Blog:Case Reviews/U.S. Supreme Court 06-16-11 - Revision history

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''Read the full article for details about the following new cases:''
* The Prohibition on Imprisonment as a Means of Promoting Rehabilitation

According to SCOTUSblog,'' Tapia v. United States'' held that 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) does not '''permit '''a sentencing court to impose or lengthen a prison term to foster a defendant's rehabilitation. That was the issue on which cert. was granted, but the Court's opinion actually states the proposition in somewhat different terms: "We consider here whether the Sentencing Reform Act '''precludes '''federal courts from imposing or lengthening a prison term in order to promote a criminal defendant's rehabilitation. We hold that it does." (Emphasis added).

Looking to the opinion, Tapia had argued that § 3582(a) instructs sentencing courts to "recogniz[e] that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation." That argument, notes the Court, also stems in part from the SRA's dictate to the Sentencing Commission that it "'insure that the guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant or providing the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.' 28 U.S.C. § 994(k)."
.
After running through the history, text and structure of the SRA, the Court is tasked with determining whether the exclusion of rehabilitation from § 3582(a)'s "recognition" format amounts to a "prohibition" as Tapia suggests. And, despite'' amicus's ''contentions to the contrary, the Court concludes that it does:

<blockquote>

''"we do not see how these alternative meanings of "recognize" help amicus's cause. A judge who "perceives clearly" that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting rehabilitation would hardly incarcerate someone for that purpose. Ditto for a judge who "realizes" or "recalls" that imprisonment is not a way to rehabilitate an offender. To be sure, the drafters of the "recognizing" clause could have used still more commanding language: Congress could have inserted a "thou shalt not" or equivalent phrase to convey that a sentencing judge may never, ever, under any circumstances consider rehabilitation in imposing a prison term. But when we interpret a statute, we cannot allow the perfect to be the enemy of the merely excellent. Congress expressed itself clearly in §3582(a), even if armchair legislators might come up with something even better. And what Congress said was that when sentencing an offender to prison, the court shall consider all the purposes of punishment except rehabilitation-because imprisonment is not an appropriate means of pursuing that goal."''

</blockquote>

Furthermore, the Court also rejects ''amicus's'' position that even if the prohibition applies, it applies only to the imposition rather than the lengthening of a sentence. As a textual matter, the Court notes, "the word 'imprisonment' does not change the function of the 'recognizing' clause-to constrain a sentencing court's decision both to impose and to lengthen a prison term." And "[t]he context of §3582(a) puts an exclamation point on this textual conclusion.Each actor at each stage in the sentencing process receives the same message: Do not think about prison as a way to rehabilitate an offender."

And the Court does not stop there, it continues to run through the statutory silence and legislative history supporting its conclusion. In short, "this is a case in which text, context, and history point to the same bottom line: Section 3582(a) precludes sentencing courts from imposing or lengthening a prison term to promote an offender's rehabilitation."

A concurring opinion by Justice Sotomayor (joined by Justice Alito!) follows the majority. More information on ''Tapia v. United States ''can be found at the SCOTUSblog case page, [http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/tapia-v-united-states?wpmp_switcher=desktop available here].

[http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/10-5400.pdf ''Tapia v. United States'']

