Accomplices to Crimes w- Knowing or Reckless Mental States
by: Ryan • January 9, 2011 • no comments
First some background, before we get to the main point of this essay, which is that the state may have to prove something unexpectedly different for an accomplice than they would for a principal.
Here are the statutory definitions of "intentionally" and "knowingly" from ORS 161.085:
"(7) 'Intentionally' or 'with intent,' when used with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense, means that a person acts with a conscious objective to cause the result or to engage in the conduct so described."
"(8) 'Knowingly' or 'with knowledge,' when used with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense, means that a person acts with an awareness that the conduct of the person is of a nature so described or that a circumstance so described exists."
Note that "intentionally" is defined in terms of result or conduct, "knowingly" in terms of conduct or circumstances. These are not hard and fast limitations (see State v. Barnes), but understanding that difference can help explain some of the ways that the case law has evolved.
Secondly, the COA has reaffirmed the idea, entirely consistent with the accomplice statute, that an accomplice, in most cases, must intend every element of the crime of which he is convicted. State v. Lopez-Minjarez. (I won't be getting into the exceptions in this essay.) See also State v. Anlauf.
Third, the Oregon Supreme Court has held that certain crimes are result-oriented, and that it is therefore error to instruct the jury, "intentionally" definition notwithstanding, that they can convict based solely on intended "conduct." State v. Woodman. The jury must find, in those cases, the defendant intended the result.
Now, imagine you represent a client who is accused of encouraging Principal Paul to fight with Victim Victor. Paul threw a punch that broke Victor's jaw. Paul is charged with Assault II (serious physical injury), which has a mental state requirement of "knowingly." He wants to argue that he never knew Victor would be hurt so badly. Unfortunately, as you know from Serious Physical Injury , that's not a defense.
But your client must have intended the Assault II to be guilty of it. And intentionally, when applied to serious physical injury, does require that the defendant intend the serious physical injury. State v. Peacock. That said, Mr. Peacock was the principal in the crime of Assault in the First Degree, not the accomplice in an Assault in the Second Degree, so it's not an open-and-shut case. Still, go back to the definition of intent above, as well as the analyses in Woodman and Lopez-Minjarez, and you will find, I think, that your argument is a strong one.
In our hypothetical, your client has a great argument that he never intended Victor's jaw to get broken, or any comparably serious injury, and there's really no evidence to the contrary. Not guilty of M11.
Next, take this analysis and apply it to any case with a reckless or knowing mental state requirement. If your client is an accomplice, see if the accomplice mental state of "intent" applies to more elements than "knowing" would apply to the principal. If yes, you may have a substantially stronger case, because it's pretty typical that the acts of the principal went beyond anything the accomplice intended.
The next thing to do is to make sure the jury instructions reflect this distinction, especially if the trial is joint one.
