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Oregon Appellate Court 05-12-11

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by: Abassos • May 11, 2011 • no comments

Read the full article for details about the following new cases:

  • Private Indecency - Jails - Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
  • Endangering the Welfare of a Minor - "Permit" a Child to be Present


Private Indecency - Jails - Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

Defendant, an inmate being held at the Washington County "Old Jail" before court, committed private indecency when he masturbated in view of a female inmate sitting in a chair across from his cell. She had a reasonable expectation of privacy because the private indecency statute defines "reasonable expectation of privacy" to include "working areas". It's not clear what parts of a traditional jail would be a "working area" but this particular area is open to court staff, judges and other court personnel and includes offices for staff and the work in lieu of jail program. It is a working area within the court's definition: a open space or bounded section set aside for work. The court gives short shrift to defendant's argument that "reasonable expectation of privacy" is obviously taken from constitutional law and under neither the Oregon nor the U.S. Constitution does an inmate have a reasonable expectation of privacy. The court finds that the specific statutory definition overrides the impliedly imported rule from Con Law. Affirmed. State v. Miller

Endangering the Welfare of a Minor - "Permit" a Child to be Present

Defendant was the roommate of a guy who owned a house and the occasional babysitter for his 15 year old kid. Defendant and the guy were also growing marijuana together in the house. The court finds that a reasonable trier of fact could find that because defendant had the authority to look after the house and the child while the homeowner was gone, defendant also had the authority to "permit" the child to be present. The court specifically concludes that:

the legislature intended the word "permit" in ORS 163.575(1)(b) to have a broad rather than narrow meaning and, therefore, to apply to people who have authority over a minor or a place and who, because of their exercise of that authority, make it possible for a minor to be exposed to unlawful drug activity. In other words, and contrary to defendant's position, the statute extends to a person, such as defendant, who has been given authority over a minor or premises and who accepts that authority knowing that it involves allowing a minor to be in a place where unlawful drug activity is occurring.

State v. McBride