Oregon Supreme Ct - February 19, 2016
by: Aalvarez • February 20, 2016 • no comments
A Defendant's Decision to Provide a False Name During an Unlawful Stop Can Attenuate the Taint of the Unlawful Encounter
Here, the defendant, who was driving his girlfriend's car, was stopped for a traffic violation and gave a false name, because he did not have a license and did not want his girlfriend's car to be towed. He later admitted to police that he gave a false name and was charged with Giving False Information to a Police Officer. Later, during a hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress statements made during the traffic stop, the deputy admitted he could not remember the infraction that caused him to pull the defendant over, and thus the state could not provide a lawful basis for the stop. Although the stop was unlawful, the trial court refused to suppress the defendant's statements and convicted him of Giving False Information to a Police Officer. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress and reversed the defendant's conviction. The state petitioned for review.
On review, the defendant argued that he could not have committed the crime of giving false information to a police officer under ORS 807.620(1) because that statute requires the defendant to provide false information to a police officer “enforcing motor vehicle laws.” Because the traffic stop was unlawful, the defendant reasoned that the officer was not enforcing motor vehicle laws and therefore the defendant’s statements could not have fallen under the statute. The Supreme Court disagreed and held that a person still commits the crime of giving false information when he provides a false name during an unlawful traffic stop.
After examining the text, context, and legislative history of the statute, The Supreme Court explained that the legislature “sought to provide a disincentive against a false name and address to police officers enforcing motor vehicle laws,” and that “[n]othing in the legislative history suggests that the legislature intended that disincentive would apply only if the officer lawfully had stopped a driver for a traffic violation.”
Further, the Court explained that although the deputy’s inability to remember the specific reason for the stop prevented the state from providing a lawful justification for the stop, that lack of memory did not automatically make the stop arbitrary as to require a finding that the officer was not “enforcing motor vehicle laws” at the time defendant made false statements. Although the officer could not remember the reason for the stop, the officer’s testimony that he stopped the defendant for a traffic violation was sufficient for the court to find that the officer was “enforcing motor vehicle laws” at the time of the stop.
Lastly, the court held that a defendant’s decision to provide a false name during an unlawful stop can attenuate the taint of the unlawful stop. Here, although the basis for the stop could not be established, the defendant’s decision to misrepresent himself went beyond the consequences that normally follow a traffic stop and by giving a false name, the defendant did something other than what the deputy asked, and did so for reasons totally unconnected to the officer’s illegality (to avoid having his girlfriend’s car towed). Because the defendant’s choice to commit a new crime was unconnected, other than in a “but for” sense, from the officer’s unlawful stop, it was sufficiently attenuated. The decision by the Court of Appeals is reversed. State v. Suppah, 358 Or. 565 (2016)
A Court Must Consider The Reasonable Foreseeability of Damages in a Restitution Hearing
The Oregon Supreme Court explicitly holds that in order to be recoverable as restitution in a criminal case, damages must be reasonably foreseeable. The general rule in civil actions is that damages are only recoverable if they are reasonably foreseeable. Because the legislature adopted the definition of “economic damages” from civil law and described the required causal connection between a defendant’s criminal activities and the victim’s damages in terms that are used in civil actions, the Supreme Court assumes the legislature intended to apply the traditional civil law concept of reasonable foreseeability to restitution hearings in criminal cases.
Applying that test to the case at hand, the Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s contention that the damages in this case were not “reasonably foreseeable as a matter of law.” Here, the defendant was convicted of arson and theft after she set fire to her restaurant and attempted to collect the insurance proceeds. She was ordered to pay restitution for, among other things, the costs her insurer expended in investigating the arson and her subsequent claim. In rejecting the defendant’s argument that the damages were not reasonably foreseeable, the Court noted that the defendant called the insurance company within a day of the fire to make a claim for insurance benefits and the insurance company hired an attorney to investigate the fire shortly thereafter, as was their common practice. Thus, the damages were reasonably foreseeable given the defendant’s fire setting and subsequent insurance claim.
Moreover, the court rejects the idea that “economic damages” as used in ORS 137.106 does not encompass attorney fees and litigation costs that a victim incurs in a criminal proceeding. Although the “American Rule” in civil proceedings generally forbids the collection of attorneys fees and costs as “economic damages,” that rule, even if the Supreme Court chose to apply it in the context of restitution, does not apply to the fees requested here:
"The fees that Oregon Mutual incurred in employing Smith Freed to investigate defendant’s claim for benefits were not fees that Oregon Mutual paid to have an attorney represent it in litigation against defendant; they were expenses that Oregon Mutual incurred because defendant filed a claim for benefits and Oregon Mutual had to decide whether to pay that claim. The American Rule would not bar the recovery of those attorney fees and non-attorney investigative costs." Affirmed. State v. Ramos, 358 Or. 581 (2016)
A Victim May Recover Lost Wages as Restitution When Subpoenaed to Trial and an Accompanying Restitution Hearing
A victim who is subpoenaed to appear at trial and an accompanying restitution hearing may recover lost wages caused by those appearances. Although, the “American Rule” generally bars civil litigants from collecting such costs in a civil proceeding, the rationale of the rule does not apply in a criminal case where the victim lost wages because he was subpoenaed to testify by the state and thus required to attend in order to represent his interest.
Although the Court upheld the award of lost wages in this case, it made very clear that lost wages are not always recoverable. The Court stated:
"It is important to remember, however, that even in the circumstance in which a victim’s costs are incurred in the underlying criminal prosecution or in the victim’s role as subpoenaed witness in the restitution hearing, a court may not award a victim’s costs as “economic damages” unless the state also establishes that those costs “resulted from” a defendant’s criminal activity and were reasonably foresee- able. In this case, defendant did not preserve an argument that the state failed to prove those facts, and we conclude that the trial court did not err in awarding the victim’s wages as restitution under ORS 137.106." Affirmed. State v. Kirschner, 358 Or. 605, (2016)
