State v Doyle.
Traffic Stop - Extension by Asking About Weapons - Dissipation of Reasonable Suspicion Regarding Officer Safety
An officer may only extend a stop by asking about weapons where the officer has an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the person either poses "an immediate threat of serious physical injury" or has engaged in criminal activity. Here, defendant was pulled over for speeding. After approaching the car, the officer saw what he believed to be a box of ammunition and asked defendant where the weapon was. Defendant said "What weapon?". At that point, the officer realized the box was cigarettes, not ammunition. But the officer asked again about the weapon. Defendant told the officer about the gun under the seat and consented to a search. The court holds that, after the officer realized that what he thought was ammunition was only cigarettes, there was no reasonable suspicion of officer-safety concerns. Defendant' response "What weapon?" was an appropriate answer to a potentially confusing question based on the officer's mistaken impression regarding the cigarette box. State v Pearson.
"Reversed and Remanded" For Denial of a Basic Trial Right Means Reversed for a New Trial
Where a Marion County judge was reversed for barring defendant's closing argument in a bench trial, the case was put back into a pre-trial posture. Thus, defendant could assert her right to a jury trial anew. Instead, the judge not only barred a jury trial, he only allowed defendant to make the closing argument he originally denied and then immediately convicted her again. Reversed and remanded for a new trial before a jury. State v Barajas
