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U.S. Supreme Court 06-06-11

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by: Grapkoch • June 5, 2011 • no comments

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''Read the full article for details about the following new cases:''
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Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
* A Right to Effective Assistance of PCR Counsel?
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* Sentencing Drug Offenders Under ACCA
  
In a fairly exciting development, the Supreme Court announced today that is was accepting certiorari in the case of ''[http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Martinez-CA9-Opinion.pdf Martinez v. Ryan]'', which asks
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* '''Question Presented''': Whether the plain meaning of the phrase "is prescribed by law," which the Armed Career Criminal Act uses to define a predicate "serious drug offense," requires a federal sentencing court to look to the maximum penalty prescribed by current state law for a drug offense at the time of the instant federal offense, regardless of whether the state has made that current sentencing law retroactive.
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* '''Holding''': "We hold that the 'maximum term of imprisonment' for a defendant's prior state drug offense is the maximum sentence applicable to his offense when he was convicted of it."
  
<blockquote>
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As my previous posts on recent SCOTUS developments may demonstrate, I usually like to engage in lengthy discussions on all points of an opinion. It makes me feel useful. However, this unanimous opinion-authored by Justice Thomas-is relatively straightforward. In fact, to the extent the formatting of this website allows me, I can summarize it in a five-point geometric proof:
  
''whether a defendant in a state criminal case who is prohibited by state law from raising on direct appeal any claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, but who has a state-law right to raise such a claim in a first post-conviction proceeding, has a federal constitutional right to effective assistance of first post-conviction counsel specifically with respect to his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim.''
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* '''Statement #1''': ACCA looks to the "maximum term of imprisonment" that "is prescribed by law."
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* '''Reason #1''': Given.
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* '''Statement #2''': By its plain terms, ACCA's reference to "maximum term of imprisonment" looks to the historical statute of conviction.
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* '''Reason #2''': ''United States v. Rodriguez'', 553 U.S. 377 (2008) (looking to the historical statute of conviction in determining whether "maximum term of imprisonment" includes recidivism enhancements).
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* '''Statement #3''': "Use of the present tense in the definition of 'serious drug offense' does not suggest otherwise."
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* '''Reason #3''': "ACCA is concerned with convictions that have already occurred."
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* '''Statement #4''': Furthermore, the phrase "maximum tern of imprisonment" cannot be interpreted to reference the current statutory text because that would mean that "a prior conviction could 'disappear' entirely for ACCA purposes if a State reformulated the offense between the defendant's state conviction and federal sentencing."
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* '''Reason #4''': United States v. Wilson, 503 U. S. 329, 334 (1992) ("[A]bsurd results are to be avoided").
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* '''Statement #5''': "Maximum term of imprisonment" refers to the punishment prescribed at the time of conviction.
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* '''Reason #5''': SAS postulate (2, 3, 4)
  
</blockquote>
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At least I think that follows the basic structure of a proof, but geometry was never really my thing. More information can be found at the SCOTUSblog case page, [http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/mcneill-clifton-t-v-united-states/ available here].
  
In the opinion below, the Ninth Circuit answered in the negative: "We have already concluded that there is no right to the assistance of post-conviction counsel in connection with a state petition for post-conviction relief, such as Martinez asserts in this case. Without a right to the appointment of counsel, there can be no right to the effective assistance of counsel." So, next term we'll likely get a chance to see if the Supremes agree with that proposition.
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[http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/10-5258.pdf ''McNeill v. United States'']
 
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More information can be found at the SCOTUSblog case page, [http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/martinez-v-ryan/ available here].
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''[http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Martinez-CA9-Opinion.pdf Martinez v. Ryan]''
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{{wl-publish: 2011-06-05 21:00:00 -0700 | grapkoch }}
 
{{wl-publish: 2011-06-05 21:00:00 -0700 | grapkoch }}

Revision as of 19:02, December 21, 2012

Read the full article for details about the following new cases:

  • Sentencing Drug Offenders Under ACCA
  • Question Presented: Whether the plain meaning of the phrase "is prescribed by law," which the Armed Career Criminal Act uses to define a predicate "serious drug offense," requires a federal sentencing court to look to the maximum penalty prescribed by current state law for a drug offense at the time of the instant federal offense, regardless of whether the state has made that current sentencing law retroactive.
  • Holding: "We hold that the 'maximum term of imprisonment' for a defendant's prior state drug offense is the maximum sentence applicable to his offense when he was convicted of it."

As my previous posts on recent SCOTUS developments may demonstrate, I usually like to engage in lengthy discussions on all points of an opinion. It makes me feel useful. However, this unanimous opinion-authored by Justice Thomas-is relatively straightforward. In fact, to the extent the formatting of this website allows me, I can summarize it in a five-point geometric proof:

  • Statement #1: ACCA looks to the "maximum term of imprisonment" that "is prescribed by law."
  • Reason #1: Given.
  • Statement #2: By its plain terms, ACCA's reference to "maximum term of imprisonment" looks to the historical statute of conviction.
  • Reason #2: United States v. Rodriguez, 553 U.S. 377 (2008) (looking to the historical statute of conviction in determining whether "maximum term of imprisonment" includes recidivism enhancements).
  • Statement #3: "Use of the present tense in the definition of 'serious drug offense' does not suggest otherwise."
  • Reason #3: "ACCA is concerned with convictions that have already occurred."
  • Statement #4: Furthermore, the phrase "maximum tern of imprisonment" cannot be interpreted to reference the current statutory text because that would mean that "a prior conviction could 'disappear' entirely for ACCA purposes if a State reformulated the offense between the defendant's state conviction and federal sentencing."
  • Reason #4: United States v. Wilson, 503 U. S. 329, 334 (1992) ("[A]bsurd results are to be avoided").
  • Statement #5: "Maximum term of imprisonment" refers to the punishment prescribed at the time of conviction.
  • Reason #5: SAS postulate (2, 3, 4)

At least I think that follows the basic structure of a proof, but geometry was never really my thing. More information can be found at the SCOTUSblog case page, available here.

McNeill v. United States