Oregon Supreme Court 03-10-11
by: Grapkoch • March 9, 2011 • no comments
Read the full article for details about the following new cases:
- Evidence: Intent/Motive vs. Character Under OEC 404(3)
- Plea Agreements: Legal Test for Determining their Existence and Terms
- Grand Jury: Resubmitting Charges and ORS 132.430(2)
- Pre-indictment Delay and Due Process
The Supreme Court offers up substantive analysis and some significant legal standards in today's opinions. At issue are the following: (1) other-crimes evidence under OEC 404; (2) the legal standards governing the interpretation of plea agreements; (3) the requisite findings for authorizing resubmission of charges to the grand jury; and (4) the standard for analyzing pre-indictment delay under the Fourteenth Amendment. Note that issues (3) and (4) are from the same case-State v. Stokes-but have been separated below for ease of analysis.
Contents |
Evidence: Intent/Motive vs. Character Under OEC 404(3)
This is a state's direct appeal. In connection with a prosecution for a 1988 murder, the state sought to introduce statements made regarding defendant's 1990 conviction for attempted murder in which defendant stated that the act was "part of a plan to rob [the 1990 victim] of drugs that he believed she was holding in her residence." On the state's theory, these statements fell under OEC 404(3) and were "admissible to prove that defendant's motive and intent had been to burglarize [the 1988 victim's] residence and rob her." The trial court disagreed.
The Court applies distinct tests for intent and motive: (1) For intent, it uses the six-factor test for other-crimes evidence articulated in State v. Johns; (2) For motive, it uses the the three-part test for motive articulated in State v. Hampton and State v. Johnson. Nevertheless, the Court notes that "[u]nder both the Johns test for intent and the Hampton test for motive, it remains the rule that, to be admissible, other crimes evidence must be relevant for a noncharacter purpose."
In its analysis, the Court focuses on the fourth and fifth prongs of Johns: "the similarity between the acts perpetrated in each crime and their physical elements." Specifically, the Court explains that the circumstances surrounding the 1988 murder (victim was strangled, stabbed and sexually assaulted, with no evidence of burglary or drug dealing) bear no relation to the circumstances surrounding the 1990 attempted murder (defendant hit victim with dumbbell and stole her purse). This same reasoning, the Court continues, applies just as forcefully to the Hampton test for motive. Therefore, they fail the test of logical relevance and are impermissible character evidence. Affirmed.[http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/S058620.htm State v. Garrett]
Plea Agreements: Legal Test for Determining their Existence and Terms
The defendant and prosecution entered a purported plea agreement that allowed them each to seek presumptive sentences and upward departures, respectively. At sentencing, defendant objected to one of the prosecution's proffered departures due to inadequate notice. The trial court denied that objection, but went on to rule that no plea agreement existed because there was no "meeting of the minds" on the issue of sentencing. Defendant's pleas were mandatorily withdrawn and a conviction was obtained via jury trial.
In beginning its analysis, the Supreme Court rejects the legal test as applied by the trial court. In an effort to clarify the issue on appeal, the Court notes that
"the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in determining whether there had been a 'meeting of the minds' with respect to the plea agreement. Contrary to the trial court's understanding, the 'meeting of the minds' of the parties requires an examination of the objective representations of the parties, not their subjective or unspoken intents."
The Court goes on to note, however, that while "contract law generally (but not invariably) controls" the terms of plea agreements, it is neither "the beginning or the end of the analysis." With the test framed, the Court concludes that the case before it is an easy one. "In this case, the only real issue was a simple question of contract interpretation: Did the plea agreement allow defendant to challenge the timeliness of the notice?" It did. Reversed and remanded.[http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/S058335.htm State v. Heisser]
Grand Jury: Resubmitting Charges and ORS 132.430(2)
In 1996 a grand jury refused to indict defendant on several charges. Because defendant was convicted on different offenses in California, the prosecution discontinued its pursuit of the charges. However, when defendant's CA conviction was overturned eight years later, the state resubmitted the charges to the grand jury and obtained an indictment. Defendant challenged the district court's finding under § 132.430(2) that resubmission of those charges was "in the interests of justice."
The Court reaffirms the "interests of justice" standard for § 132.430(2), but clarifies its ambit by noting that it "is an inquiry guided by factors such as whether resubmission would be an abuse of the grand jury process or would serve the public interest in bringing a criminal to justice." In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion because it relied on, among other things, a prosecutorial affidavit outlining significant new evidence that had come to light subsequent to the grand jury's first dismissal. Affirmed.[http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/S057751.htm State v. Stokes]
Pre-indictment Delay and Due Process
Next, the Court addressed Mr. Stokes' second contention that the eight year delay between efforts to indict him was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of Due Process. At the outset, the Court is forced to choose between competing alternatives in establishing the legal standard for pre-indictment delay. Rejecting the state's suggestion (and majority position) that pre-indictment delay Due Process concerns require "intentional, tactical delay," the Court adopts the following minority position:
"To demonstrate that preindictment delay violated the federal Due Process Clause, a defendant must show that the delay actually prejudiced the defendant and that the government culpably caused the delay. A court must weigh the government's reason for the delay against the prejudice to determine whether the delay violated our society's fundamental conceptions of justice, fair play, and decency."
In doing so, the Court explicitly leaves open the "possibility that prejudicial preindictment delay may violate the Due Process Clause, based on the circumstances of the case, where the government culpably caused that delay, although not for a tactical advantage."
Nevertheless, the Court concludes that defendant failed to demonstrate the requisite showing of "substantial, actual prejudice." Although defendant opined that some degree of speculation needed to be accounted for in any Due Process prejudice inquiry, the Supreme Court disagrees:
"Under Marion, the possibility for prejudice inherent in any delay is the province of the statute of limitations; due process is concerned only with actual prejudicial delay .The burden to demonstrate actual prejudice is properly placed on defendant here, because he was prosecuted within the statute of limitations."