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 ''Read the full article for details about the following new cases:''
-* Age a Relevant Factor in Miranda's "Custody" Analysis
+* Exclusion and Good Faith Reliance on Circuit Court Precedent
-This morning, the Court recognized that "[i]t is beyond dispute that children will often feel bound to submit to police questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would feel free to leave." Therefore, the Court announces, "[s]eeing no reason for police officers or courts to blind themselves to that commonsense reality, we hold that a child's age properly informs the ''Miranda ''custody analysis."
+This morning, the Court announced its decision on whether to apply the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule when police conduct a search in compliance with binding precedent that is later overruled. In refusing to do so, the Court explained that "[b]ecause suppression would do nothing to deter police misconduct in these circumstances, and because it would come at a high cost to both the truth and the public safety, we hold that searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule."
-Rejecting the government's argument "that a child's age has no place in the [objective] custody analysis," the Court announces that "[a] child's age is far 'more than a chronological fact'.It is a fact that 'generates commonsense conclusions about behavior and perception.'" And, after citing common sense to appropriately marginalize the government's position, the Court adds further insult by noting that "[a]lthough citation to social science and cognitive science authorities is unnecessary to establish these commonsense propositions, the literature confirms what experience bears out."
+In arriving at this conclusion, the majority explicitly rejects the proposition that the exclusionary rule is "a self-executing mandate implicit in the FourthAmendment itself." Instead, the Court reiterates the need to engage in "a more rigorous weighing" of "costs and deterrence benefits" of the rule, with a particularly sharp eye towards "the 'flagrancy of the police misconduct' at issue." Under this test, "[p]olice practices trigger the harsh sanction of exclusion only when they are deliberate enough to yield 'meaningful' deterrence, and culpable enough to be 'worth the price paid by the justice system.'"
-Furthermore, the Court reasons, because the law, common experience, and social science all "exhibit the settled understanding that the differentiating characteristics of youth are universal,.[s]o long as the child's age was known to the officer at the time of the interview, or would have been objectively apparent to any reasonable officer, including age as part of the custody analysis requires officers neither to consider circumstances 'unknowable' to them,nor to 'anticipate the frailties or idiosyncrasies' of the particular suspect whom they question."
+Applying the foregoing test, the Court notes that because the appellate precedent at issue here actually authorized a certain police practice, "all agree that the officers' conduct [at issue here] was in strict compliance with then-binding Circuit law and was not culpable in any way." In fact, the "officers who conducted the search did not violate Davis's Fourth Amendment rights deliberately, recklessly, or with gross negligence.Nor does this case involve any 'recurring or systemic negligence' on the part of law enforcement.The police acted instrict compliance with binding Circuit precedent." (Citations omitted). Therefore, there was no basis for concluding that the deterrent value of the rule exceeded its social costs.
-There are dissents that are worth reading, but one final point by the majority is all that I will highlight in this summary. In part of its assault on the majority conclusion, the dissent argues that the Due Process voluntariness test is sufficient to account for the risk that a child's statements will be involuntary. The majority rejects this argument by stating that, "[t]o be sure, that test permits consideration of a child's age, and it erects its own barrier to admission of a defendant's inculpatory statements at trial.But ''Miranda's'' procedural safeguards exist precisely because the voluntariness test is an inadequate barrier when custodial interrogation is at stake." Score a point for the continuing validity of ''Miranda''.
+Along the way to this conclusion, the Court rejects two very notable arguments (both were advocated by Davis and adopted by the dissent):
-Finally (and on a side note), I don't practice much juvenile law, but this opinion appears to be rife with both authority and precedent recognizing the unique role cognitive development/age play in assessing social interactions-particularly in the criminal justice system. In light of that, it actually presents an opinion that probably should prompt most lawyers to do more than just skim it for its holding.
+# The Court rejects the proposition that this is a retroactivity case governed by the principles in ''Griffith v. Kentucky'', 479 U.S. 314 (1987), by arguing that this is a question of "remedy" and not "retroactivity."
-More information on ''JDB v. North Carolina ''can be found at the SCOTUSblog case page, [http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/j-d-b-v-north-carolina?wpmp_switcher=desktop available here].
+More information on ''Davis v. United States'' can be found at the SCOTUSblog case page, [http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/Davis_v._United_States?wpmp_switcher=desktop available here].
-[http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-11121.pdf ''JDB v. North Carolina'']
+[http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-11328.pdf ''Davis v. United States'']
 {{wl-publish: 2011-06-15 21:00:00 -0700 | grapkoch }}

