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Oregon Appellate Court - June 19, 2013

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by: Zara Lukens, Sonja Good Stefani and Abassos • June 20, 2013 • no comments

  • Minimal factual nexus between evidence and unlawful conduct requires suppression; coercive circumstances make consent involuntary
  • Declining life-saving medical care is not a religious practice

Minimal factual nexus between evidence and unlawful conduct requires suppression; coercive circumstances make consent involuntary

The court ruled on the suppression of evidence with respect to two defendants: (1) There was a minimal factual nexus between evidence sought to be admitted and prior unlawful police conduct when officers obtained a money order receipt containing defendant’s address during an unlawful traffic stop and used the information to search defendant’s apartment. (2) Defendant’s consent to search his apartment was not voluntary because the interaction was implicitly coercive: the officers made a repeated effort to talk to defendant after he slammed the door; the officers searched defendant’s person immediately after he opened the door; the officers asked to search the apartment with a narcotics dog; and consent was obtained while the defendant was in the presence of several officers wearing ballistic vests. "State v. Magana/Rivera", 257 Or. App.__ (2013)

Declining life-saving medical care is not a religious practice

Allowing a child under 18 to die for lack of life saving medical care is conduct "that may be motivated by one's religious beliefs," as opposed to conduct that constitutes a religious practice. Therefore, imposing a sanction for such conduct does not interfere with protected religious expression. Here, defendants did not provide medical care to their 16-year-old son because of their religious beliefs.

Evidence of grandchild’s death three months prior due to lack of medical care was relevant to whether defendants should have known that their son was at risk of death. "State v. Beagley", 257 Or. App.__ (2013)