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U.S. Supreme Court - May 2nd, 2016

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by: Aalvarez • May 3, 2016 • no comments

Federal Conspiracy Law - Participants in the Conspiracy

A defendant may be convicted of conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act where he reached an agreement with the owner of the property in question to obtain that property under color of official right. Here, the government alleged that the defendant, a Baltimore police officer, along with several other members of the police force, participated in a kickback scheme with the owners of a local auto repair shop. When the defendant would report to the scene of a car accident, he would persuade the owners of the damaged cars to have their vehicles towed to the repair shop and in exchange for that service, the officer would receive payments from the shop owners. Ultimately, the defendant was charged with three counts of violating the Hobbs act on the grounds that he extorted money from the shop keepers with their consent and under color of official right. At trial, the defendant sought a jury instruction explaining that the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy was to obtain money or property from some other person who was not a member of the conspiracy. The trial court denied the instruction and the Court of Appeals upheld the conviction.

On review, the Supreme Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals, relying on precedent in Evans v. United States which held that extortion under the Hobbs Act includes the “rough equivalent of what we would describe as ‘taking a bribe.’” Here, the defendant and the shop owners shared a common purpose, namely, that the defendant and other police officers would commit every element of the substantive extortion offense. Defendant and his other officers would obtain property “under color of official right,” by convincing people to bring their cars to the shop owners and in exchange, would obtain that money from another, i.e. the shop owners. Under Evans, because the defendant's actions were the "rough equivalent" of taking a bribe, he could be convicted of conspiracy to violate the Hobbs act.

Justice Breyer concurs in the opinion, noting that he does so because he feels constrained by Evans. Although Justice Breyer believes that Evans may well have been wrongly decided, because the Court was not asked to examine the Evans decision, he concurs in the majority opinion.

Justice Thomas dissents, arguing that Evans was wrongly decided and contending that it is in error to hold that an extortionist can conspire to commit extortion with the person from whom he is extorting.

Lastly, Justice Sotomayor, joined by the Chief Justice, also dissent, arguing that the phrase property “from another” is only intended to apply to property obtain from persons outside of the conspiracy, not persons in the conspiracy, like the shop owners in this case.Ocasio v. United States

Death Penalty - Extreme Delays Between Sentencing and Execution

The Supreme Court denied a petition for cert. in a capital case out of California which alleged that a delay of 32 years between sentencing and the defendant’s scheduled execution violated the 8th Amendment. Justice Breyer, appearing ready to overturn the constitutionality of the death penalty, dissents, arguing that California’s imposition of the death penalty suffers from serious unreliability, arbitrariness in application, and delays that undermine any possible penological purpose of the death penalty. Boyer v. Davis