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Oregon Appellate Ct - Jan. 29, 2014

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by: Abassos, Cmaloney, Alarson and Alex Collins • January 29, 2014 • no comments

Attorney fees cannot be imposed when the record is silent regarding defendant’s ability to pay

A court cannot impose attorney fees based on a record that is silent regarding defendant’s ability to pay those fees. There must be some information from which the court can find the statutorily required factual predicate to imposition of the fees: that the defendant ‘is or may be able to pay’ them. ORS 151.505(3); ORS 161.665(4). Here, defendant was ordered to pay $8,000 and was sentenced to 375 months in prison. Since, the record contains no evidence of any financial resources available to defendant the court held this was a plain and grave error. State v. Coverstone, 260 Or App ___ (2014).

Consent to search is invalid when given during a custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings

When consent to search is given during a custodial interrogation and Miranda warnings are not given, the consent is invalid because it is obtained by exploiting the violation of Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution. Here, defendant was handcuffed in a patrol car when the officer asked him whether there was anything in the defendant’s vehicle that police should be concerned about. The defendant answered “no” and then spontaneously gave consent to search. The court held that the officer was interrogating the defendant in custody without informing him of his Miranda rights. The defendant’s statements and evidence should be suppressed. State v. Delong, 260 Or App ___ (2014).

Denial of Corroboration Instruction for Accomplice-Witness Constitutes Error

The question of whether the testimony of an accomplice-witness is corroborated by evidence – regardless of how slight or circumstantial – is one for the trier of fact. Accordingly, denying a corroboration instruction for the jury will constitute an error. Here, the court determined that the error was not harmless because the evidence was contradicting and equivocal to the accomplice-witness’s testimony. Additionally, the instruction could have affected the jury’s verdict, as they convicted on only three of the eleven counts. State v. Egeland __ 260 Or App __ (Jan., 28, 2014).

De Novo review Due to Faulty Evidence in Juvenile Trial.

The court takes de novo review of a juvenile delinquency case for criminally negligent homicide and assault-III, where the juvenile court relied on evidence produced from a faulty transcription. Youth had fallen asleep while driving and crashed into a motorcyclist. With the correct transcription of her post-crash interview regarding her mental state, the court found that the evidence insufficient to show that the youth disregarded a known and substantial risk that she would fall asleep while driving home from school. State v. S.N.R __ 260 Or App __ (Jan., 28, 2014).

Speedy trial motion: “typical delays inherent in scheduling trials” is not good cause

Under ORS 136.763 (2), if no trial occurs 90 days after a speedy trial motion is received, the case must be dismissed absent the defendant’s express consent or a specific reason why the trial cannot happen within the statutory window. Here, trial was re-scheduled to a day after the expiration of the 90 day window because neither the court nor the state noticed a speedy trial motion had been filed. The court dismisses the case because the state cannot point to specific any reason why the trial did not occur within the statutory window other than a general reference to “typical delays inherent in scheduling trials.” State v. Neal, __ 260 Or. App. __ (1/29/2014)

Per Curiam

  • A conviction for felon in possession of a firearm with a firearm and a conviction for unlawful use of a deadly weapon with a firearm must be merged into a single conviction of felon in possession of a firearm with a firearm. See State v. Flores, Or App 141, 313 P3d 378 (2013). Per Curiam. State v. Amaya, __ 260 Or. App. ___ (1/29/2014)
  • Prior bad acts require high degree of similarity and distinct methodology to prove identity based on modus operandi. See State v. Johnson, 313 Or. 189 (1992). Per Curiam. State v. Rushton, __ 260 Or. App. ___ (1/29/2014)