Miller v. Alabama Revisited
by: • December 15, 2014 • no comments
Juveniles are different.
The United States Supreme Court has so held on several occasions in the past decade, most recently in Miller v. Alabama.[1] In Miller, the issue was whether a mandatory true-life sentence imposed on a juvenile tried as an adult for aggravated murder constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Court held that the imposition of such a sentence was not facially cruel and unusual. However, when such a sentence is mandatory and does not permit a sentencing court to consider the specific characteristics of the juvenile offender, that sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. In other words, the Court rejected the facially cruel and unusual argument but accepted the as-applied cruel and unusual argument.
On its face, Miller might not appear to apply in Oregon because, pursuant to ORS 161.620, when a juvenile is remanded to adult court and convicted of aggravated murder, the only sentencing option for the court is a life sentence with a 30-year mandatory minimum. In other words, under one reading of Miller, the holding applies only to true-life sentences and, because Oregon does not permit a sentencing court to impose a true-life sentence on a remanded juvenile, that holding has no application here.
However, as I explained in an August 2012 Oregon Defense Attorney article (“Two Supreme Surprises”), Miller actually stands for the proposition that any mandatory sentence imposed on a remanded juvenile constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. In Miller, the Court was not primarily concerned with the actual sentence as evidenced by the fact that the Court ultimately held that a true-life sentence imposed on a juvenile convicted of aggravated murder was not facially unconstitutional. Based on that understanding of the holding in Miller, I proposed that any mandatory minimum sentence—including the mandatory minimum 30-year prison term for juvenile aggravated murders and all mandatory minimum sentences imposed pursuant to ORS 137.707 authorizing mandatory minimum sentences for juveniles at least 15 years old at the time of the offense—constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under Miller.
Although the Oregon appellate courts have not yet weighed in on the applicability of Miller to mandatory minimum sentences, the Iowa Supreme Court recently held that Miller precludes the imposition of mandatory sentences on juveniles.[2] Specifically, the court held that a mandatory sentence imposed on a juvenile constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under Article I, section 17, of the Iowa Constitution (“Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed, and cruel and unusual punishment shall not be inflicted.”). After an extensive analysis of Miller and earlier Court opinions on this topic, the Iowa Supreme Court acknowledged that no other court in the country has concluded that Miller applies to all mandatory sentences imposed on a juvenile. However, as the court explained:
- In the end, we conclude all mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment for youthful offenders are unconstitutional under the cruel and unusual punishment clause in article I, section 17 of our constitution. Mandatory minimum sentences for juveniles are simply too punitive for what we know about juveniles.[3]
Although the Iowa Supreme Court decided Lyle on state constitutional grounds, no significant differences exist between the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment in the Oregon and Iowa constitutions.
Arguably, State v. Rodriguez/Buck,[4] already permits a sentencing court to consider the specific characteristics of a juvenile offender and, as a result, resolves any constitutional infirmities. However, Rodriguez/Buck differs in one significant way: under Rodriguez/Buck, a sentencing court is not required to consider the individual characteristics of the defendant before imposing a mandatory minimum sentence. Under Miller, as interpreted by the Iowa Supreme Court, unless a sentencing court takes into account the specific characteristics of a juvenile offender prior to imposing an otherwise mandatory sentence, that sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
Presently, the question of whether the analysis in Miller applies to a life sentence with a mandatory minimum 30-year prison term is under advisement at the Oregon Court of Appeals in State v. Negrete-Vasquez (A150480).
In sum, pursuant to the holding in Miller, as explained by the Iowa Supreme Court in Lyle, any mandatory sentence imposed on a juvenile offender remanded to adult court constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Although a sentencing court may ultimately impose the same prison term as mandated under the mandatory sentencing laws, the court must consider the specific characteristics of the juvenile offender before imposing the sentence.
Endnotes
- ↑ 567 US __ 132 S Ct 2455, 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012).
- ↑ State v. Lyle, __ NW 2d __ (July 18, 2014).
- ↑ Lyle, __ NW 2d at __ (slip op 41).
- ↑ 347 Or 46, 217 P3d 659 (2009)
OCDLA Member Marc Brown is with the Appellate Division, Office of Public Defense Services. This article originally appeared in the November/December 2014 issue of The Oregon Defense Attorney journal.
