Main/Challenging Language from Standard Instruction 1005

In every criminal trial in Oregon for decades, the jury has likely been told the following:

"Generally, the testimony of any witness whom you believe is sufficient to prove any fact in dispute."

You should object to that language and, if the judge does not want to strike it outright, ask for this alternative:

"Generally, the testimony of any witness whom you believe is sufficient to prove any fact in dispute.  If the fact is necessary to proving an element of the crime, you must believe the witness beyond a reasonable doubt with regard to that fact."

The basis for the objection is this.  As currently constructed, the instruction – or at least a reasonable interpretation of it -- undermines the requirement that the state prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.  It would permit a juror to find against the defendant when it believes the complainant on a material element of the crime, but does not believe the complainant beyond a reasonable doubt.  See State v. Purrier, 265 Or App 618, 621, 336 P3d 574 (2014)(state’s argument “incorrectly describe[ed] the jury’s task as choosing which of two versions of events the jury finds more believable” and was confusing and misleading because it “omit[ed] the possibility, among others, that the jury would find the state’s version more plausible, yet not be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt.”)

The instruction is also unduly slanted towards the state, which is the only party that must actually prove any fact in dispute (assuming no affirmative defense on the part of the defendant.)  See State v Martin, 290 Or App 851, 417 P3d 505 (2018)(prohibiting even legally correct jury instruction when it was unduly slanted in favor of one party.)  

Similarly, because only one side has the burden in this case, telling the jury what it takes to find a fact in dispute has been proven is an inappropriate comment on the evidence.  

:“A trial court is not permitted to comment on the evidence. Or. R. Civ. P. 59 E; Or. Rev. Stat. § 136.330(1). Or. R. Civ. P. 59 E is applicable in criminal cases. A court impermissibly comments on the evidence when it gives a jury instruction that tells the jury how specific evidence relates to a particular legal issue. A court also impermissibly comments on the evidence if it instructs the jury to draw an inference against the defendant that shifts the burden of proof from the state to the defendant. An inference cannot relieve the state of its burden of proving each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 

State v. Hayward, 327 Or 397 (1998)  

The alternative instruction because it is a correct statement of the law and would ameliorate the risk of its misuse.  Because the standard instruction relates to a factual finding, a juror may not recognize how it relates to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction, which relates to a finding of guilt.  This amendment ameliorates that problem somewhat.
{{wl-publish: 2024-10-30 17:11:37 -0700 | Ryan@ryanscottlaw.com:Ryan  Scott  }}