A Judgment of Contempt Is Not A Judgment of Conviction
by: Eblumenthal • August 22, 2012 • no comments
The power to punish contempt is an exercise of a court's inherent authority to enforce its orders and judgments. Frost v. Lotspeich, 175 Or App 163, 174-75(2001). Punishable conduct includes misconduct in the courtroom, obstruction of judicial duties, and disobedience of court orders. See generally ORS 33.015 (defining acts constituting contempt).
There are three types of contempt proceedings: punitive, remedial, and summary. A punitive sanction "is imposed for a completed contempt that can no longer be avoided by belated compliance." State ex rel Hathaway v. Hart, 300 Or 231 235 (1985); see also ORS 33.015 ("'Punitive sanction' means a sanction imposed to punish a past contempt of court." State ex rel Hathaway v Hart). Punitive contempt proceedings have criminal-type procedural requirements. See generally ORS 33.065 to 33.085 (describing procedures in contempt proceedings). Defendants in punitive proceedings have the same rights as defendants in criminal proceedings, with the exception of the right to a jury trial. Punitive contempt sanctions are probably the most common contempt case a criminal lawyer will encounter. They arise in many contexts, including restraining order violations.
A remedial sanction addresses a continuing contempt of court. ORS 33.015(4). A remedial sanction can be avoided once the contemnor complies with the court order. See ORS 33.045 (describing types of sanctions). An example of a remedial sanction would be the court's detention of a witness who refuses to testify under subpoena.
Summary contempt sanctions punish contumacious conduct committed in the immediate presence of the court. For example, it is the contempt power upon which the court relies when dealing with obstreperous trial lawyers, such as in the film, "My Cousin Vinnie."
Because contempt is not a crime, a finding of contempt does not result in a conviction. State v. Reynolds, 239 Or App 313, 316 (2010). When a court finds a person in contempt, a court must enter a "judgment of contempt," not a judgment of conviction. Id. Courts often enter punitive contempt judgments as "unclassified misdemeanors." That is error. A judgment of contempt is not a misdemeanor because it is not a conviction.
When a person is not convicted of a crime or violation, a court may not impose fees that are statutorily attendant to a conviction for a crime or violation. State v. Gile, 161 Or App 146, 155 (1999). Thus, statutory fines, assessments, and penalties ordinarily imposed with entry of a criminal judgment should not be imposed in a contempt judgment. (The state conceded this issue in State v. Quade, (A146266, case pending)). Those include:
- Minimum Fines. ORS 137.286 TA \l "ORS 137.290" \s "ORS 137.290" \c 2 (providing for minimum fines for a "misdemeanor" or "felony."). Those fines replaced unitary assessments, former ORS 137.290, repealed by Or Laws 2011, ch 597, § 118, which applied to "cases of conviction for the commission of a crime or violation." The state conceded the inapplicability of unitary assessments in Quade.
- Restitution. ORS 137.106(1) (authorizing restitution "when a person is convicted of a crime, or a violation").
- Compensatory fines. ORS 137.101 (authorizing compensatory fines "[w]henever the court imposes a fine as a penalty for the commission of a crime").
While there is no case directly on point, a court should not be able to impose the preceding types of penalties in a judgment of contempt. This is not an exhaustive list. Any penalty for which statutory authorization depends on the existence of a criminal proceeding or a person being "convicted" should not apply to a contempt proceeding or a judgment of contempt.
Arguably, a penalty ordinarily imposed pursuant to a "sentence" should not be imposed pursuant to a contempt "sanction." For example, one could argue that contempt sanctions may not be run consecutively. Cf. State ex rel. Huddleston v. Sawyer, 324 Or 597, 615 n 13 (1997) (noting that different limiting principles apply to the court's authority to impose sentences as opposed to contempt sanctions); Or Const, Art I, § 44 ("No law shall limit a court's authority to sentence a criminal defendant consecutively for crimes against different victims") (emphasis added); but see State ex rel. Millard v. Wagy, 99 Or App 274, 278 (1989) (assuming, without deciding, that consecutive sentences authorized for contempt sanctions).
The possibilities for punitive contempt sanctions are provided in ORS 33.015. Absent other specific statutory authorization, the court may impose a fine of not more than $500 or one percent of a defendant's income, forfeiture of profits obtained by the contempt, up to six months' confinement, probation, and community service. ORS 33.105(2). A court may hold contempt proceedings and find a person in contempt for failing to pay fines or restitution imposed upon a criminal conviction. However, in such situations, the potential period of confinement is specially limited by statute. The court may not impose a term of confinement that exceeds "one day for each $25 of the fine or restitution, 30 days if the fine or order of restitution was imposed upon conviction of a violation or misdemeanor, or one year in any other case, whichever is the shorter period." ORS 161.685.
To sum up, a contempt proceeding is a sui generis exercise of a court's inherent authority. Although a punitive contempt proceeding may resemble a criminal proceeding in many respects, it is not a criminal matter, and as a result, criminal-specific penalties should not apply to contemnors.
