Now That's What I'm Talking About
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by: Ryan • November 4, 2015 • no comments
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| − | I've been saying the following for years. Today, COA backs me up: | + | I've been saying the following for years. [http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/docs/A154174.pdf Today, COA backs me up]: |
:The party seeking severance of '''properly''' joined charges bears the burden of demonstrating that joinder will result in substantial prejudice. See State v. Beauvais, 261 Or App 837, 849-50, 322 P3d 1116 (2014), aff ’d, 357 Or 524, 354 P3d 680 (2015). [Emphasis added.] | :The party seeking severance of '''properly''' joined charges bears the burden of demonstrating that joinder will result in substantial prejudice. See State v. Beauvais, 261 Or App 837, 849-50, 322 P3d 1116 (2014), aff ’d, 357 Or 524, 354 P3d 680 (2015). [Emphasis added.] | ||
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:A party may also challenge the joinder of charges on the ground that joinder is not permissible, that is, that the charges do not satisfy the statutory criteria for joinder in the first instance. ''See State v. Thompson'', 328 Or 248, 256-57, 971 P2d 879, ''cert den'', 527 US 1042 (1999). Defendant here does not contend that the charges were not properly joined. | :A party may also challenge the joinder of charges on the ground that joinder is not permissible, that is, that the charges do not satisfy the statutory criteria for joinder in the first instance. ''See State v. Thompson'', 328 Or 248, 256-57, 971 P2d 879, ''cert den'', 527 US 1042 (1999). Defendant here does not contend that the charges were not properly joined. | ||
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| + | In other words, if the counts are not properly joined, you don't need to meet the burden of substantial prejudice. | ||
I'll be talking about this at the Benson Hotel on December 5th. | I'll be talking about this at the Benson Hotel on December 5th. | ||
{{wl-publish: 2015-11-04 10:47:08 -0800 | Ryan:Ryan Scott }} | {{wl-publish: 2015-11-04 10:47:08 -0800 | Ryan:Ryan Scott }} | ||
Latest revision as of 11:48, November 5, 2015
I've been saying the following for years. Today, COA backs me up:
- The party seeking severance of properly joined charges bears the burden of demonstrating that joinder will result in substantial prejudice. See State v. Beauvais, 261 Or App 837, 849-50, 322 P3d 1116 (2014), aff ’d, 357 Or 524, 354 P3d 680 (2015). [Emphasis added.]
In a footnote, the COA adds:
- A party may also challenge the joinder of charges on the ground that joinder is not permissible, that is, that the charges do not satisfy the statutory criteria for joinder in the first instance. See State v. Thompson, 328 Or 248, 256-57, 971 P2d 879, cert den, 527 US 1042 (1999). Defendant here does not contend that the charges were not properly joined.
In other words, if the counts are not properly joined, you don't need to meet the burden of substantial prejudice.
I'll be talking about this at the Benson Hotel on December 5th.
