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U.S. Supreme Ct - April 21, 2015

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by: Frangieringer • April 21, 2015 • no comments

Fourth Amendment – No de minimis Extension of Traffic Stops Without Reasonable Suspicion

Under the Fourth Amendment, absent reasonable suspicion, police officers may not extend a stop beyond the time needed “to handle the matter for which the stop was made.” Here, an officer stopped the Defendant for driving on the shoulder of a Nebraska highway. The officer cited the Defendant and asked if he could walk his dog around the Defendant’s car. The Defendant said no. The officer then ordered the Defendant out of his car and radioed for a backup officer. After the second officer arrived, the dog was walked around the car twice, alerting on the second pass. “All told, seven or eight minutes had elapsed” since the written warning was given. Because “authority for the seizure . . . ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed,” and the dog sniff was a separate criminal investigation not tied to the traffic stop, the officer unlawfully extended the stop.

Note: the Court did not decide whether the officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The Eighth Circuit did not decide the issue and it was not preserved for argument.

Justice THOMAS, dissenting, argues that there was no Fourth Amendment violation for three reasons:

• First, a dog sniff does not change the character of a lawfully executed stop. Because the stop was “lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner,” no Fourth Amendment violation occurred.

• Second, the majority’s holding upsets the Court’s prior Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. It creates an arbitrary standard where the reasonableness of a traffic stop is dependent on the speed of the officer in investigating the traffic infraction, draws an arbitrary line between “dog sniffs and other common police practices,” such as checking for warrants, that could extend the stop, and “elides” the distinction between traffic stops “initiated based on probable cause” or those based on reasonable suspicion.”

• Lastly, because Justice THOMAS believes that there was reasonable suspicion to engage in a further criminal investigation, the majority’s holding was unnecessary.

Justice ALITO, dissenting, argues that the majority’s holding creates a perverse requirement for officers to act contrary to their safety during a traffic infraction. Instead of being permitted to wait for backup, the majority would have officers conduct a dog sniff while waiting for the results of the records check without the protection of a cover officer. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. ___ (2015).