Oregon Appellate Ct - June 24, 2015
by: Abassos, Sean McGuire, April Yates and Tyler Williams • June 24, 2015 • no comments
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*Hearsay -- Medical Diagnosis Exception Does Not Require Declarant to Identify Direct Cause of Injury or Illness | *Hearsay -- Medical Diagnosis Exception Does Not Require Declarant to Identify Direct Cause of Injury or Illness | ||
| − | * | + | *Consent to Search Following an “Amiable Conversation” With Police is Voluntarily Given |
*Dependency - Jurisdiction Requires Non-Speculative Danger | *Dependency - Jurisdiction Requires Non-Speculative Danger | ||
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OEC 803(4)’s hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of diagnosis or treatment does not require a declarant to identify the direct cause of an injury or illness. Here, defendant’s wife told three medical professionals who were treating her injuries sustained in a car accident that she had been the driver. The trial court committed clear error when it excluded these statements on grounds that the statements were not relevant to medical diagnosis or treatment because they did not identify the “direct cause” of the injury. No such requirement exists under OEC 803(4). Reversed and remanded.[http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/docs/A153551.pdf State v. Ragibov], 272 Or App 22 (2015). | OEC 803(4)’s hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of diagnosis or treatment does not require a declarant to identify the direct cause of an injury or illness. Here, defendant’s wife told three medical professionals who were treating her injuries sustained in a car accident that she had been the driver. The trial court committed clear error when it excluded these statements on grounds that the statements were not relevant to medical diagnosis or treatment because they did not identify the “direct cause” of the injury. No such requirement exists under OEC 803(4). Reversed and remanded.[http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/docs/A153551.pdf State v. Ragibov], 272 Or App 22 (2015). | ||
| − | ''' | + | '''Consent to Search Following an “Amiable Conversation” With Police is Voluntarily Given''' |
During a twenty minute “amiable conversation” with police officers, a defendant recanted his earlier request for an attorney and consented to a warrantless search. The officers had information that the defendant was involved in attempted drug buy, and were at the defendant’s house to conduct a “knock and talk.” The defendant wanted to consult with an attorney before granting the police’s request to search the property for drugs, but proceeded to converse with the officers. During this conversation, the police did not question the defendant or repeat their requests for consent. In light of this, the trial court found that the overall atmosphere of this conversation was “cordial” and “low key,” and that the defendant’s consent was given voluntarily. The Oregon Court of Appeals found that the record was sufficient to support the trial court’s ruling. Affirmed. [http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/docs/A148649.pdf State v. Hayes] 272 Or App 1 (2015) | During a twenty minute “amiable conversation” with police officers, a defendant recanted his earlier request for an attorney and consented to a warrantless search. The officers had information that the defendant was involved in attempted drug buy, and were at the defendant’s house to conduct a “knock and talk.” The defendant wanted to consult with an attorney before granting the police’s request to search the property for drugs, but proceeded to converse with the officers. During this conversation, the police did not question the defendant or repeat their requests for consent. In light of this, the trial court found that the overall atmosphere of this conversation was “cordial” and “low key,” and that the defendant’s consent was given voluntarily. The Oregon Court of Appeals found that the record was sufficient to support the trial court’s ruling. Affirmed. [http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/docs/A148649.pdf State v. Hayes] 272 Or App 1 (2015) | ||
Latest revision as of 20:59, June 25, 2015
Hearsay -- Medical Diagnosis Exception Does Not Require Declarant to Identify Direct Cause of Injury or Illness
OEC 803(4)’s hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of diagnosis or treatment does not require a declarant to identify the direct cause of an injury or illness. Here, defendant’s wife told three medical professionals who were treating her injuries sustained in a car accident that she had been the driver. The trial court committed clear error when it excluded these statements on grounds that the statements were not relevant to medical diagnosis or treatment because they did not identify the “direct cause” of the injury. No such requirement exists under OEC 803(4). Reversed and remanded.State v. Ragibov, 272 Or App 22 (2015).
Consent to Search Following an “Amiable Conversation” With Police is Voluntarily Given
During a twenty minute “amiable conversation” with police officers, a defendant recanted his earlier request for an attorney and consented to a warrantless search. The officers had information that the defendant was involved in attempted drug buy, and were at the defendant’s house to conduct a “knock and talk.” The defendant wanted to consult with an attorney before granting the police’s request to search the property for drugs, but proceeded to converse with the officers. During this conversation, the police did not question the defendant or repeat their requests for consent. In light of this, the trial court found that the overall atmosphere of this conversation was “cordial” and “low key,” and that the defendant’s consent was given voluntarily. The Oregon Court of Appeals found that the record was sufficient to support the trial court’s ruling. Affirmed. State v. Hayes 272 Or App 1 (2015)
Dependency - Jurisdiction Requires Non-Speculative Danger
Past threat of danger and speculative future risk of harm are not enough for the court to assert jurisdiction in a dependency case. Here, the Department of Health Services relied on four month old text messages and voicemails to show that the child was endangered. The court found that the text messages and voicemails, although they might have been enough to establish endangerment four months prior, did not give rise to an inference that the child was presently endangered. Similarly, testimony that the mother's mental health issues could impair her ability to safely parent if she stopped seeking treatment did not create an inference that the child was currently endangered. Because the mother’s course of treatment remains unknown, future endangerment of the child is merely speculative. Reversed. DHS v. M.A.H., 272 Or App 75 (2015).