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 ''Read the full article for details about the following new cases:''
-* Using the 10th Amendment as a Defense to Federal Crimes
+* Age a Relevant Factor in Miranda's "Custody" Analysis
-Constitutional nerds should love this opinion. ''Bond'' asked whether a criminal defendant convicted under a federal statute has standing to challenge her conviction on grounds that, as applied to her, the statute is beyond the federal government's enumerated powers and inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment. AWESOME. And, even more awesomely, the Court gives a unanimous yes.
+This morning, the Court recognized that "[i]t is beyond dispute that children will often feel bound to submit to police questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would feel free to leave." Therefore, the Court announces, "[s]eeing no reason for police officers or courts to blind themselves to that commonsense reality, we hold that a child's age properly informs the ''Miranda ''custody analysis."
-While most of its decision is devoted to gutting ''Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA'', 306 U.S. 118 (1939), the Court also explicitly addresses, and rejects, the argument that Tenth Amendment rights are only enforceable by the states themselves:
+Rejecting the government's argument "that a child's age has no place in the [objective] custody analysis," the Court announces that "[a] child's age is far 'more than a chronological fact'.It is a fact that 'generates commonsense conclusions about behavior and perception.'" And, after citing common sense to appropriately marginalize the government's position, the Court adds further insult by noting that "[a]lthough citation to social science and cognitive science authorities is unnecessary to establish these commonsense propositions, the literature confirms what experience bears out."
-<blockquote>
+Furthermore, the Court reasons, because the law, common experience, and social science all "exhibit the settled understanding that the differentiating characteristics of youth are universal,.[s]o long as the child's age was known to the officer at the time of the interview, or would have been objectively apparent to any reasonable officer, including age as part of the custody analysis requires officers neither to consider circumstances 'unknowable' to them,nor to 'anticipate the frailties or idiosyncrasies' of the particular suspect whom they question."
-''In amicus' view, to argue that the National Government has interfered with state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment is to assert the legal rights and interests of States and States alone. That, however, is not so. As explained below, Bond seeks to vindicate her own constitutional interests. The individual, in a proper case, can assert injury from governmental action taken in excess of the authority that federalism defines. Her rights in this regard do not belong to a State.''
+There are dissents that are worth reading, but one final point by the majority is all that I will highlight in this summary. In part of its assault on the majority conclusion, the dissent argues that the Due Process voluntariness test is sufficient to account for the risk that a child's statements will be involuntary. The majority rejects this argument by stating that, "[t]o be sure, that test permits consideration of a child's age, and it erects its own barrier to admission of a defendant's inculpatory statements at trial.But ''Miranda's'' procedural safeguards exist precisely because the voluntariness test is an inadequate barrier when custodial interrogation is at stake." Score a point for the continuing validity of ''Miranda''.
-</blockquote>
+Finally (and on a side note), I don't practice much juvenile law, but this opinion appears to be rife with both authority and precedent recognizing the unique role cognitive development/age play in assessing social interactions-particularly in the criminal justice system. In light of that, it actually presents an opinion that probably should prompt most lawyers to do more than just skim it for its holding.
-Contrary to ''amicus''' position, Justice Kennedy chastises, there are robust reasons for guaranteeing Bond the opportunity to personally challenge the legitimacy of federal laws under the auspices of federalism:
+More information on ''JDB v. North Carolina ''can be found at the SCOTUSblog case page, [http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/j-d-b-v-north-carolina?wpmp_switcher=desktop available here].
-<blockquote>
+[http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-11121.pdf ''JDB v. North Carolina'']
-−
-''Federalism is more than an exercise in setting the boundary between different institutions of government for their own integrity.Federalism also protects the liberty of all persons within a State by ensuring that laws enacted in excess of delegated governmental power cannot direct or control their actions.The limitations that federalism entails are not therefore a matter of rights belonging only to the States. States are not the sole intended beneficiaries of federalism.''
-−
-</blockquote>
-−
-Importantly, this individual right extends beyond the authority to argue that Congress exceeded its enumerated powers. Criminal defendants also have the right to challenge a Congressional act on the ground that it "interferes with a specific aspect of state sovereignty." This is so because "[t]here is no basis to support the Government's proposed distinction between different federalism arguments for purposes of prudential standing rules. The principles of limited national powers and state sovereignty are intertwined. While neither originates in the Tenth Amendment, both are expressed by it."
-−
-A concurring opinion by Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justice Breyer) follows the majority. More information on ''Bond v. United States'' can be found at the SCOTUSblog case page, [http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/bond-v-united-states?wpmp_switcher=desktop available here].
-−
-[http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-1227.pdf ''Bond v. United States'']
 {{wl-publish: 2011-06-15 21:00:00 -0700 | grapkoch }}

