A Book from the Library of Defense
Namespaces
Variants
Actions

Library Collections

Webinars & Podcasts
Motions
Disclaimer

U.S. Supreme Court - March 30, 2016

From OCDLA Library of Defense
Jump to: navigation, search

by: Aalvarez • March 31, 2016 • no comments

Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel – Pretrial Restraints on Funds

The pretrial restraint of assets needed to retain a defendant’s counsel of choice that are untainted or unconnected to criminal activity violates the Sixth Amendment. Here, a federal statute allows courts to freeze certain assets belonging to the defendant accused of violations of federal health care or banking laws prior to trial. Those assets include “property of equivalent value,” even if those assets are untainted or otherwise unconnected to the criminal activity the defendant is accused of. The Supreme Court holds that this portion of the statute is unconstitutional.

The majority reaches this decision by balancing the government’s interests against the interest of the defendant in using the untainted funds to obtain counsel of her choice. First, although the government has an important interest in ensuring funds remain available throughout the proceedings (for example, to pay restitution to victims at the end of the trial and other governmentally imposed fees), “compared to the right to counsel of choice, these interests would seem to lie somewhat further from the heart of a fair, effective criminal justice system.” Second, legal history and tradition do not support the pretrial forfeiture of untainted assets as the majority could not find any decision “authorizing unfettered, pretrial forfeiture of the defendant’s own ‘innocent’ property—property with no connection to the charged crime.” Lastly, the law unfairly targets factually innocent defendants: “How are defendants whose innocent assets are frozen in cases like these supposed to pay for a lawyer— particularly if they lack “tainted assets” because they are innocent, a class of defendants whom the right to counsel certainly seeks to protect?” Because the law unduly burdens a defendant’s ability to obtain counsel of their choice, it violates the Sixth Amendment.

Justice Thomas concurs with the majority, though he rejects the balancing test used by the majority and instead relies on the historical underpinnings of the Sixth Amendment to justify his conclusion.

Justice Alito and Justice Kennedy dissent, claiming that precedents set in Caplin & Drysdale v. United States and United States v. Monsanto make clear that a “defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to spend forfeitable assets (or assets that will be forfeitable) on an attorney.” Further, Kennedy and Alito argue that the decision incentivizes defendants to spend the fruits of their criminal activities as soon as possible, knowing that they can use their own, untainted money, to hire an attorney.

Lastly, Justice Kagan also dissents, explaining that although she found the Court’s prior decisions in this area to be “troubling,” specifically, the Monsanto case, because the defendant in this case had not asked the Supreme Court to overturn those prior cases, she believed precedent required her to rule in favor of the government. Reversed. Luis v. United States, 578 U.S. ___ (2016)

Apart from its holding, the Luis opinion is interesting for another reason: its discussion of the current state of indigent defense. Here’s the Atlantic’s take on that discussion.