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Oregon Supreme Court 12-30-11

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by: Abassos • December 29, 2011 • no comments

Read the full article for details about the following new cases:

  • Felon In Possession - No Mental State for Felony Status

No mental state is required for the element of being a felon in the crime of felon in possession of a firearm. In this case, defendant was told by the judge that his felony would be reduced to a misdemeanor as soon as he successfully completed probation. Defendant successfully completed probation so he assumed that his felony was a misdemeanor. The Supreme Court rules today that his mistaken belief is not a defense. State v. Rainoldi

That's the ruling to take away from today's case but it's worth going through the analysis because figuring out what elements have mental states is a notoriously confusing endeavor. The analysis starts with ORS 161.095(2), which says that, except as provided in ORS 161.105, the state is required to prove a mental state for "each material element of the offense that necessarily requires a culpable mental state". This circular sentence has been the subject of much ridicule over the years. But, for today's case, it doesn't matter because felon in possession falls into the ORS 161.095(2) exception for crimes outside the criminal code. Felon in possession isn't part of the criminal code, despite the fact that it can be found in your blue statute book labeled "Criminal Code", because ORS 161.005 sets forth a specific list of statutes that comprise what"may be cited as the Oregon Criminal Code of 1971?. Felon in possession isn't in that list.

The mental state analysis for non-criminal code crimes is as follows:

  1. Figure out whether the legislature clearly indicated its intent to dispense with a mental state for the element in question. If yes, then that's the end of the story.
  2. If such clarity is lacking, then go back to ORS 161.095(2), the circular, ridiculed statute above.

The analysis for figuring out whether the legislature clearly intended to dispense with a mental state is as follows:

  1. Look at the text of the statute. For felon in possession, the statute is silent as to mental states. Silence is not dispositive but it cuts against there being a mental state.
  2. Does the element address the defendant's conduct or does it address either the defendant's status or an attendant circumstance. For FIP, the defendant's status as a felon again cuts against there being a mental state.
  3. Does the legislative history clarify the situation? For FIP, there are no statements from Oregon legislators. But there is a significant historical knowledge from the nationwide movement toward these laws as well as the California and national laws on which Oregon's was based. The historical documents and statements indicate that the clear purpose was to deny felons firearms because felons pose a risk to the public. That risk exists regardless of whether the felon knows of his or her felon status. Thus, again, this prong cuts against there being a mental state element.
  4. Would requiring a mental state frustrate the purpose of the statute? Requiring a mental state for felonious status would frustrate the purpose of the statute because it's unrelated to the risk, creating more of a burden to the state than is appropriate for the purpose of the crime.

So there you go. All four prongs cut against the defense in this case. Thus, not surprisingly, the court finds that the legislature clearly intended to dispense with a mental state for the element of felony status. See Mental States and Elements for more analysis of today's case.