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 ''Read the full article for details about the following new cases:''
-* Age a Relevant Factor in Miranda's "Custody" Analysis
+* Exclusion and Good Faith Reliance on Circuit Court Precedent
-This morning, the Court recognized that "[i]t is beyond dispute that children will often feel bound to submit to police questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would feel free to leave." Therefore, the Court announces, "[s]eeing no reason for police officers or courts to blind themselves to that commonsense reality, we hold that a child's age properly informs the ''Miranda ''custody analysis."
+This morning, the Court announced its decision on whether to apply the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule when police conduct a search in compliance with binding precedent that is later overruled. In refusing to do so, the Court explained that "[b]ecause suppression would do nothing to deter police misconduct in these circumstances, and because it would come at a high cost to both the truth and the public safety, we hold that searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule."
-Rejecting the government's argument "that a child's age has no place in the [objective] custody analysis," the Court announces that "[a] child's age is far 'more than a chronological fact'.It is a fact that 'generates commonsense conclusions about behavior and perception.'" And, after citing common sense to appropriately marginalize the government's position, the Court adds further insult by noting that "[a]lthough citation to social science and cognitive science authorities is unnecessary to establish these commonsense propositions, the literature confirms what experience bears out."
+In arriving at this conclusion, the majority explicitly rejects the proposition that the exclusionary rule is "a self-executing mandate implicit in the FourthAmendment itself." Instead, the Court reiterates the need to engage in "a more rigorous weighing" of "costs and deterrence benefits" of the rule, with a particularly sharp eye towards "the 'flagrancy of the police misconduct' at issue." Under this test, "[p]olice practices trigger the harsh sanction of exclusion only when they are deliberate enough to yield 'meaningful' deterrence, and culpable enough to be 'worth the price paid by the justice system.'"
-Furthermore, the Court reasons, because the law, common experience, and social science all "exhibit the settled understanding that the differentiating characteristics of youth are universal,.[s]o long as the child's age was known to the officer at the time of the interview, or would have been objectively apparent to any reasonable officer, including age as part of the custody analysis requires officers neither to consider circumstances 'unknowable' to them,nor to 'anticipate the frailties or idiosyncrasies' of the particular suspect whom they question."
+Applying the foregoing test, the Court notes that because the appellate precedent at issue here actually authorized a certain police practice, "all agree that the officers' conduct [at issue here] was in strict compliance with then-binding Circuit law and was not culpable in any way." In fact, the "officers who conducted the search did not violate Davis's Fourth Amendment rights deliberately, recklessly, or with gross negligence.Nor does this case involve any 'recurring or systemic negligence' on the part of law enforcement.The police acted instrict compliance with binding Circuit precedent." (Citations omitted). Therefore, there was no basis for concluding that the deterrent value of the rule exceeded its social costs.
-There are dissents that are worth reading, but one final point by the majority is all that I will highlight in this summary. In part of its assault on the majority conclusion, the dissent argues that the Due Process voluntariness test is sufficient to account for the risk that a child's statements will be involuntary. The majority rejects this argument by stating that, "[t]o be sure, that test permits consideration of a child's age, and it erects its own barrier to admission of a defendant's inculpatory statements at trial.But ''Miranda's'' procedural safeguards exist precisely because the voluntariness test is an inadequate barrier when custodial interrogation is at stake." Score a point for the continuing validity of ''Miranda''.
+Along the way to this conclusion, the Court rejects two very notable arguments (both were advocated by Davis and adopted by the dissent):
-Finally (and on a side note), I don't practice much juvenile law, but this opinion appears to be rife with both authority and precedent recognizing the unique role cognitive development/age play in assessing social interactions-particularly in the criminal justice system. In light of that, it actually presents an opinion that probably should prompt most lawyers to do more than just skim it for its holding.
+# The Court rejects the proposition that this is a retroactivity case governed by the principles in ''Griffith v. Kentucky'', 479 U.S. 314 (1987), by arguing that this is a question of "remedy" and not "retroactivity."
-More information on ''JDB v. North Carolina ''can be found at the SCOTUSblog case page, [http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/j-d-b-v-north-carolina?wpmp_switcher=desktop available here].
+More information on ''Davis v. United States'' can be found at the SCOTUSblog case page, [http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/Davis_v._United_States?wpmp_switcher=desktop available here].
-[http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-11121.pdf ''JDB v. North Carolina'']
+[http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-11328.pdf ''Davis v. United States'']
 {{wl-publish: 2011-06-15 21:00:00 -0700 | grapkoch }}

