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Oregon Supreme Court - February 28, 2013

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by: Abassos • March 2, 2013 • no comments

 
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Written by Joseph Westover. Edited by Alex Bassos.
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'''Judicial Discretion to Deny Waiver of Jury Trial is Not Unfettered'''
 
'''Judicial Discretion to Deny Waiver of Jury Trial is Not Unfettered'''
 
   
 
   
 
A judge’s discretion to deny a defendant’s waiver of jury trial is limited by the purposes of the 1932 amendment to Article I, section 11—speed, economy, and protection of the rights of the accused, as well as the expressed preference of the prosecutor. Other considerations may also be appropriate. Here, the Court reverses two cases where the judge withheld consent, and remands for reconsideration of the defendant’s requests for waiver:
 
A judge’s discretion to deny a defendant’s waiver of jury trial is limited by the purposes of the 1932 amendment to Article I, section 11—speed, economy, and protection of the rights of the accused, as well as the expressed preference of the prosecutor. Other considerations may also be appropriate. Here, the Court reverses two cases where the judge withheld consent, and remands for reconsideration of the defendant’s requests for waiver:
·        Harrell—During jury deliberation, defendant sought to waive his jury trial. The judge withheld consent, but did not assert with enough clarity on what grounds.
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*''Harrell''—During jury deliberation, defendant sought to waive his jury trial. The judge withheld consent, but did not assert with enough clarity on what grounds.
·        Wilson—Prior to trial, defendant sought to waive. The trial judge withheld consent apparently after only considering the prosecutor’s objection. It was impermissible to not consider speed, economy, or the protection of the defendant’s rights.
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*''Wilson''—Prior to trial, defendant sought to waive. The trial judge withheld consent apparently after only considering the prosecutor’s objection. It was impermissible to not consider speed, economy, or the protection of the defendant’s rights.
State v. Harrell/Wilson, ___ Or ___ (Feb. 28, 2013).
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[http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/docs/S059513.pdf ''State v. Harrell/Wilson''], ___ Or ___ (Feb. 28, 2013).
 
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Latest revision as of 11:26, March 7, 2013

Written by Joseph Westover. Edited by Alex Bassos.


Judicial Discretion to Deny Waiver of Jury Trial is Not Unfettered

A judge’s discretion to deny a defendant’s waiver of jury trial is limited by the purposes of the 1932 amendment to Article I, section 11—speed, economy, and protection of the rights of the accused, as well as the expressed preference of the prosecutor. Other considerations may also be appropriate. Here, the Court reverses two cases where the judge withheld consent, and remands for reconsideration of the defendant’s requests for waiver:

  • Harrell—During jury deliberation, defendant sought to waive his jury trial. The judge withheld consent, but did not assert with enough clarity on what grounds.
  • Wilson—Prior to trial, defendant sought to waive. The trial judge withheld consent apparently after only considering the prosecutor’s objection. It was impermissible to not consider speed, economy, or the protection of the defendant’s rights.

State v. Harrell/Wilson, ___ Or ___ (Feb. 28, 2013).