Oregon Supreme Ct. - Oct. 30, 2014
by: Frangieringer and Abassos • October 30, 2014 • no comments
Miranda – Improper Interrogations Do Not Infect Statements From Later, Distinct Interrogations
Improper interrogations do not invalidate statements obtained in subsequent, defendant-initiated interrogations that are temporally distinct and qualitatively different from the prior, illegal interrogations. Here, Defendant was subject to four interrogations in the span of eight hours. In the first and second interrogations, detectives improperly questioned defendant after invocation leading to statements concerning defendant’s limited abuse of decedent. The statements obtained during the third and fourth interrogations were admissible because 1) they were not obtained through threat or promise, 2) defendant was mirandized before any statements were obtained, 3) defendant initiated the third interrogation 30 minutes after the second interrogation, 4) defendant was read her Miranda warnings again before beginning the fourth interrogation, and 5) the statements obtained were “qualitatively different” from those obtained by the detectives in the first and second interrogations. Taking all of these factors into consideration, police ignoring the invocation in the first interrogation did not render defendant’s subsequent statements in her third and fourth interrogations involuntary. State v. McAnulty, 356 Or 432 (2014)
Jury Selection – Enumerating Reasons Why Jurors Are Not Death Penalty Qualified
Jurors may be excused from a death qualified jury for 1) lack of understanding and inability to make sentencing decisions, 2) voting against the death penalty in the absence of specific evidence, 3) expressing strong opinions against the death penalty, 4) when defense counsel fails to objects sua sponte excusal of a juror. Here, one juror stated that she was unsure whether she could make the sentencing decisions required of her. A second believed he couldn’t vote for death if no evidence was presented why defendant killed decedent. A third spoke out strongly against the death penalty, and a fourth where court, of its own accord, excused without objection a juror who stated that he could never take a life. State v. McAnulty, 356 Or 432 (2014)
Dangerous Offender – Brutality Of Actions Against One Victim Is Enough To Be A Danger To Society
A victim class of one does not limit an assessment of future dangerousness. Here, there was sufficient evidence that defendant would “target, control” and cause other acts of violence in the community after defendant had targeted and isolated her daughter “over an extensive period of time coupled with numerous acts of brutal violence.” The brutality of defendant’s conduct was sufficient to draw an inference beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant would be a danger to others. State v. McAnulty, 356 Or 432 (2014)
Jury Instruction – Mercy Alone Is Not Sufficient To Impose Life
Jury instruction stating that mercy alone is sufficient to support life imprisonment would incorrectly inform the jury that it could base its verdict on “mercy alone” without contemplating other evidence in the case. Trial court did not err in not giving one of defendant’s three mercy instructions. State v. McAnulty, 356 Or 432 (2014)
Murder By Abuse – ORS 163.115(1)(c) does not create mutually exclusive categories based on age
ORS 163.115(1)(c), stating when criminal homicide constitutes murder by abuse, does not preclude “murder by abuse of children between the ages of 15 and 18.” Here, decedent was 15. Because the statute does not make children “under 14 years of age,” a mutually exclusive category from people who are dependent through “age or physical or mental disability,” the statute did not preclude classifying the killing of a fifteen year old as murder by abuse. State v. McAnulty, 356 Or 432 (2014)