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 ''Read the full article for details about the following new cases:''
-* Using the 10th Amendment as a Defense to Federal Crimes
+* Age a Relevant Factor in Miranda's "Custody" Analysis
-Constitutional nerds should love this opinion. ''Bond'' asked whether a criminal defendant convicted under a federal statute has standing to challenge her conviction on grounds that, as applied to her, the statute is beyond the federal government's enumerated powers and inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment. AWESOME. And, even more awesomely, the Court gives a unanimous yes.
+This morning, the Court recognized that "[i]t is beyond dispute that children will often feel bound to submit to police questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would feel free to leave." Therefore, the Court announces, "[s]eeing no reason for police officers or courts to blind themselves to that commonsense reality, we hold that a child's age properly informs the ''Miranda ''custody analysis."
-While most of its decision is devoted to gutting ''Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA'', 306 U.S. 118 (1939), the Court also explicitly addresses, and rejects, the argument that Tenth Amendment rights are only enforceable by the states themselves:
+Rejecting the government's argument "that a child's age has no place in the [objective] custody analysis," the Court announces that "[a] child's age is far 'more than a chronological fact'.It is a fact that 'generates commonsense conclusions about behavior and perception.'" And, after citing common sense to appropriately marginalize the government's position, the Court adds further insult by noting that "[a]lthough citation to social science and cognitive science authorities is unnecessary to establish these commonsense propositions, the literature confirms what experience bears out."
-<blockquote>
+Furthermore, the Court reasons, because the law, common experience, and social science all "exhibit the settled understanding that the differentiating characteristics of youth are universal,.[s]o long as the child's age was known to the officer at the time of the interview, or would have been objectively apparent to any reasonable officer, including age as part of the custody analysis requires officers neither to consider circumstances 'unknowable' to them,nor to 'anticipate the frailties or idiosyncrasies' of the particular suspect whom they question."
-''In amicus' view, to argue that the National Government has interfered with state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment is to assert the legal rights and interests of States and States alone. That, however, is not so. As explained below, Bond seeks to vindicate her own constitutional interests. The individual, in a proper case, can assert injury from governmental action taken in excess of the authority that federalism defines. Her rights in this regard do not belong to a State.''
+There are dissents that are worth reading, but one final point by the majority is all that I will highlight in this summary. In part of its assault on the majority conclusion, the dissent argues that the Due Process voluntariness test is sufficient to account for the risk that a child's statements will be involuntary. The majority rejects this argument by stating that, "[t]o be sure, that test permits consideration of a child's age, and it erects its own barrier to admission of a defendant's inculpatory statements at trial.But ''Miranda's'' procedural safeguards exist precisely because the voluntariness test is an inadequate barrier when custodial interrogation is at stake." Score a point for the continuing validity of ''Miranda''.
-</blockquote>
+Finally (and on a side note), I don't practice much juvenile law, but this opinion appears to be rife with both authority and precedent recognizing the unique role cognitive development/age play in assessing social interactions-particularly in the criminal justice system. In light of that, it actually presents an opinion that probably should prompt most lawyers to do more than just skim it for its holding.
-Contrary to ''amicus''' position, Justice Kennedy chastises, there are robust reasons for guaranteeing Bond the opportunity to personally challenge the legitimacy of federal laws under the auspices of federalism:
+More information on ''JDB v. North Carolina ''can be found at the SCOTUSblog case page, [http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/j-d-b-v-north-carolina?wpmp_switcher=desktop available here].
-<blockquote>
+[http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-11121.pdf ''JDB v. North Carolina'']
-−
-''Federalism is more than an exercise in setting the boundary between different institutions of government for their own integrity.Federalism also protects the liberty of all persons within a State by ensuring that laws enacted in excess of delegated governmental power cannot direct or control their actions.The limitations that federalism entails are not therefore a matter of rights belonging only to the States. States are not the sole intended beneficiaries of federalism.''
-−
-</blockquote>
-−
-Importantly, this individual right extends beyond the authority to argue that Congress exceeded its enumerated powers. Criminal defendants also have the right to challenge a Congressional act on the ground that it "interferes with a specific aspect of state sovereignty." This is so because "[t]here is no basis to support the Government's proposed distinction between different federalism arguments for purposes of prudential standing rules. The principles of limited national powers and state sovereignty are intertwined. While neither originates in the Tenth Amendment, both are expressed by it."
-−
-A concurring opinion by Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justice Breyer) follows the majority. More information on ''Bond v. United States'' can be found at the SCOTUSblog case page, [http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/bond-v-united-states?wpmp_switcher=desktop available here].
-−
-[http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-1227.pdf ''Bond v. United States'']
 {{wl-publish: 2011-06-15 21:00:00 -0700 | grapkoch }}