Another factor to consider when determining the appropriate mental state
by: Ryan • November 13, 2014 • no comments
Today, the Court of Appeals issued State v. Enyeart, which answered the question of the appropriate mental state of Interfering with a Police Officer, ORS 162.247(1)(b), which provides:
- A person commits the crime of interfering with a peace officer * * * if the person, knowing that another person is a peace officer or a parole and probation officer as defined in ORS 181.610:
- (b) Refuses to obey a lawful order by the peace officer
Sub(a) includes an intentional mental state but as you'll see, any mental state is missing from sub(b). However, "refuses" is conduct, and we know from statute and case law that only two possible mental states apply to conduct, knowingly and intentionally.
And we know from cases such as State v. Weir that the Court of Appeals will -- in the absence of any clear directive from the legislature -- apply the lowest appropriate mental state.
But in this case, the court decided intentionally applied, not knowingly. Why? Because of the nature of the word "refuse." Can you knowingly refuse? Or is any refusal by definition intentional? The court's analysis makes sense: you can knowingly not do something, but to refuse to do something is different and requires something more, something like . . . intent!
What other conduct words, like refuse, would be inconsistent with a lower, if legally viable, mental state? I don't know, but suggestions are welcome.
