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U.S. Supreme Court 05-26-11

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by: Grapkoch • May 25, 2011 • no comments

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''Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
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''Read the full article for details about the following new cases:''
* ''Requisite Proof for Witness Tampering 18 USC § 1512(a)(1)(C)
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* Court Moots Issue Concerning Warrants for Child Interviews
''* ''Automatic Exclusions under the Speedy Trial Act
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Earlier this term, the Court heard arguments in ''Camreta v. Greene''. That case had asked whether the traditional warrant/warrant exception requirements that apply to seizures of suspected criminals should apply to an interview of the child in light of reports of child abuse, or whether a balancing standard should apply instead.
  
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However, the Court-in an [http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-1454.pdf opinion available here]-avoided the 4th Amendment question on mootness grounds:
  
In addition to its decision in ''Camreta v. Greene'', the Court issued two other criminal opinions today. However, both involve the construction of federal statutes.
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<blockquote>
  
====Requisite Proof for Witness Tampering 18 USC § 1512(a)(1)(C)====
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''In this case, the happenstance of S.G.'s moving across country and becoming an adult has deprived Camreta of his appeal rights. Mootness has frustrated his ability to challenge the Court of Appeals' ruling that he must obtain a warrant before interviewing a suspected child abuse victim at school. We therefore vacate the part of the Ninth Circuit's opinion that addressed that issue, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.''
  
In ''Fowler v. United States'', the Court addressed whether a defendant can be convicted of murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C), which is part of the federal witness-tampering statute, without proof that information regarding a possible federal crime would have been transferred from the victim to '''federal '''law enforcement officers or judges.
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</blockquote>
  
The circumstances of this case narrowed the issue to cases "where a defendant killed a person with an intent to prevent that person from communicating with law enforcement officers in general but where the defendant did not have federal law enforcement officers (or any specific individuals) particularly in mind." The Court answers that "in such circumstances, the Government must show that there was a '''reasonable likelihood''' that a relevant communication would have been made to a federal officer" in addition to the defendant's general intent.
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Two concurring opinions appear (authored by Scalia and Sotomayor (joined by Breyer)), as well as one dissenting opinion (Kennedy joined by Thomas). For the most part, those opinions are targeted at the majority's decision that a party who prevails due to qualified immunity may nevertheless seek certiorari on the constitutional question at issue so long as the issue is justiciable in all other respects.
  
More information can be found at the SCOTUSblog [http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/fowler-v-united-states?wpmp_switcher=desktop case page available here].
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For more infomation, the ''Camreta ''case page at SCOTUSblog is [http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/camreta-v-greene?wpmp_switcher=desktop available here].
 
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[http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-1454.pdf ''Camreta v. Greene'']
[http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/10-5443.pdf ''Fowler v. United States'']
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====Automatic Exclusions under the Speedy Trial Act====
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In ''United States v. Tinklenberg'', the Court addressed whether the time between the filing of a pretrial motion and its disposition is automatically excluded from the deadline for commencing trial under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, or is instead excluded only if the motion actually causes a postponement, or the expectation of a postponement, of the trial.
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The Court answers that "the filing of a pretrial motion falls within [18 USC §3161(h)(1)(D)] irrespective of whether it actually causes, or is expected to cause, delay." Therefore, the time between filing and disposition is automatically excluded.
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On an additional point, the Court also notes that days and weekends are included in the ten-day counting period features in § 3161(h)(1)(F), which provides that in certain circumstances the time required to transport prisoners is automatically excluded up to a ten-day maximum. The Court's decision is premised upon its rejection of the idea that the STA incorporated former Fed.R.Crim.P 45.
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More information can be found at the SCOTUSblog [http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/united-states-v-tinklenberg?wpmp_switcher=desktop case page available here.]
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[http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-1498.pdf ''United States v. Tinklenberg'']
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{{wl-publish: 2011-05-25 21:00:00 -0700 | grapkoch }}
 
{{wl-publish: 2011-05-25 21:00:00 -0700 | grapkoch }}

Latest revision as of 19:02, December 21, 2012

Read the full article for details about the following new cases:

  • Court Moots Issue Concerning Warrants for Child Interviews

Earlier this term, the Court heard arguments in Camreta v. Greene. That case had asked whether the traditional warrant/warrant exception requirements that apply to seizures of suspected criminals should apply to an interview of the child in light of reports of child abuse, or whether a balancing standard should apply instead.

However, the Court-in an opinion available here-avoided the 4th Amendment question on mootness grounds:

In this case, the happenstance of S.G.'s moving across country and becoming an adult has deprived Camreta of his appeal rights. Mootness has frustrated his ability to challenge the Court of Appeals' ruling that he must obtain a warrant before interviewing a suspected child abuse victim at school. We therefore vacate the part of the Ninth Circuit's opinion that addressed that issue, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Two concurring opinions appear (authored by Scalia and Sotomayor (joined by Breyer)), as well as one dissenting opinion (Kennedy joined by Thomas). For the most part, those opinions are targeted at the majority's decision that a party who prevails due to qualified immunity may nevertheless seek certiorari on the constitutional question at issue so long as the issue is justiciable in all other respects.

For more infomation, the Camreta case page at SCOTUSblog is available here. Camreta v. Greene